Derk Pereboom posits that there is no free will but that fact is not inconsistent with moral responsibility.
The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
71–80 of 118 posts
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#72 Although, as we show in [1], determinism may
formally be shown to be consistent, there is no
longer any evidence that supports it, in view of the
fact that classical physics has been superseded by
quantum mechanics, a non-deterministic theory.
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#73Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The definition of 'me' is my prior state. I don't think this is true. We know that thought and memory are constrained (accessed) at a physical level - at least to some extent. That is, damage to your physical brain can result in diminished or eliminated access to those things. Indeed, thought as we know it seems to be a physically mediated process (perhaps not completely defined by our physical bodies, but at least…
> You are, at your basest existence, the ability to choose. A choice engine with a physical layer; a physical memory, physical emotion, the ability to think. But at your foundation, you choose. I don't see how this is at odds with the prior state view. You are a state machine. As time moves, you have no choice but to choose, and this is entirely dependent on your previous state and your current environment. The physi…
Even if it is correct to say that, "You are a state machine." and "prior state" is an input to the state generation function of the machine, this is _not_ incompatible with free will, and does _not_ require a pre-determined universe.
Simply put, current state as an input does not necessitate pre-determination.
I think the point user all2 was making is that if we remove the prior state modifier from the generate state function then the core piece that is left over is "your basest existence".
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#74Although, as we show in [1], determinism may formally be shown to be consistent, there is no longer any evidence that supports it, in view of the fact that classical physics has been superseded by quantum mechanics, a non-deterministic theory. I am surprised at the number of folks who still try to argue that science (particularly physics) has "proved" that these is no free will. This may in fact be true, but you can'…
Yeah exactly, what does quantum mechanics even have to do with it?
This is just scientism if you ask me.
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#75Most people miss the point when they discuss free will because they focus on the idea of whether we are free to make decisions in real time.
Free will is something that happens OVER TIME.
In other words you have free will to the extent that your previous decisions allowed you to survive which was again based on other previous decisions and so you are constantly accumulating and changing "code to your program" so to speak because you can reflect on the results of your pre-defined behavior.
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#76Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think that's just hiding the internals of the non-physical part of us from view, but it doesn't change anything. I already addressed the status of non-material components of a person in my post - if they are part of the person then they are part of their state. Whether you can 'see into' that state or not doesn't make any difference to the fact that it's still part of you and still a precondition of and an input in…
Separating the two bits like this lets you have your cake and eat it too; it allows for a causal explanation between a person's (comprising both their physical and non-physical) state, and their actions, but that total state (and therefore, responsibility) can't be completely reasoned about in the reality that we exist in. They appear indistinguishable from the 'uncertain decisions' you mention in your first post, bu…
Untestable theories don’t explain anything by definition. If it influences the physical world in an ongoing way, in principle it must be testable. If it’s not testable, that can only be because it is not making a difference.
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#77Although, as we show in [1], determinism may formally be shown to be consistent, there is no longer any evidence that supports it, in view of the fact that classical physics has been superseded by quantum mechanics, a non-deterministic theory. I am surprised at the number of folks who still try to argue that science (particularly physics) has "proved" that these is no free will. This may in fact be true, but you can'…
The followup argument is usually something along the lines of quantum mechanics is just probabilistic as far as we know.
Quantum physics doesn't allow for free will in an otherwise deterministic universe, any more than hooking up a RNG to a computer allows for the computer to have free will.
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#78I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…
I think you're taking the wrong message away from the following simple idea: "Good decisions depend on taking the available information into account." If we take this for granted, then it's not clear why free will is a good thing. How would you say pre-determined actions and free will are compatible? I would say they are not (and indeed randomness doesn't really help). In contrast, I would claim that the only sensibl…
The only conclusion here is that you believe free will can only be explained by dualism. Quantum nonlocality [1] provides at least one other explanation as a place free will may hide.
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#79Quite apart from the math and science of deterministic physics and probabilistic quantum physics, there's a broader evolutionary question.
Why would we evolve this hallucination that we have free will, if in fact we fundamentally don't? It seems like a lot of effort and metabolic energy on a moment-by-moment basis to maintain the illusion. I guess you could make an argument we're in some sort of simulation the maker of which required this illusion to be present for reasons of their own.
But the conscious awareness of our moment-by-moment availability of choice is one of the most difficult things to deny even if you're incredibly skeptical about everything else you can observe through the senses (a la descartes).
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#80Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, if the experimenter can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain measurement, then the particle’s response (to be pedantic—the universe’s response near the particle) is not determined by the entire previous history of…
Is that basically saying that at some level, we should be able to see effects that have no cause? Is that what freewill boils down to?
More like effects whose cause we can't ascribe... would have a free will component to their cause. It seems a bit silly because wherever you can ascribe a cause, there's no free will, so when is there free will?