Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 • Hacker News Board

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#71

Post by Nursie » Wed, Oct 05, 2016, 9:41 AM UTC

4ad wrote: post #57

Nursie wrote: post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So much worse with NFC, where I can just tap my card (or my phone) against the reader and be done. Further, you always had to wait for the cashier to scan everything in the UK. The 'magic button' is an implementation detail and not native to the technology. But apart from that, sure, you want an easily-cloneable passive technology because it saves you a few seconds under some circumstances.

> Further, you always had to wait for the cashier to scan everything in the UK. But not in the US. This is also just an "implementation detail". But implementation details are essential for the user experience. > you want an easily-cloneable passive technology because it saves you a few seconds under some circumstances. Exactly, convenience trumps everything. At the end of the day, I don't lose any money with the les…

No. Convenience doesn't trump everything, economics does. Banks with better security can offer cheaper services to merchants, and the merchants lower prices to the customer.

You don't lose money with the stripe in the US because the banks eat the (massive) losses. Here they don't, because of the better tech. You can still use the stripe, but the merchant takes the liability. It's up to them. Guess why they don't...

So no, convenience doesn't trump everything.

Oh, and in the US you have to wait and sign a piece of paper, eating into your precious time.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#72

Post by 4ad » Wed, Oct 05, 2016, 9:41 AM UTC

anonymousDan wrote: post #21

I don't quite get what they are currently doing. Is it that they have some kind of Internal mitm proxy that proxies every TLS session with external hosts, recording the conversation for later offline analysis? Why wouldn't they still be able to do that? Or are they just worried about their ability to intercept internal conversations? I'd be really interested to know what a typical bank security architecture looks lik…

They don't MITM, they record sessions and later decrypt out-of-band as needed.

With TLS 1.3, they would need to MITM, which require infrastructure changes and potentially affects the performance.

They are complaining TLS 1.3 forces them to do work they otherwise wouldn't have to do.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#73

Post by Nursie » Wed, Oct 05, 2016, 9:42 AM UTC

4ad wrote: post #67

raverbashing wrote: post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> At the end of the day, I don't lose any money with the less secure technology. The bank does. Why should I care? Apparently you never had a card skimmed 1 - Your card is cancelled and you have to wait some days for a replacement (requiring also that you update it everywhere) 2 - The money you lost (in case of debit) will get back to you, after an investigation.

> Apparently you never had a card skimmed I did! Just a few days ago! And it's a chip card, but doesn't matter since the skimmer used the information in the magstripe online. > Your card is cancelled and you have to wait some days for a replacement (requiring also that you update it everywhere) The new card arrived minutes ago! And that only because they had to send it to a different country. I would have gotten one…

There isn't enough information on the chip to perform online transactions, the CVV is not present. I call shenanigans.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#74

Post by raesene6 » Wed, Oct 05, 2016, 9:43 AM UTC

blazespin wrote: post #65

raesene6 wrote: post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

With regards to your example, in my experience in the banking industry, you just re-encrypt for the internal leg. TBH I think the BITS guy is over-egging his case a fair bit. For all outbound to Internet comms they've got to use an interecepting proxy anyway 'cause they're unlikely to have the relevant private key for the communication. So those systems are in place already. For inbound comms sure there's a hit, you'…

Yeah, but this means you end up with all this communication infrastructure with MITM or DMZ termination of ssl. Is that really going to be more secure than just allowing for non forward secrecy? Just because the working group removes non forward secrecy from tls doesn't mean it's going to make things better.

Well part of my point was they already have MITM infrastructure and DMZ termination of SSL is something I've seen many times in banks, so it's not exactly an unknown concept there.

As to your question of whether it's more secure, I'd ask more secure for whom? It's obvious that forward secrecy provides valuable additional protection for ordinary users of TLS. That financial services organisations will need to account for a different method of achieving the same goals they have now at some hypothetical point in the future when TLSv1.2 is deprecated, doesn't seem an unreasonable trade-off to me, but then I don't have to pay for those new systems.

As I said in my original comment I think the BITS guy is over-blowing his arguments to make a point.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#75

Post by kybernetyk » Wed, Oct 05, 2016, 9:43 AM UTC

lexman0 wrote: post #18

There are a lot of keyboard warriors in this thread. This guy puts forward a rational argument for big business. Unless you have extensive experience in this area, perhaps you shouldn't be so quick to judge "oh they are just spying on their users". The simple answer to this question is that if a way is not given for businesses to decrypt their own traffic that they generated and encrypted, they simply won't encrypt i…

>Take this example: A regulation says...

