It doesn't solve the current issue, but in case we don't manage to push back on this, some people might not know that there are various actual linux OSes for mobile: - SailfishOS: still linux based and seems fairly community inclusive, but the UI part of the stack is closed source. Is the only one officially allowed to run android apps, via emulation. Has existed for a very long time, it's lightweight and I think the…
I'm using a Librem 5 as my daily phone. PureOS is actively developed and based on Debian. Monthly development updates are published here: https://puri.sm/posts/tag/advanced-readers/ Personally, I do not use Android apps on the Librem 5, but Waydroid is available in the PureOS repository. Waydroid is a container-based approach to boot a full Android system on regular GNU/Linux systems running Wayland based desktop env…
Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
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Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#692Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm using a Librem 5 as my daily phone. PureOS is actively developed and based on Debian. Monthly development updates are published here: https://puri.sm/posts/tag/advanced-readers/ Personally, I do not use Android apps on the Librem 5, but Waydroid is available in the PureOS repository. Waydroid is a container-based approach to boot a full Android system on regular GNU/Linux systems running Wayland based desktop env…
The way out is for people to support the various Linux phones. These Linux distros need to support and push Android compatibility, so that people can load F-Droid, Aurora, and Obtainium on them and get most of the Android apps they want. The ability to use both Linux and Android apps should satisfy nearly everyone. A strong message of consumer defiance needs to be sent.
Using desktop linux phones and trying to force that as a norm would set privacy and security back substantially.
The inverse of what you suggest, which is Android with desktop linux app compatibility, would be a huge step forward, and is already much closer than you might think.
Modern phones have substantially better VM support in the hardware than in previous models, and it is maturing at a very fast rate. We would be able to run linux VMs on Android, paired with desktop mode, with evidence for USB passthrough for an externel GPU in AOSP
There is also evidence that we will be able to put desktop linux app icons on the Android homescreen and using them in an app-like fashion.
This would use the more secure host to run the VM for the less secure OS.
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#693Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#694Earlier quoted context omitted.
Those reasons are explained clearly and openly. Ironically, your /o/OS is way less open than GOS on Google hardware.
How is /e/ less open than Graphene? As far as I understand, they are both pretty open minus firmware that they can't control? I'm actually curious if there's something I don't know about /e/
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#695Earlier quoted context omitted.
These devices fall far behind the industry standard hardware security requirements GrapheneOS has.
Wasn't it just explained they meet the criteria?
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#6961) side loading, or however it's called, is used by less than 1-2% of global Android users (we can't be more than 50 million). Google made us a favor leaving it open after an only 24h delay. It could be much worse but now it's nothing in our eternal tinkering with developer options. Thank you from me Google.
2) GMS is a huge convenience for any app developer that needs tight control, including governments. They can secure their apps against users of any hat color. Add to that the possibility of hidden backdoors to support surveillance and Google's direct lobbying in EU. This makes it very difficult to go without it, even under the current anti-US EU direction and it will be the last that will be replaced in Europe.
3) There are various levels of "degoogling". From installing a totally open OS without or with microG, to just don't login to a Google account in stock Android. It's a spectrum but someone at the free edge will never have the same rights with one in the jailed edge.
4) Developer verif is NOT to prevent ad blocking. There is a simple and free method to block anything you like at DNS level: just select Private DNS and insert an appropriate URL for ads/trackers/porn etc, eg from controld.com. Find some other justification, like tight user control to continue sleeping with the governments or reach ultimate user surveillance with the upcoming children ident.
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#697Earlier quoted context omitted.
> You would install your own build of GrapheneOS. Not the official images. Awesome, so you're advising against installing GrapheneOS for anyone that wants control over their own data. Sorry for twisting the words slightly, but that's the essence of the issue here, isn't it? > Its not advisable to run anything as root, at all. Or expose access to it in any form. And then you advise for exposing access to it in pretty…
No, official GrapheneOS is an ideal method to control data. As a part of this, they also provide build documentation for whatever you want to do. It is FOSS, after all. To be clear, I am NOT advising root access. I am not contradicting myself. I am telling you it is dangerous but still telling you how it can be done in a less terrible way. To withhold that info would be senseless gatekeeping. GrapheneOS supports bein…
An app developer getting access to send my files to a random server somewhere? That's just a simple permission prompt, no unlock needed.
But me getting access to my own files? That's an absolute no-go. Even with adb and unlock, absolutely impossible
Seriously, you need to explain the difference. Because I don't see how apps being a one-way street (they can access my data, but I can't access theirs) is in any way reasonable.
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#698Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#699Earlier quoted context omitted.
If I hand my windows laptop to someone, they can also install a keylogger. But no one said we have to copy that flawed concept. macOS and Linux already have a good solution, requiring your full unlock password in a privileged dialog to authorize changes. It's ridiculous that changing the settings on my device is protected 10× more than transferring all my money to a random person.
> But no one said we have to copy that flawed concept. macOS and Linux already have a good solution, requiring your full unlock password in a privileged dialog to authorize changes. You use operating systems that have significantly worse security than GOS, iOS and even stock Android as your examples? Also you literally are the owner with GrapheneOS, lacking security is not "full ownership." You can create your own bu…
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#700Let's see some points: 1) side loading, or however it's called, is used by less than 1-2% of global Android users (we can't be more than 50 million). Google made us a favor leaving it open after an only 24h delay. It could be much worse but now it's nothing in our eternal tinkering with developer options. Thank you from me Google. 2) GMS is a huge convenience for any app developer that needs tight control, including…
It's wild how far we've come, from IBM trying to lock down the PC to truly open hardware, to you now thanking Google for only mostly restricting what you can do with a device that you bought and own...
The rest of your content is just other forms of Google apologia.
This is honestly deeply disheartening... And on "hacker" news of all places...