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US pulls out of Trans-Pacific Partnership

arstechnica.com

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Re: US pulls out of Trans-Pacific Partnership

#71
post #2

TPP felt to me one of the issues that really defined the Trump campaign and the voters it appealed to. I think Clinton eventually [0] took a public stance against the TPP, but ignoring the public's perception of her relation to the truth, she clearly did not prioritize the dismantling of TPP in the way that Trump did. In fact, it's really hard to imagine her undoing President Obama's work were she in office. If someo…

>TPP felt to me one of the issues that really defined the Trump campaign and the voters it appealed to.

It also helped define Trump's campaign because like a lot of issues his stance on it had little relation to the actual facts. TPP had plenty of problem that made it overall a bad agreement. Opposing it was generally smart. However, there was no indication that such a deal would have harmed the US economy. There is also wide consensus among economists that free trade benefits the nation at large. It isn't the fault of the economists that this country does a bad job of sharing the benefits of such deals with the entire population.

Re: US pulls out of Trans-Pacific Partnership

#72
post #47

The TPP was about something other then money and trade. It was about soft power. It was about containing China. It was about influence. By cancelling it, Trump has handed 1/3 of the worlds GDP to China. Because I suspect China will step in and seal the deal. I know Trump railed about the TPP. But I'm sad no one stood up to defend it. Clinton just flipped flopped. I suppose it's easier for the average American to unde…

The insanity here (for me) is that I spent years trying to communicate the containment strategy aspect to TPP, even linking to public officials and defense documents specifying that this was the purpose. Ultimately I think I found some small measure success, but for the most part it was unwelcome news that the United States was trying to apply coercive statecraft on a competitor. For the most part the entire political spectrum didn't want to hear what I had to say. What's more those discussions often got hit hard by downvote brigading, trolling and moderator bans.

I never very much liked the TPP as it very clearly represented not only unwelcome international competition and power projection, but also because its chapters (first leaked and then eventually published) very clearly benefit large multinational businesses that lord over the United States' strategic resources, exacerbating issues of economic equality on the homeland. The benefit to the American people was that it made problems for the Rise of China - the real possibility of which could see my generations' children and grandchildren in an America that doesn't dominate the world like we do today.

I always felt like there was a better way: a way to both build America so that it is happy and safe, and create deals that benefit all social classes in the homeland.

I'm fairly certain that the Trump Administrations' instincts here will be to replace economic coercion with military coercion and I'm fairly certain that the administration's replacement deals will just as unequally favor those in America who already wield an outsized share of power.

In this regard I'm glad to see TPP go but I would much rather have seen a more creative administration holding the reins.

Re: US pulls out of Trans-Pacific Partnership

#73
post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Here's the real story every time you read about the comparison between multilateral and bilateral international agreements (speaking very generally): * Powerful nations want bilateral agreements, because it's the strong negotiating with the weak. Imagine the U.S. negotiating a trade deal with Nicaragua: The U.S. position is overwhelmingly strong; they could walk away and cancel all trade with Nicaragua; the U.S. woul…

Powerful nations want bilateral agreements, because it's the strong negotiating with the weak. And this is why "hard Brexit" is such a risky endeavor for the UK. The EU is much larger and more experienced in trade deals. From day one Britain will be negotiating from a position of weakness. Once negotiations begin, Britain has a hard 2-year deadline... And to make it worse, they don't have people with experience in bi…

I'd add that the leading European nations, such as the UK, Germany and France, used to be global powers.

Power, soft and hard, depends in large part on pure economic capacity; that enables many things, including economic leverage, larger militaries, and high tech. I don't have the old numbers, but look at this list and imagine their relative power as individual nations before the rise of China and India:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28no...

But China and India likely will take two of the top three spots, along with the U.S., leaving those individual European powers far behind - $5 trillion economies in a world of $25 trillion superpowers (making a guess at future growth). They will be small fish among the sharks, no longer with a place at the table or influence on global affairs. A unified EU would be a fourth power, but that takes time, especially the political unification necessary to conduct foreign affairs (where the EU government has unified control of foreign policy - otherwise their words aren't backed up by the actual power). They are moving the wrong way.

Re: US pulls out of Trans-Pacific Partnership

#74
post #47

The TPP was about something other then money and trade. It was about soft power. It was about containing China. It was about influence. By cancelling it, Trump has handed 1/3 of the worlds GDP to China. Because I suspect China will step in and seal the deal. I know Trump railed about the TPP. But I'm sad no one stood up to defend it. Clinton just flipped flopped. I suppose it's easier for the average American to unde…

And why should china be contained?

