FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf] • Hacker News Board

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#71

Post by officeplant » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:16 PM UTC

makeworld wrote: post #39

georgyo wrote: post #6

It says Telegram has no message content. Isn't telegram not E2EE by default, instead required explicit steps to make a conversation encrypted? Either way looks like Signal wins by a lot. The size of it spot is so small, it seems almost squeezed in. But only because they have nothing to share.

> the FBI's ability to legally access secure content Maybe there are laws preventing legal access to message content? Maybe related to wherever Telegram is incorporated.

It helps Telegram is HQ'd in the UK and the operational center is in Dubai.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#72

Post by wizzwizz4 » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:16 PM UTC

ajsnigrutin wrote: post #63

Muromec wrote: post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

you don't have to fake the voice, just mitm and record cleartext

But they have to fake the voice, if I call the other person and say "my emoji sequence is this, this and that" for the other person to verify and vice-versa.

Person A calls you. I intercept the call, so person A is calling me, and then I call you (spoofing so I look like Person A). When you pick up, I pick up, then I transmit what you're saying to Person A (and vice versa).

How do you know I'm intercepting the transmission? Does the emoji sequence verify the call, perhaps?

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#73

Post by wizzwizz4 » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:19 PM UTC

timbit42 wrote: post #31

I'd like to see Tox and Jami.

I read somewhere that Tox's security was compromised.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#74

Post by adgjlsfhk1 » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:19 PM UTC

FalconSensei wrote: post #69

nimbius wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

> do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone but can't they force you to put your password in that case, instead of your finger?

no. The 5th amendment has been read weirdly by the supreme court.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#75

Post by [deleted] » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:19 PM UTC

no_time wrote: post #30

colechristensen wrote: post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not if they want to operate in the United States or have access to our banking system. You don’t get to pick your jurisdiction and then operate globally. You’re obligated to follow the laws where you want to operate.

I wonder how this affects nonprofits like Matrix/Element and Signal. What can they do with them? Gangstalk their developers? Coerce big tech to ban them from their appstores?

[deleted]

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#76

Post by caseysoftware » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:20 PM UTC

FalconSensei wrote: post #69

nimbius wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

> do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone but can't they force you to put your password in that case, instead of your finger?

In general, no.

The contents of your mind are protected because you must take an active part of disclose them. Of course, they can still order you to give them the password and stick you in jail for Contempt of Court charges if you don't.

Check out Habeas Data. It's a fascinating/horrifying book detailing much of this.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#77

Post by colechristensen » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:21 PM UTC

viro wrote: post #61

no_time wrote: post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I wonder how this affects nonprofits like Matrix/Element and Signal. What can they do with them? Gangstalk their developers? Coerce big tech to ban them from their appstores?

Refusing a valid court issued search warrant/order is a criminal offense. I think 180 days for each refusal of a legal order.

Well signal does not have the data, they comply with such orders with the tiny amount of metadata they have (like a timestamp of when your account was created and that’s about it)

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#78

Post by randomluck040 » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:22 PM UTC

FalconSensei wrote: post #69

nimbius wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

> do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone but can't they force you to put your password in that case, instead of your finger?

I think a fingerprint is easier to get if you’re not willing to cooperate. However, I think if they really, I mean really want your password, they will probably find a way to get it out of you. I think it also depends if it’s the local sheriff asking for your password or someone from the FBI while you’re tied up in a bunker somewhere in Nevada.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#79

Post by vmception » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:22 PM UTC

georgyo wrote: post #8

t0mas88 wrote: post #4

So if you have something to hide, don't use iCloud backup. And Whatsapp will give them the target's full contactbook (was to be expected), but also everyone that has the target in their contact list. That last one is quite far reaching.

You and the person you are communicating with must both not use iCloud backup. And since apple pushes the backup features pretty heavily, you can be reasonable sure that the person you are communicating is using backups. IE, you cannot use iMessage.

iCloud backup can backup your whole phone, specifically the files section. iOS and OSX users can save anything to that.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#80

Post by no_time » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:22 PM UTC

viro wrote: post #61

no_time wrote: post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I wonder how this affects nonprofits like Matrix/Element and Signal. What can they do with them? Gangstalk their developers? Coerce big tech to ban them from their appstores?

Refusing a valid court issued search warrant/order is a criminal offense. I think 180 days for each refusal of a legal order.

The issue is a bit more complex. I was thinking more on the lines of "will I get bothered for making crypto available for the masses that nobody can crack?"