71–80 of 156 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
and this is one of the most backwarded response one can give in my opinion. "Don't hate the player, hate the game" doesn't justify the player's actions. This is not a video game. I really hate the fact that people will do anything under the name of business. It's more like we're moving towards uncivilized in that regard.
I don't think 'the game' refers to video games here.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
1. It can only be an act of war if it was done by a nation state. Even though the US likes to declare war on abstract concepts like "drugs" and "crime", that is not how it works in international law. 2. Terrorism has similarly precise definitions, usually along the lines of "the act has to be in pursuit of political aims". Just because its a big and important target does not make it political, ransomware is an econom…
If the attackers are acting under the protection or tacit approval of a foreign government then you can bet that somewhere, someone is prepping a policy paper for kenetic responses. Given the recent pipeline issue and its national security implications I am not going to be surprised at all if some hackers in Russia end up dead from 'accidents' that are so obviously not accidents that no one is fooled.
You could but you probably would lose that bet. This has been done for decades now, especially between friendly countries (see https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-mi6-brexit...) without any sort of repercussion.
Diplomatic posturing aside ("We will treat any intrusion attempt on our networks as an agression"), literally no government actually wants to go to war over a hack.
> Given the recent pipeline issue and its national security implications I am not going to be surprised at all if some hackers in Russia end up dead from 'accidents' that are so obviously not accidents that no one is fooled.
This is even more nonsensical. Certainly governments would benefit way more from hiring those hackers and/or buying vulns from them than killing them. Especially in less-friendly countries like Russia.
I have a feeling there is a very short security-hygiene checklist that, if followed, could prevent the vast majority of the ransomware attacked that we have seen in the last few years. * Keep all systems up to date with the latest patches. * Have a DR plan and test it regularly. * Make frequent backups, verify them, and keep them offline . Historically organizations have been so bad at backups that the advice has bee…
I have a feeling there is a very short security-hygiene checklist that, if followed, could prevent the vast majority of the ransomware attacked that we have seen in the last few years. * Keep all systems up to date with the latest patches. * Have a DR plan and test it regularly. * Make frequent backups, verify them, and keep them offline . Historically organizations have been so bad at backups that the advice has bee…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
1. It can only be an act of war if it was done by a nation state. Even though the US likes to declare war on abstract concepts like "drugs" and "crime", that is not how it works in international law. 2. Terrorism has similarly precise definitions, usually along the lines of "the act has to be in pursuit of political aims". Just because its a big and important target does not make it political, ransomware is an econom…
> It can only be an act of war if it was done by a nation state This is not true. For example major countries like the United States and the United Kingdom are not nation states but can still commit acts of war under international law.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Complete, tested tape backups would cure many, many ills. They're out of fashion, but..
Tape backups are ok but still mean significant operational downtime because recovery from tape is slow. This is better for long term data storage than rapid recovery. For recovery, you need more accessible backups. And to test your backup plan.
Ransomware: Another great "feature" of difficult to trace digital currencies.
I have a feeling there is a very short security-hygiene checklist that, if followed, could prevent the vast majority of the ransomware attacked that we have seen in the last few years. * Keep all systems up to date with the latest patches. * Have a DR plan and test it regularly. * Make frequent backups, verify them, and keep them offline . Historically organizations have been so bad at backups that the advice has bee…
Companies often have IAM/ssh/keys all over the place. If you centralize things to IAM you can lower permissions based on their last use. EG. A frontend dev needs access to GCP to configure things in firebase. This frontend developer hasn't used these IAM permissions in 3 months. This persons IAM permissions should automatically have these permissions removed.
Probably one of the easiest yet most powerful thing to implement in cloud sec ops AND probably never done.
https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/recommender-managing
Example script to automate it: https://github.com/james-ransom/auto-apply-gcp-iam-recommend...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I hope this train of thought becomes more mainstream.
Politicians always seem to be scared to front-load costs. Happens with military/infrastructure spending all the time - get a cheap initial quote and then get screwed long-term. And with covid. Govs didn't have the courage to lock down early and fast / close borders and cost themselves a lot of money in the short term.
I have a feeling there is a very short security-hygiene checklist that, if followed, could prevent the vast majority of the ransomware attacked that we have seen in the last few years. * Keep all systems up to date with the latest patches. * Have a DR plan and test it regularly. * Make frequent backups, verify them, and keep them offline . Historically organizations have been so bad at backups that the advice has bee…
Complete, tested tape backups would cure many, many ills. They're out of fashion, but..