Note that this doesn’t satisfy the government’s original request, which was for worldwide backdoor access into E2E-encrypted cloud accounts. But I have a more pertinent question: how can you “pull” E2E encryption without data loss? What happens to those that had this enabled? Edit: Part of my concern is that you have to keep in mind Apple's defense against backdooring E2E is the (US) doctrine that work cannot be comp…
I think it’s really speech [0], which is why it’s important to user privacy and security that Apple widely advertises their entire product line and business as valuing privacy. That way, it’s a higher bar for a court to cross, on balance, when weighing whether to compel speech/code (& signing) to break E2EE.
After all, if the CEO says privacy is unimportant [1], maybe compelling a code update to break E2EE is no big deal? (“The court is just asking you, Google, to say/code what you already believe”).
Whereas if the company says they value privacy, then does the opposite without so much as a fight and then the stock price drops, maybe that’d be securities fraud? [2]. And so maybe that’d be harder to compel.
[0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43134235
[1]: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/google-ceo-eric-schmid...
[2]: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-26/everyt...