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The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

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Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#71

Post by posterboy »

sandinmytea wrote: post #57

For anyone trying to generalize Mr. Jayne's theory from an article or set of comments - I suggest that you definitely do not. Really, don't do that with anyone's theories, but instead READ THE BOOK. The way that Jaynes "carves up consciousness" as Daniel Dennet puts it in one review, is very different than the way that a reflexive intellectual instinct would choose to. The taxonomy that Jaynes decides upon is distinc…

Your warning is noble, but I read comments to decide whether the topic is useful. I found the negative comments convincing, so I don't mind questioning the topic further.

Self-awarenes was worked out with "I know that I don't know" and again, but in positive terms with "I think therefore I am". These are the most basic forms of reflection, a y-combinator differentiating endlessly. With literarry writing, this reflection could be stretched out over generations, yielding a national identity, but oral transmission of religious teachings had been practiced before, just with a higher rate of mutation. Such verbalization is important for stability, and similarity is important for discoverability, but if verbalization hadn't happened, the perhaps because it goes without saying.

PS: A single threaded cpu doesn't need to spell out distributed computing primitives, either. It still may use signals, in many cases, even if implemented completely in software.

PPS: maybe there's an interesting parallel from natural language to the progression from imperative language over object oriented or declarative, to agent based programming. Bicameral Petri Nets ...

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#72

Post by goto11 »

harshreality wrote: post #51
goto11 wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And the theories of Immanuel Velikovsky. Like the bicameral mind, the theories of Velikovsky are attractive to modern lay people because they give a "rational" explanation for mythology.

I think you're making a category error comparing quackish theories of planetary dynamics to questionable theories of mind. Nobody really knows how the modern human psychological consciousness developed. To compare a theory about that, to a theory claiming as-near-as-we-can-tell-physically-wrong things about Jupiter and Venus and Earth's rotation and physical forces, is invalid. When I read criticisms of Jaynes, they…

The difference is the purported evidence for the theory does not hold as all, as opposed to the theory of natural selection which has observable and reproducible evidenced in the form of breeding. You are kind of turning the burden of proof on its head by claiming that the hypothesis could develop into an better theory. You can say than about any unproven hypothesis.

Some parts of the theory are unfalsifiable (e.g that ancient people did not have self-awareness) which is impossible to disprove, which means it is not a scientific theory at all. The parts based on "evidence" is easy to disprove: Take the theory that gods speaking to Achilles is the bicameral mind. According to the theory the Odyssey is composed after the watershed moment...but gods are still talking to people. So you need another explanation for that (e.g. it is actually fiction). But in that case you can apply the same explanation to the gods speaking in the Iliad, so the theory does not give you any additional explanatory power.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#73

Post by Apocryphon »

goto11 wrote: post #70
freeflight wrote: post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Tbh Achilles hearing his other mind is a much more plausible, and realistic, explanation than pretending that invisible and all-powerful gods and deities spoke to him in "thoughts" with their psychic abilities.

It doesn't make it a good theory that you can come up with an even more ridiculous theory. It is not even clear if any of the events of the Iliad are historical beyond there probably was some kind of war. You can explain Gods talking to Achilles with this theory...but can you explain Achilles literally fighting a river-God and winning? Even if this is based on historical events, the Homeric epics are centuries remove…

Yeah, using bicameral theory to explain away myths and religions (and vice versa) completely ignores that there are loads of reported miracles and supernatural events that go beyond visions and voices. Bicameral theory makes a dull Occam's Razor, and myths and religion aren't great evidence for testing a scientific hypothesis.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#74

Post by jnbiche »

sandinmytea wrote: post #60
wpietri wrote: post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This point is one I've chewed on some: > Therefore, if people educated in the right way could hear voices I'd expect there still to be groups of people (members of some religious sect perhaps) who hear voices. My (entirely made up) theory here is that it's mediated through stress and exhaustion. Even today there's something called "brief psychotic disorder" where during a period of extreme stress somebody can experie…

For anyone reading this above comment, I believe wpietri has the gist of it. To form a conception of this otherwise impossible to conceive-of social/psychological dynamic, one has to imagine people and civilization which has no reverse focus on the self whatsoever. There would be no collectively determined subjective language to refer to one another and to oneself. For example, I could say "NAME1 verbed NAME2!" and "…

> There would be no collectively determined subjective language to refer to one another and to oneself.

