71–80 of 163 posts
Off topic: I simply can't find how to opt out of tracking on HuffPost. I get a GDPR popup and the opting out path leads endless cycles (with occasional captcha solving).
https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock
Earlier quoted context omitted.
In the Anglosphere we've traditionally been quite wary of national ID databases for our own citizens, for better or worse. Most governments of foreign countries I have visited (US, many parts of Asia) have my fingerprints. The Australian government doesn't (to my knowledge, anyway).
Any Australian with a driver's license or passport most definitely has their facial biometrics stored. Any visitor to the country also is subject to it. This has been in existence for over a decade and I'm astonished people aren't aware of that.
As an Indian developer, I cringe every time the government claims a system is un-hackable. Especially when contracts are handed to one of the big Indian IT companies. Having started my career in one of those companies, I saw firsthand how most of the development process was just filling in gaps. Security through obscurity was thought to be “highly secure” and security experts were non existent. No surprises that the…
This happens in every country, not just India. And the database has not been compromised.
The database is not known to be compromised.
I expected better discussion on HN (apart from sensationalist articles), the article does a poor job intentionally though. Summary 1. Existing data is not compromised 2. Duplicate data can't be entered or overwritten 3. BUT, ghost accounts can be created easily. Aadhar was introduced to fight ghost accounts who siphon off subsidies provided for poor. This hack/patch defeats that purpose. I still think this is not a b…
Not so easy. Every effort that's made to reduce fraud (false positives), might affect genuine beneficiaries who depend on the system for food, healthcare and education - by increasing exclusion (false negatives). A probabilistic auth platform with a really wide scope is a recipe for failure.
I expected better discussion on HN (apart from sensationalist articles), the article does a poor job intentionally though. Summary 1. Existing data is not compromised 2. Duplicate data can't be entered or overwritten 3. BUT, ghost accounts can be created easily. Aadhar was introduced to fight ghost accounts who siphon off subsidies provided for poor. This hack/patch defeats that purpose. I still think this is not a b…
There are three people across three different parts of the world who corroborate the report - CTO of a global technology group, a security based analyst and a professor of Computer Science. I wonder how this is "sensationalist".
> "Having looked at the patch code and the report presented by Anand, I feel pretty comfortable saying that the report is correct, and it could allow someone to circumvent security measures in the Aadhaar software, and create new entries. This is pretty feasible, and looks like something that would be possible to engineer," Wallach said.
While I still dislike citizen's database, I can also see why some kind of person authenticator is needed for country like India. I sat through UIDAI architects presentations, and from what I could tell that substantial thought was given to design. So while I maintain skepticism for such database, I also believe India needs some way authenticate various transactions (monetary or otherwise). SSN is a joke, at least Aadhaar was given substantial thought.
I have to admire the courage of the people who have investigated and reported this, given that the entire leadership of UIDAI and its backers in the central government are intolerant of any criticism and have been known to file police complaints[1] against journalists, critics and whistleblowers. Even its visionary and leading cheerleader from the private sector preferred to imagine conspiracies rather than acknowled…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
>States are evil. The best possible case is that they might be, at times, the lesser evil. Calm down there American.
I am European. Just because it's a less popular opinion, it's not any less true. I don't even understand the logic itself. States are supposedly not evil, and we need them because ... well because people are more evil. That's the idea. But states are people. Isn't that by itself a massive contradiction ? The difference between, say, the Netherlands and Monsanto is the method of incorporation, and the legal authority…
According to the article the database has not been compromised. It's a compromise of the client which can be used to add new Aadhar entries.
As an Indian developer, I cringe every time the government claims a system is un-hackable. Especially when contracts are handed to one of the big Indian IT companies. Having started my career in one of those companies, I saw firsthand how most of the development process was just filling in gaps. Security through obscurity was thought to be “highly secure” and security experts were non existent. No surprises that the…
No amount of 'security' will help here. That's because every one including the people don't give a dime about 'security' in India. In Aadhar enrollment centers, passwords are shared. You might like to introduce an OTP like concept, but phones are shared too. 2FA? nice try, but then people also share answers to security questions. Next what? DNA authentication? Biometrics? guess what none of those are any where near r…