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NTSB Issues Investigative Update on San Francisco Airport Near Miss
71–80 of 123 posts
Re: NTSB Issues Investigative Update on San Francisco Airport Near Miss
#72Earlier quoted context omitted.
That is quite plausible. They somehow didn't register the "X" on 28R. Edit: Sorry, I meant 28L. Just dyslexic, I guess.
You wouldn't be the first person to confuse R for L.
recently harrison ford screwed up and landed on the taxiway at KSNA in southern california. he didn't even do a go around, just landed on the taxiway - and he gets to keep his certificate apparently http://www.ocregister.com/2017/04/04/harrison-ford-will-keep...
Re: NTSB Issues Investigative Update on San Francisco Airport Near Miss
#73How about using different colour lights for taxiways and runways. They are already using different colour tarmac lines: yellow vs white.
> Lights for taxiway C were also on and set to default settings that included centerline lights (green) along its length. Default settings also included edge lights (blue) and centerline lights (green) illuminating the transition or stub taxiways from the runway to the taxiway. > Runway and approach lighting for runway 28R were on and set to default settings, which included a 2,400-foot approach lighting system, a pr…
The planes on the taxiway have white takeoff/landing lights. It sounds like the second in the queue didn't turn theirs on until just before the incident, but if any of the others had theirs on prior, it could contribute to misidentifying the taxiway. I think it's common to have the lights on while taxiing and turning them off at rest.
Re: NTSB Issues Investigative Update on San Francisco Airport Near Miss
#74Wouldn't this whole problem disappear if runways were designed differently, at the minimum one exclusive for landing and one for takeoff with no chance for planes landing and planes taking off to meet, like 2 parallel hockey sticks.
Both runways would be painted and lit up completely differently with large lettering explicitly saying take off and landing.
Re: NTSB Issues Investigative Update on San Francisco Airport Near Miss
#75Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm wondering the same thing. Why don't planes land themselves at this point?
The main reason is that computers aren't very smart although I know that even some developers think that. Actually they can autoland but not everywhere and then you still need to tell them where, basically tune them in on the right glide path. Then you really need to be prepared to take over any second, which is a dangerous position on its own. (Just like all self driving cars right now.) It's still possible to selec…
Asiana 214 - https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asiana_Airlines_Flight_214
"Over-reliance on automation and lack of systems understanding by the pilots were cited as major factors contributing to the accident."
Re: NTSB Issues Investigative Update on San Francisco Airport Near Miss
#76Earlier quoted context omitted.
ILS is separate from the radar system mentioned by parent. ILS uses directional radio signals from each end of the runway to provide a glideslope and lateral guidance, not radar. The signals are transmitted from the ground and used for guidance by the aircraft. No part of ILS could alert ATC to anything since the ground stations are only transmitters.
Yes, I know. But it's analogous to the GPS system the parents are discussing.
Trouble there is that, at least to the best of my knowledge, ILS glide slope and localizer are generally only surfaced in the cockpit as a pair of bugs vertically and horizontally peripheral to the artificial horizon indicator. If you're already having a helmet fire, these are likely easy to overlook, and there's no horn or anything. (But as has been pointed out here by several other commenters before now - if you're already having a helmet fire, another horn may not do any good.)
Re: NTSB Issues Investigative Update on San Francisco Airport Near Miss
#77Earlier quoted context omitted.
And they cut it extremely fine. The final NTSB report will probably calculate this, but I'm guessing if they had waited another second or two before shoving those throttles forwards they would have hit a plane (or three). Whats even more scary, is I get the impression that the pilots only shoved the throttles forwards because the tower told them to abort.
If you listen to the recording the pilot suspected something was not right, that's why he asked for confirmation that the runway is clear. Most likely he already anticipated a high probability of a go-around.
They teach you in driving school to never overtake in a two-way road unless you are 100% sure you can make it. I'd assume pilots would he held to at least equal standards...
Re: NTSB Issues Investigative Update on San Francisco Airport Near Miss
#78Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, I know. But it's analogous to the GPS system the parents are discussing.
Trouble there is that, at least to the best of my knowledge, ILS glide slope and localizer are generally only surfaced in the cockpit as a pair of bugs vertically and horizontally peripheral to the artificial horizon indicator. If you're already having a helmet fire, these are likely easy to overlook, and there's no horn or anything. (But as has been pointed out here by several other commenters before now - if you're…
I don't think there's any indication that these pilots were under any kind of undue stress when they lined up their approach? If at any point during the several minutes of their final approach they'd looked even once at their ILS they'd have seen that they were way off.
Re: NTSB Issues Investigative Update on San Francisco Airport Near Miss
#79This was a very close call. Initial reports indicated it was like an ordinary go-around. No. "The incident pilots advanced the thrust levers when the airplane was about 85 feet above ground level. Flight data recorder data indicate the airplane was over the taxiway at this time. About 2.5 seconds after advancing the thrust levers, the minimum altitude recorded on the FDR was 59 feet above ground level." They overflew…
Watch the first few seconds of this video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MnzNvhQxu90
The pilots should not have mistaken the taxiway for the runway. There simply are too many differentiating features between the runway and the taxiway.
This isn't acceptable piloting.
Re: NTSB Issues Investigative Update on San Francisco Airport Near Miss
#80So the guy keying up and saying "Where is this guy going?" and "He's on the taxiway" might actually have made a difference in the outcome, huh: > The flight crew of the first airplane in queue on taxiway C (UAL1) transmitted statements regarding ACA759, one of which mentioned the alignment of ACA759 with the taxiway while ACA759 was on short final (see figures 2 and 3). > The flight crew of the second airplane in que…
It may be doubly fortunate that that multiple pilots and controllers did not attempt to say this at the same time. At Tenerife, both the Pan-Am crew and the tower suspected that the KLM aircraft had started its take-off roll, and both tried to warn its crew at the same time, but the resulting radio interference between the concurrent transmissions made the messages unintelligible.
This was discussed in detail here:
http://www.salon.com/2002/03/28/heterodyne/
The author states that there is a feasible technical solution that, at the time of the article (2002) had not been mandated. Does anyone know if the situation has changed?