Re: US pulls out of Trans-Pacific Partnership

#75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Here's the real story every time you read about the comparison between multilateral and bilateral international agreements (speaking very generally): * Powerful nations want bilateral agreements, because it's the strong negotiating with the weak. Imagine the U.S. negotiating a trade deal with Nicaragua: The U.S. position is overwhelmingly strong; they could walk away and cancel all trade with Nicaragua; the U.S. woul…

Thank you! Very keen. To add to this comment, there’s more nuance when speaking less generally: * In cases where there is competition between powerful nations, weaker nations can and do gain advantage by playing the interests of one country off of one another. For instance, during the Cold War the United States and Soviet Union would engage in trade, weapons, and security deals. States caught in the middle understood…

Thanks; that's a great addition to the discussion. One important nit:

> The United States effort with both NAFTA and the TPP were to contain Russia and China, respectively, by building a coalition of countries with trade that excludes each specific United States adversary

As I understand it (I'm no expert in the field), U.S. policy in regard to China is that its rise to superpower status is inevitable, and the U.S.'s strategy is to get China to join a rules-based (i.e., law-based) international order - preferably the existing one - rather than create an anarchic great power competition that often results in terrible wars. On a political level, TPP was designed as a step in that direction; it wasn't intended to exclude China but to compel them to join a rules-based trade regime for the Pacific - i.e., either play by the rules or be excluded from trade. The goal was that they would join.

Re: US pulls out of Trans-Pacific Partnership

#76

One of the TPP sections that concerned me the most was where corporations could sue nations for passing legislation that detrimentally affected their business (think countries passing environmental restrictions on companies). My concern was greatest that US companies would do this to other nations, like Australia where I am. I'm assuming now that US companies won't be able to do this, but is the TPP still binding bet…

> think countries passing environmental restrictions on companies

I don't think that was ever true about TPP to start with.

Re: US pulls out of Trans-Pacific Partnership

#77
post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Here's the real story every time you read about the comparison between multilateral and bilateral international agreements (speaking very generally): * Powerful nations want bilateral agreements, because it's the strong negotiating with the weak. Imagine the U.S. negotiating a trade deal with Nicaragua: The U.S. position is overwhelmingly strong; they could walk away and cancel all trade with Nicaragua; the U.S. woul…

> Supporters of an international rules-based, law-based order, and of a democratic and rights-based order want broad multilateral agreements. Then the weak nations can band together and resist the powerful; it gives them self-determination, the foundation of democracy; it creates rule of law rather than rule of the powerful. Ironically, most of those small, weaker countries are not democratic.

Yes, and it raises a challenge: Who speaks for their citizens? I think the best argument is that their own governments do - that's true de facto, regardless; and foreign powers are very poor and understanding the needs of locals, no matter how good-willed. The foreign powers tell them what's good for them (and coincidentally what never conflicts with the foreign powers' interests); they don't listen so well.

Re: US pulls out of Trans-Pacific Partnership

#78

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How?

The discussion is that US pulls out of TPP...because Trump promised it and he initiated it.

But what does Trump's PR about his workers program and now much as been accomplished have to do with it? It's just political promotion.

The first part of the comment in question seems fine; the last is an ad for a politician.

Re: US pulls out of Trans-Pacific Partnership

#79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Thank you! Very keen. To add to this comment, there’s more nuance when speaking less generally: * In cases where there is competition between powerful nations, weaker nations can and do gain advantage by playing the interests of one country off of one another. For instance, during the Cold War the United States and Soviet Union would engage in trade, weapons, and security deals. States caught in the middle understood…

Thanks; that's a great addition to the discussion. One important nit: > The United States effort with both NAFTA and the TPP were to contain Russia and China, respectively, by building a coalition of countries with trade that excludes each specific United States adversary As I understand it (I'm no expert in the field), U.S. policy in regard to China is that its rise to superpower status is inevitable, and the U.S.'s…

> As I understand it (I'm no expert in the field), U.S. policy in regard to China is that its rise to superpower status is inevitable

Interesting. My understanding is quite the opposite: that the U.S. policy in regard to China is that its rise to superpower status is in question.

