Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's a form of victim blaming. We have hoards of people chasing down any developers that have written a fast response UDP protocol and any operators running them. Yet the cause is incompetent ISPs that fail to implement BCP 38. Even if the crusade to end useful UDP protocols is successful, all of that short-sighted behavior is for nothing because untraceable DDoS attacks are still a problem. Someone with a spoofing c…
> It's a form of victim blaming. 1. Victim blaming is when you excuse someone's bad behaviour with the justification that the person(s) negatively affected by it could have protected/tried to protect themselves against it. That doesn't have anything to do with the question whether you should try to protect yourself, or whether you might have some obligation to try and protect others. 2. Based on your logic, what you…
They are also victims from the second order effects of idiots in prominent places claiming that their services are the source of the Internet's woes (e.g. Cloudflare's ridiculing of dns resolver operators).
Your entire second point is nonsensical because they aren't impacted by DoS attacks. They aren't 'victims' in any sense.
Also, people running UDP services cannot stop source spoofed DDoS attacks. You can block the entire UDP protocol today and the problem of untraceable attacks will be just as prevalent tomorrow. The largest attack observed (>1tbps didn't use amplifying UDP services at all).
BCP 38 would end this problem, full stop. ISPs complicit in what amounts to fraud deserve no sympathy. On most routers, ingress filtering is a one line option. Yet people like you promote breaking changes to UDP protocols as a half-baked solution that doesn't do anything to actually stop source spoofed DDoS attacks. It baffles me.