Well said.

If it seems unlikely to anyone that society could transition to the state described to one where they have a full conception of self, just think of all the societies that didn't have any concept of zero. Yet they now use zero in their everyday life.

Like zero, self is a concept that now seems hard to imagine not having. Yet we know for a fact that societies at one time had no idea of zero.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#75

Post by justinpombrio »

Alan_Dillman wrote: post #53
thanatropism wrote: post #34

Science aside, the breakdown-of-bicameral-theory has intriguing parallels to Lacan's theory of the mirror stage. In this (nonscientific - but we're learning the limits of scientific psychology) theory, infants are born unarticulated, a mass of limbs with no wholeness to them. In the mirror stage they discover they have a body which is articulated and which is subject to the gaze of others. This begins the split betwe…

I have early memories of a non verbal world, and in it, objects were not discrete. There were visually distinct elements, such things on the walls, and the walls themselves, but I had no concept of them being separate, or having names, or needing them, and didn't think about them. I just looked around. There was no chain of thoughts, just silent observation. Likewise, I lacked object permanence. When my mother left t…

FYI, this way of experiencing the world can be regained through meditation. This includes, from my experience:

- The quieter inner narrative and silent observation.

- The feeling that things not currently being experienced do not "exist" in the same way that things currently being experienced do. They exist in your imagination, and they exist in the sense that you correctly predict that if you were to observe them they would be there, but this knowledge feels ephemeral in contrast to the vivid detailed senses being experienced right now.

- The disconnectedness of time. The past only exists in your memories. If you recall a memory, that happens in the present, and is quite unlike the experience you had that formed the memory.

- Less of a sense of self. All your knowledge is available, but it feels third-person.

I can't relate to some of the other parts of your experience, though, like the lack of separation/names of objects, and the realization of causation.

As a caveat, I haven't been in this state of mind for a week or two, and as you say it doesn't play well with being remembered and analyzed.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#76

Post by freeflight »

goto11 wrote: post #70
freeflight wrote: post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Tbh Achilles hearing his other mind is a much more plausible, and realistic, explanation than pretending that invisible and all-powerful gods and deities spoke to him in "thoughts" with their psychic abilities.

It doesn't make it a good theory that you can come up with an even more ridiculous theory. It is not even clear if any of the events of the Iliad are historical beyond there probably was some kind of war. You can explain Gods talking to Achilles with this theory...but can you explain Achilles literally fighting a river-God and winning? Even if this is based on historical events, the Homeric epics are centuries remove…

> It doesn't make it a good theory that you can come up with an even more ridiculous theory.

But in that context "Gods talking to him" isn't the "more ridiculous theory" we came up with after, it was the original theory. Just like this:

> but can you explain Achilles literally fighting a river-God and winning

Doesn't make it "more plausible" for gods and deities to be involved. That "river-God" could have been any numbers of dangerous aquatic animals, which would be way more plausible than arguing "He fought an actual river god!".

I realize I'm ruffling a lot of theist feathers here, but any explanation that involves the "supernatural" should automatically be considered rather implausible, especially when there are much more plausible alternatives that do not involve the supernatural at all.

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#77

Post by Balgair »

AltruisticGap wrote: post #32

> Jaynes recognizes that consciousness itself is only a small part of mental activity and is not necessary for sensation or perception, for concept formation, for learning, thinking or even reasoning. Thus, if major human actions and skills can function automatically and unconsciously, then it is conceivable that there were, at one time, human beings who did most of the things we do – speak, understand, perceive, sol…

These issues are only going to be more complex as time marches onward. Our understanding of neuroscience and the mind are just getting out of infancy with the optogenetic and CRISPR revolutions. It's going to be pretty cool to see how our definitions change as the science marches onward.

