Article on HN: "The government shouldn't be trying to do this, we need encryption, decentralized services" Article on Reddit: "Delete Facebook! Fuck Zuckerberg."
Makes sense, as these are the respective target audiences of the two communities.
71–80 of 109 posts
Article on HN: "The government shouldn't be trying to do this, we need encryption, decentralized services" Article on Reddit: "Delete Facebook! Fuck Zuckerberg."
Makes sense, as these are the respective target audiences of the two communities.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Is it? You kind of lost me. Isn't the actual issue math?
It's this: https://xkcd.com/538/
The other day i posted a rant on p2p here on HN and everyone was like, huh! Use whatsapp. We need to build our own p2p and e2e secure chat client like whatsapp which works on every platform. Sure, it's possible - skype was exactly this before except for the e2e part. Why we techies can't? Let's make a group and dissect the problem in our free time. Who is up for it?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's this: https://xkcd.com/538/
set up the device to wipe itself after $x number of incorrect attempts. keep giving the wrong password after every whack from the wrench. then you have plausible deniability. "how can i possibly think straight when you keep hitting me with that wrench?" just need to make $x a value small enough that you can survive the wrench.
I think it has become abundantly clear that a fully peer to peer, encryption required (non-optional), no single central server infrastructure solution is the answer. No points to tap. No point in tapping the data. If they want to capture conversations it's time to go back to the proper old ways of actually spying on high-value targets.
The legal approach is correct and easy for the public to understand. Explained correctly it is also popular. The government used to have to do things like get a warrant and investigate specific crimes. They couldn't listen to everyone's phone conversations all the time and they shouldn't be able to do this on the Internet either. Digital dragnets are illegal and unconstitutional.
The technical approach is also correct. If you're building something that makes it harder for criminals inside the government to commit more crimes, you're doing work that is profound and in the best interests of society. Anyone with passion and technical skill can participate in this work. It's the right thing to do.
Both efforts help each other. Keep the government in line and accountable to the people. Make it harder for people inside the government to do the wrong thing. All approaches deserve support and should leverage each other's work. They should cooperate with law-abiding, constitutionally empowered government authorities as well. There are good guys in the government too.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
set up the device to wipe itself after $x number of incorrect attempts. keep giving the wrong password after every whack from the wrench. then you have plausible deniability. "how can i possibly think straight when you keep hitting me with that wrench?" just need to make $x a value small enough that you can survive the wrench.
No good, it is already standard for forensic teams to clone and checksum a hardrive before attempting to look through files. The clone is sent to evidence and any password attempts will be made on a copy. The "original" copy will be kept safe and any number of passwords can be used against nth iteration of copying the clone.
I think it has become abundantly clear that a fully peer to peer, encryption required (non-optional), no single central server infrastructure solution is the answer. No points to tap. No point in tapping the data. If they want to capture conversations it's time to go back to the proper old ways of actually spying on high-value targets.
This discussion should never be framed as a choice between legal solutions and technical solutions. They are complementary. The legal approach is correct and easy for the public to understand. Explained correctly it is also popular. The government used to have to do things like get a warrant and investigate specific crimes. They couldn't listen to everyone's phone conversations all the time and they shouldn't be able…
But the main place where law and tech come together is enforcement. For law to work at all, it has to be enforced relatively evenly. Technology may make a law's enforcement impossible or easy, but it does not make it more or less "right" in the abstract.
I think it has become abundantly clear that a fully peer to peer, encryption required (non-optional), no single central server infrastructure solution is the answer. No points to tap. No point in tapping the data. If they want to capture conversations it's time to go back to the proper old ways of actually spying on high-value targets.
Isn’t this what Slack is?
I think it has become abundantly clear that a fully peer to peer, encryption required (non-optional), no single central server infrastructure solution is the answer. No points to tap. No point in tapping the data. If they want to capture conversations it's time to go back to the proper old ways of actually spying on high-value targets.
Other than that, it's doable.
Spam protection and censorship (necessary for mobile app stores) can be distributed as opt-out blacklists. If it gets to be a huge problem then a "enter this password to add me" type thing could work too.
I've been compiling a bunch of ideas as such for fully P2P decentralized/encrypted chat, but I'm stuck at the two issues I mentioned earlier.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Possession of encryption software could be treated the same as possession of drugs It's too late for that, every machine, every browser, every user is using encryption software all the time.
"It's too late to criminalize prostitution, every is already having sex" "It's too late to criminalize possession of drugs. Half the country takes pharmaceuticals!"