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Interview with CEO of rsync.net: “no firewalls and no routers”

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Re: Interview with CEO of rsync.net: “no firewalls and no routers”

#71
post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's not out of some love for Macs. I have a 2008 MacBook running Catalina and it's simply because the cost of replacing it is >0. If this works and works well(and it does) then why would I get rid of it? Just to spite apple, which doesn't care either way? I also have a 2005 car that still runs - should I get rid of it because the company that made it stopped providing any kind of support for it long time ago? Or you…

Maybe it was easy for you to modify your OS to continue updating, or you downloaded some ISO of Catalina someone else pre-hacked for you - but it was certainly a non-trivial effort for whoever figured out how to trick the OS into installing and/or updating. It just seems like wasted effort, since the company all this supports really has made it clear they do not want you to have this ability, and can at any moment ma…

So I don't agree, and I will use the car analogy again - old cars are not "supported" in any way and yet many people keep them going. There's serious engineering effort to make the parts, to write new software, to improve existing firmware etc. By your logic, that's also "wasted" effort since the manufacturer chooses to abandon cars after just few years, so why would you keep them going.

I feel the same way about computers - like, who gives a damn what apple thinks. I have a laptop that is still going because people keep making it compatible. That's a good thing, not a bad thing.

Re: Interview with CEO of rsync.net: “no firewalls and no routers”

#72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> including the backups coming in from customers. Which are encrypted in flight...if they aren't then anyone on the 30 machines between customer and final destination can also see the backups coming in from customers.

True, but the packets in-flight can take different routes. If you have a machine on the switch, you know you've captured all the packets that were in-flight. This make it easier to break the encrypted packets. It's a choice--everything in security is a risk-management assessment, but I'm surprised rsync.net was able to get so many security certifications with this setup.

> If you have a machine on the switch, you know you've captured all the packets that were in-flight.

Same applies if someone takes over the firewall, machine on the last hop before they hit port 22.

In a world where stuff like this https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2020/09/01/zero-day-cisco-en... routinely happens there is a benefit to forgoing all of that when it makes sense.

Re: Interview with CEO of rsync.net: “no firewalls and no routers”

#73
post #48

I wonder if they have any sales to large enterprises or similar institutions. In my experience, the larger organizations will have a "security" questionnaire required of their vendors, and the person administering it is a droid, incapable of evaluating whether the questions, originally written in the mid-00s and only updated for buzzword compliance since, are applicable to modern security practice today, or to the pa…

Cloudflare not using any firewalls seems like a strange concept, considering they literally sell firewall-as-a-service.

https://www.cloudflare.com/waf/

Re: Interview with CEO of rsync.net: “no firewalls and no routers”

#74

Don't know if running a dumb switch connected to your ISP is the best infosec policy: https://blogs.cisco.com/manufacturing/the-top-5-reasons-to-a...

The only "security risk" i see there is number 1, and that is all to do with physical security.

> Disadvantage #1 – Open ports on unmanaged switches are a security risk

Why? Is there something that would prevent an attacker with physical access from unplugging an existing cable? Does the average managed switch config have mac limits and auto shutdown if a link is lost for just a few seconds? Mac limits are easilly bypassed, even without (permanently) disconnecting the legimate device by inlining an active device, maybe some mac spoofing.

I don't include 802.1x or automatically shutting down a port that loses an uplink as a "simple and effective security precaution", it would be a right pain for many situations. Is the latter even a feature? I certainly haven't come across it (unlike normal portsecurity like limiting number of mac addresses, which just adds to overhead with limited effective security).

> Disadvantage #2 – No resiliency = higher downtime

If my device has one ethernet cable into one switch, how does that help? If my unmanaged switch goes pop, I have a spare that I can put in and be back running in a minute. My managed cisco edge switches take 10+ minutes just to reboot.

If my device has two ethernet cables, one into one unmanaged switch, one into another, losing that switch isn't a problem.

> Disadvantage #3 – Unmanaged switches cannot prioritize traffic

Correct they can't. Managed switches without qos set up can't prioritise traffic either. If your switch is dropping packets, you don't have enough bandwidth. I've seen packet loss when sending 500mbit down a 1G uplink on managed switches, even on QOSed traffic. Indeed I've seen higher priority traffic drop and lower priority not drop. QOS isn't trivial. Ultimately it comes down to how big your buffers are whether your packet gets through or not, so your application should cope with some loss, and if you get too much loss you need more bandwidth. If you have 48 devices connected at 1Gbit each, each firing 100mbit of traffic every second, all bang on the second, with a 10gbit uplink, on paper you only need 4.8gbit of uplink. You'll also need a 600MB packet buffer and expect a lot of delay on your packets, whether you have managed or unmanaged, QOS or no QOS.

