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The American Healthcare Conundrum

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Re: The American Healthcare Conundrum

#681

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Personal experience with specific interventions reflects something real: US cancer survival rates, cardiac procedure outcomes, and access to cutting-edge treatments are genuinely strong for people with good coverage. That's not disputed. The cost-outcome tradeoff shows up at the population level. US life expectancy: 77.5 years. Spain: 83.6. UK: 81.6. Infant mortality: US 5.4 per 1,000 vs. Spain 3.4, UK 3.7 (OECD 2023…

The cost and life expectancy differences are indisputable, but the rationale may need more nuanced: that's not necessarily a problem with the healthcare industry, but with lifestyles, safety regulations, food standards, and a long et cetera of reasons. For instance Spanish people, on average, have more balanced diets and are more active than American people. They also lead much less stressful lives. That's a big fact…

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Re: The American Healthcare Conundrum

#682

The problems are so vast it is difficult to even describe to outsiders. For example, if I purchase a particular medication at a local pharmacy, it costs $25. However, my insurer mandates that I purchase it via their Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBM) Optum, which charges $125. Easy enough right, you price shop? Well then it doesnt count towards your deductible. The whole thing is an elaborate trap to not pay. Sometimes…

Your example captures two distinct extraction mechanisms in one transaction. The $25 to $125 gap is spread pricing: the PBM pockets the difference between what they pay the pharmacy and what they bill the plan. The deductible non-application is a separate mechanism: by routing through their own channel, the PBM ensures that cost doesn't reduce your out-of-pocket maximum, extending your exposure for the year.

The FTC's 2024 Interim Report documented $7.3B in specialty drug markups from the Big 3 PBMs in a single year. The Ohio Auditor found PBM spread pricing extracted $224.8M from one state's $2.5B Medicaid drug budget annually.

Re: The American Healthcare Conundrum

#683

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Prescriptions are a total racket. A good portion of actual medication literally costs a few dollars at most. Then there’s layer upon layer of bloat and bureaucracy that add no value but drive the cost up 10x or more. It’s totally bonkers. When these Rx cards and Marc Cuban CostPlus drugs came out where you just pay cash and a fraction of the price I thought there must be some catch or scam here. But turns out no, the…

See https://pharmacy.osu.edu/news/prescription-discount-cards-wh...

Thanks for sharing the OSU piece, good read. A few things it surfaces that complicate the "discount cards help patients" narrative: discount card companies still contract with PBMs to set pricing, they don't bypass them entirely. The savings often come out of the pharmacy's margin rather than the PBM's: the article shows a pharmacy receiving $5 on a drug it acquired for $15, with the PBM still collecting a transaction fee either way. GoodRx was also fined by the FTC for selling patient health data to advertisers without authorization, so there's a second extraction happening on the data side.

The deeper point the card market reveals: a profitable arbitrage layer can consistently undercut the insurer's "negotiated" rate, which tells you the negotiated rate isn't really a discount. Generic apixaban costs £1.16 per 30-day supply in the UK. Medicare's gross cost for Eliquis (same molecule) is $862.

Re: The American Healthcare Conundrum

#684

I saw Jim Clark (founder of SGI, Netscape, Healtheon) talk one time about entrepreneurship. He said something that compactly explains a lot of issues humanity faces in general: "One person's inefficiency is someone else's bottom line." A lot of the things that the original post shares has this characteristic. Sure, things in US healthcare are wildly inefficient, but that's how a lot of these companies make a lot of m…

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Re: The American Healthcare Conundrum

#685

Public perception is that the US is not willing to pay for universal healthcare. However, the US spends enough money, it just spends it inefficiently. The US spends ~$900 Billion a year on Medicaid [1] and ~$1.1 Trillion a year on Medicare [2]. If the US spent this money as efficiently as Japan (or UK [3], ...) it could pay for Universal Healthcare without increasing its budget. [1] https://www.kff.org/medicaid/medic…

The direction is right. Total US healthcare spending is $4.87T for 335M people ($14,570/capita, CMS NHE 2023). Japan's per-capita is $5,790, with the highest life expectancy in the world and lowest infant mortality in the OECD. The annual national gap is approximately $3T.