I'll give a concrete example: Persistent vegetative states. Prior to some recent research [0,1], people in these states were thought to be just, well, akin to vegetables. However, under MRI, it was found that there were conscious people 'trapped' in these bodies. Not for all, but for some. Communication out of their 'locked-in' state is now possible. In terms of Jaynes, this means that the acts of perception, concept formation, learning, thinking, and reasoning are not all directly linked; they can occur independent of each other.

Sure, you can argue if these people are conscious still or not, just like with Ulysses. But what we are now seeing is that the seat of the mind, our brains, can be parceled out. Bits of it can act independent of the other parts. That a mind is kinda, sometimes, in specific cases, sorta like Legos. That a human mind is divisible, that the idea of a mind is likely to encompass more than just humans, and that we're just in a small sub-set of 'minds'.

So, it's going to be fun to watch how our ideas of a 'mind', of 'consciousness', of 'personhood', all change as the data keeps rolling in.

[0]https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4913176/

[1]https://jnnp.bmj.com/content/74/11/1571

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#78

Post by coldtea »

rjplatte wrote: post #69
coldtea wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Jaynes was a professor at Princeton University, so he must've built up enough credibility to get this appointment Well, Pauling got two Nobel prizes, but still had crackpot theories about Vitamin C

Both Jaynes and Pauling are extremely intelligent and not gullible people. Why are we so quick to dismiss their "Crackpot" theories, simply because they don't fit with the dominant paradigm?

Isn't the question taking what it supposed to prove for granted (that we do a facile dismissal of those theories? Who said we didn't do a thorough dismissal?)

Well, is it "simply because they don't fit with the dominant paradigm" or rather because they have been discredited time and again?

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#79

Post by goto11 »

akvadrako wrote: post #42
goto11 wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well if the theory is bullshit then surely it does not actually help anyone understand religion? So the Gods are speaking to people in the Iliad because it was actually one half of the brain speaking to the other. But the Odyssey allegedly is composed after the watershed moment, but Gods are still speaking to people. So the theory does not actually explain anything about religion. The theory can "rationally" explain…

I get that the analysis of the Iliad doesn't prove anything and it could just be a stylistic thing, but that doesn't mean the general story he lays out if totally wrong. The theory is valuable because it's a good explanation for a lot of things and it doesn't disagree with the evidence. That's the purpose of all scientific theories, in Popper's philosophy of science, which is still the most relevant. I haven't heard…

So what could theoretically disprove the theory?

Re: The “bicameral mind” 30 years on: A reappraisal of Jaynes’ hypothesis (2007)

#80

Post by theoh »

thanatropism wrote: post #67
theoh wrote: post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Isn't the mirror stage really about discovering the unity of the body (as a kind of closed contour), thus permitting entry into the Imaginary? Then the Symbolic is initiated when these entities (of which the body's image is supposedly the first) start to be thought of in relation to each other, as in language. In that sense, I don't think you can have language without the Symbolic, so the analogy with Jaynes fails. J…

About entering the Imaginary: you're in the right. That said, there are a number of stages in the development of Lacan's thought (Malcolm Bowie counts three); he starts out ostensibly as a clinician but gradually expands his concepts outwards until they're a generalized theory of subjectivity. From this point we can argue whether societies have structures somehow resembling subjectivity - as an economist I've spent a…

Well, I've never heard of Lacanian economics, but there are plenty of fields in which understanding a bit about Lacan is essential if you want to appreciate the canon.

Lacan as a person/analyst doesn't seem appealing to me, but some kind of psychodynamic therapy surely has a future in the long term, as insight accumulates into the mind. So Lacan seems like something to cautiously sift through for insight.

The social as a subjective entity, or at least an apparently somewhat integrated/regulated entity that individual humans can interact with (the big Other), certainly exists as a concept in people's minds. It's a very formalistic, broad-brush picture of social interactions, of a kind that would probably appeal to computer scientists. There's not a lot of scope for nuance at the level of individual interactions. From that point of view, I suppose it could resemble the crude regulative ideas that control the bicameral mind.

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