> Disadvantage #4 – Unmanaged switches cannot segment network traffic

Correct, but then if I have 8 desktops in a cluster why wouldn't I pop in a desktop switch with 8 1G ports? I want them all on the same vlan anyway.

> Disadvantage #5 – Unmanaged switches have limited or no tools for monitoring network activity or performance

They don't, but again do I want that for a specific use case?

If I want a managed switch (which I usually do), then I'll spec a managed switch. It's unlikely it will be cisco. If my requirements don't need features of a managed switch then I won't bother.

I find it interesting that there's no mention of preventing broadcast storms, or IGMP snooping - both of which are far more useful for a typical edge switch than qos.

Personally, I tend to use managed switches - indeed I just bought a couple of 24 port TP Link POE switches for an event I'm planning. I'm not 100% sure I'd go for an unmanaged switch in rsync's case, but from your list

1) Doesn't apply -- servers are in a secure location

2) Doesn't apply -- servers are either single connected (so need a physical visit, and replacing an unmanaged switch is far quicker and easier than a managed switch), or they're dual connected to two different switches

3) If they're doing inline management then you might want to carve out a small part of your uplink to prevent yourself from being dossed by a dodgy server (if your server is saturating your uplink bandwidth and you ssh session can't establish that could be an issue. If you've got OOB access on a separate link though, not a problem, and clearly they don't have that problem)

4) Doesn't matter -- they don't want different vlans

5) They presumably measure the bandwidth use of each of their servers. The question thus is "does the ISP give me logs I can rely on for the wan". Personally I wouldn't, but I can see the idea

Spanning tree: Secure network, they aren't going to connect one port to another to cause a storm

IGMP: They presumably aren't using multicast for anything major so bitrates would be very low even if they were there

Reasons to use a firewall or a switch with an ACL in this specific case that I can think of:

1) 2 points of control -- a zero-day on freebsd's firewall could open a port to an unintended source which was listening but blocked by iptables (or bsd's version). If you had a non-bsd firewall it's unlikely the same zero-day would work

2) Port 22 is only open to a specific IP range, again there's a zero-day, and TTL of outbound packets is high enough to establish a session

Reasons to use a managed switch even ignoring firewalling:

1) Reliable traffic stats -- you could guess at these by summing the uplinks of all the connected devices although some packets will be dropped and some may be going to other devices on the network

Reasons to use QOS on a managed switch:

To allow inband managment if something goes wrong. A separate ilo/ipmi/kvm connection would be better for that though.

I don't think they'd need features like span ports (I personally use them all the time, and fibre taps, but I have a different use case which is UDP heavy and loss-intollerent)

Re: Interview with CEO of rsync.net: “no firewalls and no routers”

#75
post #48

I wonder if they have any sales to large enterprises or similar institutions. In my experience, the larger organizations will have a "security" questionnaire required of their vendors, and the person administering it is a droid, incapable of evaluating whether the questions, originally written in the mid-00s and only updated for buzzword compliance since, are applicable to modern security practice today, or to the pa…

I used to (late 2000s) work for a tiny, tiny company that was courting a customer in the mobile banking space. They wanted us to tick boxes. So we bought a box (some sort of Fortinet) that said it was a firewall and IDS. Plugged it in, used it as our new router. "Cost of doing business."

Could we have argued with them during the sales process? Only if we wanted to lose the sale. The Fortinet was cheap compared to the value of the contract.

Re: Interview with CEO of rsync.net: “no firewalls and no routers”

#76
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure those reasons really apply to their case. Especially since they're running the boxes that it's connected to. They can do resiliency, network segmentation, and monitoring on their platform. What's a Cisco box going to do for them?

Dumb switches will blast packets to all interfaces that are connected. If there's a machine on the switch that's in promiscuous mode, it can see all the packets on the local network (including the backups coming in from customers). Managed switches typically have ACL support. I get the KISS principle, but this setup seems to be trading security for simplicity.

> Dumb switches will blast packets to all interfaces that are connected

Multicast and broadcast sure, but dumb switches will still keep mac-address>port mapping. If the router sends to 52:54:00:ad:ra:a7, the dumb switch will remember that's on port 7 (having seen traffic from it recently - if only an arp reply) and only send the packet to port 7.

Hubs (remember them!) will blast every packet to every port.

