Earlier quoted context omitted.
A couple issues: * Decapping and feature extraction even from simpler devices is error prone; you can destroy the device in the process. You only get one bite at the apple; you can't "image" the hardware and restore it later. Since the government is always targeting one specific phone, this is a real problem. * There's no one byte you can write to bypass all the security on an iPhone, because (barring some unknown re…
No, the chief protection against the PIN code hacking comes from the retry counter. The FBI doesn't need the crypto keys, it just needs the PIN code. So it needs to brute force about 10,000 PIN codes. Any mechanism that prevents the application processor from either a) remembering it incremented the count b) corrupts the count or c) patches the logic that handles a retry count of 10, is sufficient to attack the phone…
On phones after the 5C, nothing you can do with the AP helps you here; the 10-strikes rule is enforced by the SE, which is a separate piece of hardware. It's true that if you can flip bits in the SE, you can influence its behavior. But whatever you do to extract or set bits in SE needs to not cause the SE to freak out and wipe keys.