China is 25 years or more from being on par with the United States in terms of military projection in its own region (much less power projection in distant lands and seas). China has legitimate issues with all of its territories that have strategic resources: its water is in Tibet, its minerals and oil is in its Uyghur region. The United States today has China surrounded by the "first island chain." China's economy is robust, but has inherent weaknesses that could cause it to fracture as it tries to jump the 'middle income gap'. Indeed out of several dozens of states that have attempted jumping the gap, only a couple have succeeded. Ongoing sovereignty disputes in Hong Kong and Taiwan keep the Chinese mainland divided and focused in on its own territory. Japan today could match Chinese military might, and with the right trajectories could maintain an upper hand in the future. America has tried to block Chinese multilateral/international banking efforts (AIIB, ADB, etc) and it's admission into the Special Economic Basket of currencies at the IMF. Today the United States (well, under the prior administration...) is trying to prevent full membership of China inside the WTO, and it's membership isn't guaranteed. India forms a natural check on Chinese regional power as its population is larger than China and its economy is growing at even faster rates. Russia (which shares a huge and important border with China) and America both eye China and it's ambitions and could individually or together align to snuff Chinese expansion where they to find a good justification. China's international investments are questionable, as much of them are in countries with poor histories of solvency (this is a strategic bet on the part of China). It's One Belt One Road infrastructure project is vulnerable to stability issues in Central Asia (of which there is a long history). The people's party in China also (rightly) fears regime change operations in their country - this remains a real possibility. China has a burgeoning nuclear power (DPRK) on its border, a nation in dispute with a long time American military protectorate.

The United States has a lot of issues it can make with China, from internation trade, currency practices, South China Sea settlement, Taiwan and recognition of independence, Japanese security (look at their reform of National Security legislation), Indian bolstering, Korean Unification, Russia's far east, Central Asian proxies, etc.

The United States is hoping that, with containment pressure on all of China's strategic bets that it won't be able to realize its ambitions to greatness - and will fizzle. This is a practiced playbook: it's how the United States prevented the Soviet Union from realizing super power parity. Curiously, the timeline originally predicted by strategic thinkers for the Soviet Union for parity was also "25 years."

Including China into the "rules-based international order" isn't code for "we want a nation as powerful as our own to also rule the international order." The United States Grand Stategy toward China - indeed toward any and every potential adversary - is to prevent their rise by raising obstacles and costs to its succession.

Re: US pulls out of Trans-Pacific Partnership

#80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Thanks; that's a great addition to the discussion. One important nit: > The United States effort with both NAFTA and the TPP were to contain Russia and China, respectively, by building a coalition of countries with trade that excludes each specific United States adversary As I understand it (I'm no expert in the field), U.S. policy in regard to China is that its rise to superpower status is inevitable, and the U.S.'s…

> As I understand it (I'm no expert in the field), U.S. policy in regard to China is that its rise to superpower status is inevitable Interesting. My understanding is quite the opposite: that the U.S. policy in regard to China is that its rise to superpower status is in question. China is 25 years or more from being on par with the United States in terms of military projection in its own region (much less power proje…

Great talking with you, by the way.

Our understandings are different, of course, and it's great to learn another perspective. I agree with much of what you say, I just think it weighs less heavily. But a few concrete points:

1) A minor point: China's massive and questionable investments in poor countries are not grants, but loans (at least, based on what I've read). They may be creating leverage over those countries via debt, similar to what the West had at least until massive debt forgiveness.

2) 25 years is a larger number than what I understand. Depending on how it's measured, China's economy already is ~75% of the U.S.'s size and growing much more quickly (though with many serious risks, as you point out). Also, they don't need complete parity, just the prospect of parity - that will be enough to intimidate neighbors. Finally, China currently can focus all their resources on one region; the U.S.'s are distributed globally - one reason Obama hoped to withdraw from some situations.

3) My understanding was that the Cold War 'containment' strategy was not based on the assumption that the USSR would reach parity, but that their Communist economic system was fatally flawed, would inevitably collapse, and all the West had to do was wait and keep the USSR contained. At the time, some did claim that the USSR would or even did catch up - IIRC (a hazy memory of the histories I read) Kissinger thought so and so did the CIA at some point(s). But mainly we tried to pressure them into failing; that's the popular wisdom for why Reagan engaged in an arms buildup and 'Star Wars' missile defense. Regardless, based on hazy memory of numbers from the 1970s that I saw a year ago, the USSR and Warsaw Pact grew to around 50% of NATOs economic strength.

> The United States Grand Strategy

From what I've read many times from foreign policy insiders, such a thing doesn't exist. The foreign policy institutions are so massive and complex, from Dept of State to Dept of Defense to the National Security Advisor and staff, to all the large subcomponents of each, to Congress, to all the career bureaucrats that outlast any President, that getting them all moving in the same direction is impossible. Also, those people are disappointingly and shockingly focused on the day-to-day; few have time for grand strategy. As one person observed,

If, as F. Scott Fitzgerald said, '[t]he test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function,' then the government is a genius.

I think you would enjoy the whole article:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/05/how-the-u-s-saw-syrias-w...

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