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Costly Airbus paint flaw goes wider than the Gulf

reuters.com

71–80 of 109 posts

Re: Costly Airbus paint flaw goes wider than the Gulf

#71
post #5

It seems that victim blaming is not something specific to just Boeing. Airbus blamed Qatar airways and the hot weather till similar issues emerged with planes of Finn Air and Air France in colder climates. Whatever happened to the customer is always right? Guess it is easier to victim blame when you operate in essence a duopoly. Competition is critical to solve these issues in the long run.

>Whatever happened to the customer is always right?

The full quote is: "In matters of taste, the customer is always right."

Re: Costly Airbus paint flaw goes wider than the Gulf

#72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>I'm not sure there exists a more complex set of requirements for paint than for aircraft. Extreme cold to surface temperatures, the requirement to flex with adhered surfaces without cracking, plus the desire for a paint job to last for years. That's basically a walk in the park compared to anything that needs to deal with unearthly temperatures and harsh chemicals at the same time. Furthermore, air (and airborne wat…

I really liked the old American Airlines scheme where they just didn't paint the airplane. It was beautiful. But in the modern age, if you need a metal mesh around a carbon fiber fuselage then not painting the airplane is probably not an option. Sad.

>" I really liked the old American Airlines scheme where they just didn't paint the airplane."

It wasn't quite that simple. I believe the 'bare metal' finish actually had a layer of protective varnish painted on, to protect the metal from oxidation (anyone who has handled bare aluminum can tell you that it develops a layer of oxide very quickly). In addition to that, the panels had to be specially chosen and very carefully handled, as small blemishes were very obvious.

Re: Costly Airbus paint flaw goes wider than the Gulf

#73

Halfway through the article is this extraordinarily helpful information (given that I know nothing at all about aircraft paint): > When Airbus 15 years ago launched the A350, it chose to follow Boeing's new 787 in using carbon-fibre instead of metal. > Experts say the lighter jets consume less fuel but are harder to deck out in a way that makes paint stick. > The new jets also need a layer of metallic mesh to dissipa…

From the article:

> Airbus is also not alone in facing problems. Boeing has had paint issues and a phenomenon known as rivet rash, or flecks of missing paint, on its competing 787s.

Re: Costly Airbus paint flaw goes wider than the Gulf

#74

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I thought Boeing blamed it on a combination of poor maintenance practices by the relevant airlines, poor handling and response to inflight error messages and maintenance requests on previous flights that left the issue unaddressed, and then weaknesses on the pilot side during the accident flights? I personally think they went a bit overboard with the revised procedure memory items.

I am no expert, but I remember the main culprit was that Boeing had insisted no further training is required for pilots to avoid some sort of expensive recertification. Weakness of pilots was the direct result of this. Pilots having experience with previous 737 planes were told in no uncertain terms that they can fly this new plane the exact same as the previous one and no further training or testing is required or e…

> Boeing had the audacity of blaming the pilots when they inevitably died in crashes.

That wasn’t a great look, but Boeing is correct that if the pilots had followed the existing checklist memory items for stab trim runaway, the airplanes would not have crashed.

The difficulty is that prior generations had breakout switches which would inhibit the stab trim from running in a direction counter to the control column deflection. That obviously won’t work for the intended purpose of MCAS (to give flight control feel in opposition to excessive pitch up).

The checklist item for runaway trim is not “stop stab trim by deflecting control column” but rather “stop stab trim by throwing the stab trim cutout switches”. Pilots who used the “deflect control column” technique contrary to the checklist would have gotten away with the error in non-Max 73s, but not in the -Max edition. That’s pretty far from “0% pilot contribution” to the mishap IMO.

Re: Costly Airbus paint flaw goes wider than the Gulf

#75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I thought Boeing blamed it on a combination of poor maintenance practices by the relevant airlines, poor handling and response to inflight error messages and maintenance requests on previous flights that left the issue unaddressed, and then weaknesses on the pilot side during the accident flights? I personally think they went a bit overboard with the revised procedure memory items.

I am no expert, but I remember the main culprit was that Boeing had insisted no further training is required for pilots to avoid some sort of expensive recertification. Weakness of pilots was the direct result of this. Pilots having experience with previous 737 planes were told in no uncertain terms that they can fly this new plane the exact same as the previous one and no further training or testing is required or e…

The old procedure was

Control Column - Hold Firmly

Autopilot - Disengage. Do NOT re-engage. Control pitch attitude manually with column and electric trim.

