In 1998, the EFF and John Gilmore published the book about "Deep Crack" called "Cracking DES: Secrets of Encryption Research, Wiretap Politics, and Chip Design". But at the time, it would have been illegal to publish the code on a web site, or include a CDROM with the book publishing the "Deep Crack" DES cracker source code and VHDL in digital form.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EFF_DES_cracker
https://www.foo.be/docs/eff-des-cracker/book/crackingdessecr...
>"We would like to publish this book in the same form, but we can't yet, until our court case succeeds in having this research censorship law overturned. Publishing a paper book's exact same information electronically is seriously illegal in the United States, if it contains cryptographic software. Even communicating it privately to a friend or colleague, who happens to not live in the United States, is considered by the government to be illegal in electronic form."
So to get around the export control laws that prohibited international distribution of DES source code on digital media like CDROMS, but not in written books (thanks to the First Amendment and the Paper Publishing Exception), they developed a system for printing the code and data on paper with checksums, with scripts for scanning, calibrating, validating and correcting the text.
The book had the call to action "Scan this book!" on the cover (undoubtedly a reference to Abby Hoffman's "Steal This book").
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steal_This_Book
A large portion of the book included chapter 4, "Scanning the Source Code" with instructions on scanning the book, and chapters 5, 6, and 7 on "Software Source Code," "Chip Source Code," and "Chip Simulator Source Code," which consisted of pages and pages of listings and uuencoded data, with an inconspicuous column of checksums running down the left edge.
The checksums in the left column of the listings innocuously looked to the casual observer kind of like line numbers, which may have contributed to their true subversive purpose flying under the radar.
Scans of the cover and instructions and test pages for scanning and bootstrapping from Chapter 4:
https://imgur.com/a/7pHSAT1
(My small contribution to the project was coming up with the name "Deep Crack", which was silkscreened on all of the chips, as a pun on "Deep Thought" and "Deep Blue", which was intended to demonstrate that there was a deep crack in the United States Export Control policies.)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EFF_DES_cracker#/media/File:Ch...
The exposition about US export control policies and the solution for working around them that they developed for the book was quite interesting -- I love John Gilmore's attitude, which still rings true today: "All too often, convincing Congress to violate the Constitution is like convincing a cat to follow a squeaking can opener, but that doesn't excuse the agencies for doing it."
https://dl.packetstormsecurity.net/cracked/des/cracking-des....
Chapter 4: Scanning the Source Code
In This chapter:
The Politics of Cryptographic Source Code
The Paper Publishing Exception
Scanning
Bootstrapping
The next few chapters of this book contain specially formatted versions of the documents that we wrote to design the DES Cracker. These documents are the primary sources of our research in brute-force cryptanalysis, which other researchers would need in order to duplicate or validate our research results.
The Politics of Cryptographic Source Code
Since we are interested in the rapid progress of the science of cryptography, as well as in educating the public about the benefits and dangers of cryptographic technology, we would have preferred to put all the information in this book on the World Wide Web. There it would be instantly accessible to anyone worldwide who has an interest in learning about cryptography.
Unfortunately the authors live and work in a country whose policies on cryptography have been shaped by decades of a secrecy mentality and covert control. Powerful agencies which depend on wiretapping to do their jobs--as well as to do things that aren't part of their jobs, but which keep them in power--have compromised both the Congress and several Executive Branch agencies. They convinced Congress to pass unconstitutional laws which limit the freedom of researchers--such as ourselves--to publish their work. (All too often, convincing Congress to violate the Constitution is like convincing a cat to follow a squeaking can opener, but that doesn't excuse the agencies for doing it.) They pressured agencies such as the Commerce Department, State Department, and Department of Justice to not only subvert their oaths of office by supporting these unconstitutional laws, but to act as front-men in their repressive censorship scheme, creating unconstitutional regulations and enforcing them against ordinary researchers and authors of software.
The National Security Agency is the main agency involved, though they seem to have recruited the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the last several years. From the outside we can only speculate what pressures they brought to bear on these other parts of the government. The FBI has a long history of illicit wiretapping, followed by use of the information gained for blackmail, including blackmail of Congressmen and Presidents. FBI spokesmen say that was "the old bad FBI" and that all that stuff has been cleaned up after J. Edgar Hoover died and President Nixon was thrown out of office. But these agencies still do everything in their power to prevent ordinary citizens from being able to examine their activities, e.g. stonewalling those of us who try to use the Freedom of Information Act to find out exactly what they are doing.
Anyway, these agencies influenced laws and regulations which now make it illegal for U.S. crypto researchers to publish their results on the World Wide Web (or elsewhere in electronic form).
The Paper Publishing Exception
Several cryptographers have brought lawsuits against the US Government because their work has been censored by the laws restricting the export of cryptography. (The Electronic Frontier Foundation is sponsoring one of these suits, Bernstein v. Department of Justice, et al ).* One result of bringing these practices under judicial scrutiny is that some of the most egregious past practices have been eliminated.
For example, between the 1970's and early 1990's, NSA actually did threaten people with prosecution if they published certain scientific papers, or put them into libraries. They also had a "voluntary" censorship scheme for people who were willing to sign up for it. Once they were sued, the Government realized that their chances of losing a court battle over the export controls would be much greater if they continued censoring books, technical papers, and such.
Judges understand books. They understand that when the government denies people the ability to write, distribute, or sell books, there is something very fishy going on. The government might be able to pull the wool over a few judges' eyes about jazzy modern technologies like the Internet, floppy disks, fax machines, telephones, and such. But they are unlikely to fool the judges about whether it's constitutional to jail or punish someone for putting ink onto paper in this free country.
* See http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITAR_export/Bernstein_case/ .
Therefore, the last serious update of the cryptography export controls (in 1996) made it explicit that these regulations do not attempt to regulate the publication of information in books (or on paper in any format). They waffled by claiming that they "might" later decide to regulate books--presumably if they won all their court cases -- but in the meantime, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution is still in effect for books, and we are free to publish any kind of cryptographic information in a book. Such as the one in your hand.
Therefore, cryptographic research, which has traditionally been published on paper, shows a trend to continue publishing on paper, while other forms of scientific research are rapidly moving online.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation has always published most of its information electronically. We produce a regular electronic newsletter, communicate with our members and the public largely by electronic mail and telephone, and have built a massive archive of electronically stored information about civil rights and responsibilities, which is published for instant Web or FTP access from anywhere in the world.
We would like to publish this book in the same form, but we can't yet, until our court case succeeds in having this research censorship law overturned. Publishing a paper book's exact same information electronically is seriously illegal in the United States, if it contains cryptographic software. Even communicating it privately to a friend or colleague, who happens to not live in the United States, is considered by the government to be illegal in electronic form.
The US Department of Commerce has officially stated that publishing a World Wide Web page containing links to foreign locations which contain cryptographic software "is not an export that is subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)."* This makes sense to us--a quick reductio ad absurdum shows that to make a ban on links effective, they would also have to ban the mere mention of foreign Universal Resource Locators. URLs are simple strings of characters, like http://www.eff.org; it's unlikely that any American court would uphold a ban on the mere naming of a location where some piece of information can be found.
Therefore, the Electronic Frontier Foundation is free to publish links to where electronic copies of this book might exist in free countries. If we ever find out about such an overseas electronic version, we will publish such a link to it from the page at http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Crypto_misc/DESCracker/ .
* In the letter at http://samsara.law.cwru.edu/comp_law/jvd/pdj-bxa-gjs070397.h..., which is part of Professor Peter Junger's First Amendment lawsuit over the crypto export control regulations.
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