Live data from Hacker News

Air Gapping a MacBook Air: The Great BCM15700A2 Mystery

tech.firstlook.media

71–80 of 80 posts

Re: Air Gapping a MacBook Air: The Great BCM15700A2 Mystery

#71
post #24
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The NSA developed their own networking protocol, separate from TCP or UDP, which operates just above the physical layer. The idea is that you rewrite the network card firmware so that there’s an NSA MITM running on it. The host computer never knows, because as far as the computer is concerned the network card is sending exactly the data you would expect. And even if you hook up network monitoring tools externally, yo…

> which operates just above the physical layer. So at the link layer? If so, what you described does not sound like an effective technique to exfiltrate data over the internet, unless the NSA also controls the LAN/internal network the target device is on. Why? Because any non-standard protocol data will be thrown out by the first switch or router on the path out of the target LAN. In other words, the exfiltrated data…

"Why? Because any non-standard protocol data will be thrown out by the first switch or router on the path out of the target LAN. "

That's not necessarily true. Misconfigurations and weird issues in networking gear caused vendors to be kind of permissive about some things. Depending on the vendor, they might drop it or pass it through. Network security folks in the field, in or away from NSA, probably have a good idea of what things make it through most often plus fall-back options. They might even keep current documentation of it based on field reports over time. They'd just use that stuff. Also, intelligence work is very difficult and opportunistic already. A method doesn't have to work all the time: just enough to keep trying it.

Re: Air Gapping a MacBook Air: The Great BCM15700A2 Mystery

#72
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No it's not, it just seems that way to the vast majority of us who haven't developed the proper intuition.

Of course, there is the GA evolved antenna. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolved_antenna

And the 'thing' device http://www.cryptomuseum.com/covert/bugs/thing/index.htm

Re: Air Gapping a MacBook Air: The Great BCM15700A2 Mystery

#74
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No it's not, it just seems that way to the vast majority of us who haven't developed the proper intuition.

Of course, there is the GA evolved antenna. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolved_antenna

For this or other successful genetic algorithms, it would seem clear you still can’t know if it’s an optimal design simply because in most cases the number of designs tested would be a small fraction of the possible designs.

However, things like useful sound recognition being done with only a small number of logic gates (commenter below provided a nice article, thank you) make it hard to imagine doing much better.

I wonder if the process can be shown theoretically to offer any help in guaranteeing minimum bounds w.r.t. the optimal case, even if can’t be fully proven to be optimal.

Re: Air Gapping a MacBook Air: The Great BCM15700A2 Mystery

#75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Could packet delays perhaps survive over the network?

Yes. I used both header fields and delays as covert channels in the past since I know security professionals never looked for them. I derived them by just applying a standard, covert-channel analysis on the protocol. Others have described some methods publicly: https://defcon.org/images/defcon-10/dc-10-presentations/dc10... https://engineering.purdue.edu/dcsl/publications/papers/2009... The oldest methods of finding…

Interesting, please share when you’ve the time. Thanks!

Re: Air Gapping a MacBook Air: The Great BCM15700A2 Mystery

#76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Could packet delays perhaps survive over the network?

Yes. I used both header fields and delays as covert channels in the past since I know security professionals never looked for them. I derived them by just applying a standard, covert-channel analysis on the protocol. Others have described some methods publicly: https://defcon.org/images/defcon-10/dc-10-presentations/dc10... https://engineering.purdue.edu/dcsl/publications/papers/2009... The oldest methods of finding…

It’s comments like yours why I always check the thread after reading an article. Thank you!!

Re: Air Gapping a MacBook Air: The Great BCM15700A2 Mystery

#77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Previous hacks of the iSight cam involved rewriting the firmware of that separate microcontroller. IIRC there was also a delay at one point, so that it was possible to take a picture really fast before the LED turned on.

Concerned only pre-2009 models or earlier, needed physical access as well. AFAICR.

Correct, since 2009 roughly, the sensor power was tied into the LED, so if the sensor had enough power to register an image, the LED would have to be on. Apple modified the circuitry specifically because of the old exploit.