If runaway continues, stab trim cutout (both) to cutout.

http://www.b737.org.uk/images/runawaystab2000.jpg

The new procedure is not that much different.

With PK-LQP - previous flight it took 6 minutes for them to get to this procedure - and it was suggestion of a dead-heading pilot. This resolved things. Despite going through this exact issue on previous flight, the next flight takes off, same issue develops because of underlying maintenance issue, they were dealing with this for 8 minutes, 28 activations of incorrect trim but with a fatal outcome.

Yes, MCAS was a bad design, yes it increased risk. I'm not sure it was a "nothing could be done" type situation. Better maintenance? Better communication between flights? Stab trim cutout earlier if you don't like how the automatic trim is working?

Airbus has historically pushed more automation / flight protection. My own suspicion is Boeing will go that way as well, ie, human in loop model they had (where human fixes the computer going crazy) just doesn't work well especially for folks flying these big jets without much earlier GA / manual flying time.

For example, in the US, a pilot would have done lots of manual flying on small planes first, and so might be a bit less automation dependent and better able to take over when computers go crazy. Also more hours before you fly the big jets (think 1,500 hours flight time). Usually a 4 year degree.

Overseas, you can come off the street and be flying a jet with 200 - 240 hours of time including sim time? That is a TON less flying time, probably very very little manual stick and rudder flying. A fair number of saves in the US have come from folks with great stick and rudder flying experience, even things like glider experience you just don't have overseas.

There usually is something called differences training for variants like this. Wouldn't cover MCAS, and is usually brief, but not normally zero. I'm surprised they did zero differences training if that was the case - that is very unusual. You've got to do normally at least an hour or two. A new variant is not unheard off, 737 probably has something like 12 variants under one type certificate. I would check your source there that no differences training came up.

Re: Costly Airbus paint flaw goes wider than the Gulf

#77

I recently rode in an Iberia Air Airbus A350. I was struck by how the paint seemed to be dirty / droopy under the windows. This was supposedly a ~10 year old plane (I forget the tail number, so I can't look it up). https://imgur.com/a/TWNWPQs

That's an A330. The A350 did not yet exist 10 years ago.

Re: Costly Airbus paint flaw goes wider than the Gulf

#79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am no expert, but I remember the main culprit was that Boeing had insisted no further training is required for pilots to avoid some sort of expensive recertification. Weakness of pilots was the direct result of this. Pilots having experience with previous 737 planes were told in no uncertain terms that they can fly this new plane the exact same as the previous one and no further training or testing is required or e…

> Boeing had the audacity of blaming the pilots when they inevitably died in crashes. That wasn’t a great look, but Boeing is correct that if the pilots had followed the existing checklist memory items for stab trim runaway, the airplanes would not have crashed. The difficulty is that prior generations had breakout switches which would inhibit the stab trim from running in a direction counter to the control column de…

Excellent point.

A lot of focus is on pilots, but the safety chain was also weak. Maint, communication with flight dept, communication to subsequent pilots etc, training dept and required experience / education to fly. Not a good combo. Someone with 200 hrs of time, plane badly maintained, no good handoff around prior issues etc.

I still think Boeings safety model with humans as the backup for computers probably doesn't work in a world where a large majority of pilots lean on fully fly by wire (computerized) planes. Someone with 240 hours, a bunch of that just sim time - can they hand fly a plane in its entire envelope?

This is where Boeing sounded really tone deaf. They built a model around humans as backup, a very US centric model (ie, folks with tons of general aviation experience just as a hobby from young ages, military flight experience etc) which was not really appropriate here.

Re: Costly Airbus paint flaw goes wider than the Gulf

#80
post #5

It seems that victim blaming is not something specific to just Boeing. Airbus blamed Qatar airways and the hot weather till similar issues emerged with planes of Finn Air and Air France in colder climates. Whatever happened to the customer is always right? Guess it is easier to victim blame when you operate in essence a duopoly. Competition is critical to solve these issues in the long run.

>Guess it is easier to victim blame when you operate in essence a duopoly. The lesson the public repeatedly teaches to MBA types is that the narrative matters more than reality. It makes complete business sense to blame the customer.

The standard is a fair bit higher now in airplane safety than it was. The 787 issues make you realize this (shims / flatness stuff etc). Go back 50 years this wouldn't have gotten a second look in most cases (and yes, there were more fatalities).
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