71–80 of 367 posts
Preventing the target resolver from seeing client's IP address breaks GeoDNS. This is already a problem with 1.1.1.1 which doesn't honour the EDNS client subnet extension. Given generally DNS is just the start of an intereaction, usually followed by the connection directly between the client and intended destination, I don't see what kind of snooping these privacy measures are there to prevent.
> However, each of these guarantees relies on one fundamental property — that the proxy and the target servers do not collude. So long as there is no collusion, an attacker succeeds only if both the proxy and target are compromised.
I'm not sure how an end user would be expected to assess this any more than they could ascertain whether any particular DoH/DoT provider is as trustworthy as they claim.
Opened this post expecting to be hating on another power grab dressed up as protocol engineering, but this one seems to actively /reduce/ the centralization of user data collection in DoH. Props to Cloudflare, I'm impressed.
I would like someone to correct me if I am wrong, but I think we can never have 100% privacy because the destination IPs cannot be encrypted or hidden, so as long as the destination IP can be observed, the server that you are connecting at can be obtained (I know a server can host many web pages, but this requires the port, which cannot be encrypted either). So I don't know to what extent this protocol can be useful.
Every iPhone connects to APNS for push notifications and stays connected, and, last I looked at the protocol, the client certificate was linked to the device serial number. That's quite a geoip tracklog dataset, and AFAIK you can't turn it off.
It's to the point now that to keep my city-level location private from Apple, I'm not putting SIMs in any of my iPhones/iPads any longer, and carrying a battery powered VPN travel router (with a SIM uplink in it) for them to talk to. Super annoying that it has to come to this.
Opened this post expecting to be hating on another power grab dressed up as protocol engineering, but this one seems to actively /reduce/ the centralization of user data collection in DoH. Props to Cloudflare, I'm impressed.
I still have doubts, 1.1.1.1 was a clear power grab and effort to control more of the internet. DoH in partnership with Mozilla was an extension of that So I am still suspect of their motives but maybe the negative PR got to be too much
What does Cloudflare think of Safari's new CNAME-cloaking detection to block cookies? https://webkit.org/blog/11338/cname-cloaking-and-bounce-trac...
The reason I ask is because Cloudflare's "orange cloud" DNS mitigates that protection because it prevents Safari from detecting the cloak. On the other hand, I haven't run into many engineers who think CNAME-cloaking actually hurts privacy in light of Safari's other efforts to partition local storage.
Does Cloudflare think it would be help privacy for Apple to know the final IPs behind orange cloud DNS?
Opened this post expecting to be hating on another power grab dressed up as protocol engineering, but this one seems to actively /reduce/ the centralization of user data collection in DoH. Props to Cloudflare, I'm impressed.
I would like someone to correct me if I am wrong, but I think we can never have 100% privacy because the destination IPs cannot be encrypted or hidden, so as long as the destination IP can be observed, the server that you are connecting at can be obtained (I know a server can host many web pages, but this requires the port, which cannot be encrypted either). So I don't know to what extent this protocol can be useful.
With current encrypted SNI proposal, your privacy (between you and the superprovider) is /improved/ by talking to a site behind a large aggregating provider. It sucks (since the superprovider still sees everything), but that's how it is.
edit: added clarifications in (parens)
So Google got sued by ISPs which lobbied an investigation by DOJ for trying to encrypt DNS: https://www.engadget.com/2019-09-29-congress-doj-scrutinze-g... Will ISPs be too scared to sue Apple and Cloudflare for this? Or are they giving them an out?
Which wouldn't be the case if everyone loses access to the IP + DNS request info.
In my state, Comcast is going to start charging heavy bandwidth users extra. After a few people get surprise bills, I suspect that lawmakers will require that internet providers break down a bill by application.
Until we get rid of SNI[1] in HTTPS for good there will still be providers (like my ISP) that do deep packet inspection on SNI and kill the connection right away if you happen to visit a forbidden site (and this was western Europe, yesterday, on a site behind CloudFlare) [1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication
Part of the counter-argument that has been so prevalent on HN (most recently: [0]) is that when you prevent middlemen on your network from being able to see what website you're browsing, you're doing exactly that: preventing anyone, even a trusted network administrator, from being able to inspect traffic. I'm all for DoH and ECH since US ISPs have a history of inspecting and logging traffic, but it seems like there s…
Management of devices without authentication and authorization means anyone can do it. Which is the state of things today (for DNS).
I suspect that practical matters will interfere with widespread adoption of encrypted DNS. In my state, Comcast is going to start charging heavy bandwidth users extra. After a few people get surprise bills, I suspect that lawmakers will require that internet providers break down a bill by application.