The series is not arguing for a specific coverage structure. It is documenting where the excess goes, mechanism by mechanism. Four issues in, $128.6B is accounted for conservatively: drug pricing, hospital commercial markups, PBM extraction. Each mechanism has a defensible, operationally precedented fix that does not require redesigning the entire system. Montana Medicaid adopted commercial reference pricing at 200% of Medicare and measured no quality deterioration. The FTC documented PBM specialty drug markups and three states have already enacted clawback restrictions. None of that required universal healthcare.

Re: The American Healthcare Conundrum

#686

I suspect we can solve about 2.9T of waste by eliminating publicly traded for-profit healthcare and for-profit insurance.

For-profit structure is part of the problem but not all of it. Issue 3 analyzed 3,193 hospitals using CMS HCRIS FY2023 cost reports. For-profit hospitals do have the highest cost-to-charge markups: 4.11x median. But nonprofits are 2.46x, and nonprofits hold 75.5% of total national hospital supply spend. The ownership form does not reliably determine pricing behavior when market conditions are the same: opaque prices, patients who cannot shop, no reference price to anchor negotiation.

Maryland has had all-payer hospital rate-setting since 1977 with a largely nonprofit hospital sector. It produces significantly better cost control than the national average. The structural fix for hospital pricing (commercial reference pricing at 200% of Medicare) works regardless of tax status because it creates a known floor price. That is what the RAND data and the Montana Medicaid experience both show. The mechanism matters more than the ownership form.

Re: The American Healthcare Conundrum

#687

It’s disturbing to see multiple comments that “capitalism” is to blame for the costs in healthcare. The US healthcare market is the least free market in the US. Capitalism (when there is true competition) brings down costs pretty universally. Those parts of the market that are market oriented tend to get better and cheaper over time (for example, generic over the counter meds, needles, and even health care panels, AI…

Agreed on the diagnosis: the inpatient hospital market does not function as a competitive market. Patients arriving by ambulance do not shop on price. Insurance insulates consumers from marginal cost. Regulatory and capital barriers prevent new entrants. The HCRIS FY2023 data for 3,193 hospitals shows what this produces: a 2.6x median markup to actual cost, with the highest-markup hospitals rarely losing patients to lower-cost alternatives nearby.

Your examples of what works are instructive. Generic OTC, needles, blood panels all share the same conditions: price-visible, consumer-controlled, no third-party payment insulation. The RAND hospital data shows the identical procedure (hip replacement) costing $29K commercially in the US versus $14.7K in Germany and $8.7K in Spain. Same implant, same surgeon training requirements. The patient's insurance status varies; the procedure does not.

Montana's commercial reference pricing is not deregulation, but it creates the price-visibility function you are describing: a known floor price that makes it possible for a purchaser to act on price information. Employers have adopted it nationally with documented savings.

Re: The American Healthcare Conundrum

#688
post #506

If healthcare was cost competitive there would be prices listed like a fast food restaurant.

CMS now requires hospitals to publish machine-readable price files under the Hospital Price Transparency Rule (effective 2021, enforcement added 2022). Compliance rates are technically high. The problem is the files run tens of thousands of line items in inconsistent formats, negotiated rates vary by insurance plan, and chargemaster list prices bear no predictable relationship to what any patient actually pays.

RAND's Round 5.1 study analyzed actual paid claims rather than posted prices and found commercial insurers paid 254% of Medicare rates for identical procedures at the same hospitals. The transparency is on paper. The opacity is structural: a price list is only useful if a purchaser can act on it, and the moment of care is not when most patients can comparison shop. Which is why reference pricing works at the employer level (purchaser can act in advance on a population basis) but published hospital price lists have not moved the market.

Re: The American Healthcare Conundrum

#689

I suspect we can solve about 2.9T of waste by eliminating publicly traded for-profit healthcare and for-profit insurance.

For-profit structure is part of the problem but not all of it. Issue 3 analyzed 3,193 hospitals using CMS HCRIS FY2023 cost reports. For-profit hospitals do have the highest cost-to-charge markups: 4.11x median. But nonprofits are 2.46x, and nonprofits hold 75.5% of total national hospital supply spend. The ownership form does not reliably determine pricing behavior when market conditions are the same: opaque prices,…

I’m willing to agree on some points however, the for-profit model is what incentivizes the convolution in the first place. It has been the main driver for injecting complexity at every level. In turn, even nonprofits have to spend capital to make sense of it.

In other words, it does measurable harm to the entire industry and builds the moat wider in favor of the for-profits and shrinks the margins of the nonprofits trying to compete.

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