Earlier quoted context omitted.
> One can lie for multiple reasons. For instance, to avoid conflict; or because one is not in a mood. Deception is one among many reasons. In all of those cases deception is the purpose of lying, the other purposes described aren't alternatives to deception, they are the purposes for which one seeks to deceive. It's true that focussing on this has a nexus with Christian moral theory and it's influence on secular mora…
>In all of those cases deception is the purpose of lying, the other purposes described aren't alternatives to deception, they are the purposes for which one seeks to deceive. That's what Christian morality says. There are other cultures which don't see the way you see. Western philosophy doesn't even answer the question "Why truth?"; only Nietzsche raises that question. In Christianity, truth doesn't need any further…
When two parties engage in an argument, some theory-laden facts become facts (for instance, propositional logic in this context is seen as fact), other facts become theoretical claims.
That's the issue here: you call it a 'fact', I call it a theoretical claim. The dispute is at the level of describing the phenomenon itself. If one follows the best theory of argumentation in the market (that of pragma-dialectical school), this way of transforming theory-laden descriptions into facts violates one of the rules of dialogue.