Re: Air Gapping a MacBook Air: The Great BCM15700A2 Mystery

#78
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One thing the NSA is very good at is getting access to virtually every type of networking card. If they achieve access to a target, it's likely they control a path to it. If the target is a wifi device, the custom protocol becomes doubly effective: Exfiltration is a matter of having a receiver anywhere in the vicinity. And that receiver can amplify the signal to blast it a few miles. There are tools to sweep the EM s…

> If they achieve access to a target, it's likely they control a path to it. Without specific, documented cases this is speculation of course. But I don't see why they'd use a link level protocol. 1. It requires patching multiple networking devices in the path, which is not very quiet. 2. It sticks out in any monitoring (via mirror ports) more than a UDP packet to a random host. DNS or ntp as a transport would be muc…

And what exactly would be the problem for the NSA with patching networking devices? They even mention how it's useful specifically for these hard targets

>"some of the most productive operations in TAO because they pre-position access points into hard target networks around the world."

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa...

Re: Air Gapping a MacBook Air: The Great BCM15700A2 Mystery

#79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes. I used both header fields and delays as covert channels in the past since I know security professionals never looked for them. I derived them by just applying a standard, covert-channel analysis on the protocol. Others have described some methods publicly: https://defcon.org/images/defcon-10/dc-10-presentations/dc10... https://engineering.purdue.edu/dcsl/publications/papers/2009... The oldest methods of finding…

Interesting, please share when you’ve the time. Thanks!

Language-based Information Flow Security (2003)

http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/jsac/sm-jsac03.pdf

Note: This is a great overview with plenty of terms you can use to find modern work. It's branching out in all these areas. Key words to use include "non-interference", "static analysis," "covert channels," "labels," "confidentiality," and "side channels."

Securing Information Flow at Runtime (2008)

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.142....

Note: Example of the language work they do to lay down foundations.

Static, Info-Flow Analysis That Handles Implicit Flows (2010)

http://www.cs.rpi.edu/~milanova/docs/csmr10.pdf

Note: This is a bit more like how you'd develop low-intervention, preventative analysis.

Static, Info-Flow Analysis on Hardware Language (2017)

https://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/trustzone/asplos17.p...

SecVerilog: Security-Typed HDL for Secure Hardware without Runtime Components (2017)

https://people.ece.cornell.edu/af433/pdf/ferraiuolo-dac-17.p...

Inline, Information-Flow Monitor for JIT-like Applications

https://www.cs.stevens.edu/~naumann/inlining/Chudnov_Informa...

Jif, Sif, and Fabric

https://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif/

Note: Used in Civitas secure voting app. Links to Sif and Fabric are down the page a bit. Note 2: You should be noticing by now that the Cornell teams (a) are pretty awesome and (b) were way ahead of most on this stuff.

Deterministically Deterring Timing Attacks in Deterland (2016)

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6aa3/18e95cae5a932e330857e5...

Note: Thanks to a few events, there are piles of work on hardware ranging from invididual components to whole chips. So, I'm just grabbing examples of different types. This one is on VM's in cloud.

Øzone: Efficient Execution with Zero Timing Leakage for Modern Microarchitectures (2017)

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.07706.pdf

Note: Dedicated, execution unit.

SAFE processor

http://www.crash-safe.org/papers.html

Note: Its metadata engine can do secrecy labels. It can do a lot of policies actually. Commercially available for RISC processors as CoreGuard.

Software-based, Gate-level Information Flow Security for IoT Systems (2017)

http://rakeshk.crhc.illinois.edu/micro17_cam.pdf

Note: Throwing an attempt in that's trying to avoid secure processors. Only read abstract since I just found it. I'm always skeptical if commodity chips are involved, though. Best I've seen are hardware I.P. that reuse optimized processors sort of sitting between their cores and the decoders or RAM. Plus, multicore without shared caches or multiprocessing with each core/chip a security domain.

So, there's some different things for you. Kemmerer and Wray are definitive, older works. Sabelfield and Myers best overview of new stuff. After Meltdown/Spectre, the rest is coming so fast I'm not even tracking it. I'm glad someone asked justifying an attempt at a survey. Found some good links. :)

Re: Air Gapping a MacBook Air: The Great BCM15700A2 Mystery

#80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes. I used both header fields and delays as covert channels in the past since I know security professionals never looked for them. I derived them by just applying a standard, covert-channel analysis on the protocol. Others have described some methods publicly: https://defcon.org/images/defcon-10/dc-10-presentations/dc10... https://engineering.purdue.edu/dcsl/publications/papers/2009... The oldest methods of finding…

It’s comments like yours why I always check the thread after reading an article. Thank you!!

Comments like yours keep me writing them. Thank you! :)
Post reply on HN