Then the regulations are faulty and need updating to be on par with reality.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#76

Post by 4ad » Wed, Oct 05, 2016, 9:45 AM UTC

raverbashing wrote: post #70

4ad wrote: post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Apparently you never had a card skimmed I did! Just a few days ago! And it's a chip card, but doesn't matter since the skimmer used the information in the magstripe online. > Your card is cancelled and you have to wait some days for a replacement (requiring also that you update it everywhere) The new card arrived minutes ago! And that only because they had to send it to a different country. I would have gotten one…

Ah so apparently you have American bank cards This is more complicated when you're a tourist You know in Europe people don't have many cards. Some people use a prepaid one for online transactions (not only for fraud but also for "things I suspect I might get overcharged") (I also don't want to swipe my card before I know how much they're charging for it, so I'll wait for everything to give them my card) Don't dismiss…

> Ah so apparently you have American bank cards

No, this was a Romanian bank, and a Romanian card, and I am currently in Austria.

> You know in Europe people don't have many cards.

Yes, I know that. It's very annoying because it allows many merchants to not accept cards, or certain types of cards (e.g. VISA/Mastercard).

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#77

Post by Nursie » Wed, Oct 05, 2016, 9:45 AM UTC

4ad wrote: post #60

raverbashing wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, having to wear a safety belt is also an inferior experience but we do it for safety True, swiping is faster (but you have to scribble something on a paper or an e-screen where the end result usually resembles nothing like your signature) :) I can agree with the criticism there but the tradeoff doesn't bother me (too much)

> having to wear a safety belt is also an inferior experience but we do it for safety We do it for our safety, but chip cards are for bank's safety. Consumers are not liable for fraud anyway, only the bank wins. Let me put it another way. Americans consumers love their magstripe; they wouldn't if they lost money. At the end of the day, chip or magstripe, the consumer has the same amount of money in his bank account.…

Because otherwise the consumer pays for the fraud and the insurance anyway.

Why do you think US credit card transaction fees to merchants are so damn high?

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#78

Post by knorker » Wed, Oct 05, 2016, 9:51 AM UTC

> Exporting of ephemeral keys: This solution has scalability and security problems on large, busy servers where it is not possible to know ahead of time which session is going to be the important one.

I don't buy it.

You can store entire sessions worth of data, but can't also optionally save metadata?

Yes, I realise you may not want to store it for all connections, but if you don't want to have a "should I store" oracle inline with the connections, then do it async and skip writing it do disk/storage service once the answer comes back.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#79

Post by drvdevd » Wed, Oct 05, 2016, 9:52 AM UTC

angersock wrote: post #48

lexman0 wrote: post #18

There are a lot of keyboard warriors in this thread. This guy puts forward a rational argument for big business. Unless you have extensive experience in this area, perhaps you shouldn't be so quick to judge "oh they are just spying on their users". The simple answer to this question is that if a way is not given for businesses to decrypt their own traffic that they generated and encrypted, they simply won't encrypt i…

It isn't so much regulations as boneheadedly conservative internal IT. I've dealt with the same thing in healthcare. The rest of us shouldn't suffer because it might mean slightly reduced profit margins for these bozos.

And like, when you put your box on a VLAN which goes through some DPI boxes which goes through some other stuff which is subject to some firewall policy ... guess what? It's still connected to the Internet.

Re: Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

#80

Post by 4ad » Wed, Oct 05, 2016, 9:53 AM UTC

Nursie wrote: post #71

4ad wrote: post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Further, you always had to wait for the cashier to scan everything in the UK. But not in the US. This is also just an "implementation detail". But implementation details are essential for the user experience. > you want an easily-cloneable passive technology because it saves you a few seconds under some circumstances. Exactly, convenience trumps everything. At the end of the day, I don't lose any money with the les…

No. Convenience doesn't trump everything, economics does. Banks with better security can offer cheaper services to merchants, and the merchants lower prices to the customer. You don't lose money with the stripe in the US because the banks eat the (massive) losses. Here they don't, because of the better tech. You can still use the stripe, but the merchant takes the liability. It's up to them. Guess why they don't... S…

> Banks with better security can offer cheaper services to merchants

Yeah, like we know that will ever happen.

> economics

Then let the banks allow people to chose what type of card they want, allow merchants to charge different price based on the type of card, allow merchants to implement paying before scanning, etc. Basically, allow the economy to work. The system works the way it works (in any country) because of fixed regulations. There's no economy. Neither consumers not merchants have any say in how anything works.

> Oh, and in the US you have to wait and sign a piece of paper, eating into your precious time.

Usually you "sign" on some electronic POS, but this time is comparable to the time spent entering the PIN, still much less than the extra time required to wait for the chip transaction to go through at the end of shopping session.