Re: Interview with CEO of rsync.net: “no firewalls and no routers”

#77
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"How are personal files being handled? Is encryption being used? Are you able to access this data using a shared key?" We give you an empty UNIX filesystem. So, if you push up files over rsync or sftp, they will sit here unencrypted. However , there are now excellent "tools like rsync that encrypt the remote result with a key rsync.net never sees" - chief among them being 'borg'[1]. Other options include duplicity an…

The phrase 'Cloud storage' conjures distributed replicated fault tolerance within a region to provide high availability and strong durability against datacenter disasters (fire, electrical/mechanical failures etc) and cross geographic region replication to protect against natural calamities (earthquake, tornado, floods etc). It also conjures a managed service with object-level (volume, directory, file) metadata, vers…

"and cross geographic region replication to protect against natural calamities (earthquake, tornado, floods etc)."

As I mentioned - you can have that. That "geo redundant" service is managed by us and requires no intervention on your part. It costs 1.75x more.

"It also conjures a managed service with object-level (volume, directory, file) metadata, versioning and strong identity access management capabilities."

We give you an empty UNIX filesystem that you access over (Open)ssh. Whatever metadata and identity management comes with that (or with overlay tools, like borg or restic) you may use as you see fit.

Re: Interview with CEO of rsync.net: “no firewalls and no routers”

#78
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure those reasons really apply to their case. Especially since they're running the boxes that it's connected to. They can do resiliency, network segmentation, and monitoring on their platform. What's a Cisco box going to do for them?

Dumb switches will blast packets to all interfaces that are connected. If there's a machine on the switch that's in promiscuous mode, it can see all the packets on the local network (including the backups coming in from customers). Managed switches typically have ACL support. I get the KISS principle, but this setup seems to be trading security for simplicity.

Thie first paragraph is incorrect. A hub will "blast packets to all interfaces that are connected". A switch, even a dumb one, still switches packets. Broadcasts and frames addressed to unknown destinations will flood out all ports, but not unicast frames with destinations currently in the MAC table.

It is true that an attacker could flood the MAC table, spoof their MAC, etc, after compromising a layer-2 adjacent host and use that to manipulate traffic flows. That's somewhat disturbing, but no Customer backup data should be hitting their network outside of SSH anyway. I think the potential is more for DoS than compromise of confidentiality or integrity.

I really admire rsync.net's simplicity, but dumb switches give me the willies. I feel blind not having per-interface counters, at the very least. If nothing else, I'd like to be able to reconcile the counters coming from my OS interface with the switch in troubleshooting scenarios.

Re: Interview with CEO of rsync.net: “no firewalls and no routers”

#79

Nice article. rsync.net is one part of my personal computing setup that I never even think twice about. It's simple and it works, and that clearly applies to the infrastructure too. I use ZFS locally and it has made managing my own data strangely pleasing, and it's nice to have the same system on my off-site storage too. On the laptop-front, I find myself drifting towards a similar setup to John. I have a hefty works…

I would love to use this simple setup as well. It's too bad ZFS snapshots cannot be sent and stored encrypted. I would love to use rsync.net but the idea to have my data sitting in someone else's computer in plain text feels wrong. So instead I have to use restic, which re-implements many features of ZFS and this also feels wrong.

You can 'zfs send' to a (special kind of) rsync.net account.

We support encrypted zfs[1][2][3] and raw-send, etc.

The pricing is the same but there is a 1TB minimum because we need to give you your own VM (bhyve) and we have to burn an ipv4 address for you, etc.

[1] https://www.rsync.net/products/zfs.html

[2] https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/12/rsync...

[3] https://www.servethehome.com/automating-proxmox-ve-zfs-offsi...

Re: Interview with CEO of rsync.net: “no firewalls and no routers”

#80
post #53
post #48

I wonder if they have any sales to large enterprises or similar institutions. In my experience, the larger organizations will have a "security" questionnaire required of their vendors, and the person administering it is a droid, incapable of evaluating whether the questions, originally written in the mid-00s and only updated for buzzword compliance since, are applicable to modern security practice today, or to the pa…

"I wonder if they have any sales to large enterprises or similar institutions." Yes, certainly. We frequently fill out very detailed checklists and questionnaires related to our quality policy, standards, internal policies, etc. We're also very honest about how we approach these issues: https://www.rsync.net/resources/regulatory/pci.html ... and they generally appreciate the honesty.

FYI, your "pricing" link at the top of that pci.html page 404's. The pricing link works from other pages however.
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