Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is so that you can be sued or prosecuted if the app is malicious.
There's no such requirement for publishing a website
Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
671–680 of 793 posts
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#672This would be the line for me. If at some point I'm unable to build an .apk and install it on my phone without Google letting me, I'm moving to Huawei.
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#673how is graphene these days, or is there a better alternative that can run map apps that depend on google play services (like waze)?
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#674I don't understand how this is legal in the EU under the DMA, does anyone know?
I already contacted the DMA authorities and complained how this has an effect on German diabetes communities and they replied that I am not the first one who approaches them on this and they are already investigating it. Google is just trying how far they can push this.
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#675Earlier quoted context omitted.
These devices fall far behind the industry standard hardware security requirements GrapheneOS has.
If they're only supported on a single line of devices made by a single company and there are thousands of devices made by hundreds of companies, then that's not industry standard. It might be better than industry standard, and it might be good, but it's hardly common.
So no, they are not "only met on a single line of devices", in fact Samsung gets super close, but they remove yellowboot support and cripple the device if you unlock the bootloader.
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#676It doesn't solve the current issue, but in case we don't manage to push back on this, some people might not know that there are various actual linux OSes for mobile: - SailfishOS: still linux based and seems fairly community inclusive, but the UI part of the stack is closed source. Is the only one officially allowed to run android apps, via emulation. Has existed for a very long time, it's lightweight and I think the…
> It doesn't solve the current issue These operating systems aren't compatible with most of the apps and services people want to use. It's going to become much worse. The compatibility layers several provide have extremely poor compatibility combined with disabling the Android security model and app sandbox. Apps running in those compatibility layers are much less contained with less isolation from the Linux kernel,…
Being isolated a little bit more from the kernal offers an illusion of privacy meanwhile where you are, what you have installed, your photos and friends are available to other apps at a much higher level. I understand being able to slow down a nation state actor is important but most privacy concerns for average people happen at the OS level not the kernel.
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#677Earlier quoted context omitted.
Usability-wise, they are no match for Android and iOS—or even versions of them from five years ago. UI/UX is costly, and most FOSS projects cannot get it right without massive investments from enterprises (e.g., Red Hat's UX designers heavily contributed to GNOME) or startups (e.g., Zed, Element, Bluesky). Projects without that backing are mostly unusable, at least from a Gen Z perspective.
FWIW, I use my smartphone as an MP3 player, SMS messenger and TOTP auth. iOS and Android did that fine 5 years ago, I don't need Instagram or 8 Ball Pool to survive in life.
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#678Earlier quoted context omitted.
There is a good solution. A big disclaimer and the user accepting the risk of running the software they want. The same solution they've been doing for years that did not need change. The new developer program is only here because it is more convenient to Google and governments.
We've known for literally decades that that doesn't actually work, for several reasons: 1. People are conditioned to ignore warnings. There are way too many benign warnings in the world; you can't read them all. 2. Even when people wouldn't ignore them, in cases where they are being tricked by scammers it's easy for the scammer to talk people into accepting them. 3. Those sorts of warnings aren't actionable. You're i…
To be clear, enough does not mean that will stop every trojan/scam. People send Starbucks gift cards to callers claiming to be from the IRS calling to collect overdue taxes despite the obvious absurdity. Enough means that someone who doesn't know anything about computers but who reads and believes the warning label has sufficient information to know that it's a potentially dangerous decision. Some people will make the dangerous decision anyway, but it's on them at that point.
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#679Earlier quoted context omitted.
> We're legally allowed to provide compatibility with Google Play via our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer. and they are legally allowed to fingerprint grapheneos and block Play functionality. maybe once that happens grapheneos will finally take anti-fingerprinting seriously.
> and they are legally allowed to fingerprint grapheneos and block Play functionality. No, and you also don't understand how the Play Integrity API is implemented. Google has a bunch of monopolies tied to Android. Antitrust laws put limits on what they're allowed to do which Google has been egregiously violating for many years. Google isn't legally allowed to pull a bait and switch with Android by changing it away fr…
Permit faking hardware attestation by providing a remote attestation provider device that runs stock Android and a corresponding app. When app on GrapheneOS asks to be attested, that request gets routed via the cloud to the stock Android remote device. People will have to buy 2 phones, one running GrapheneOS that they actually use, one that runs stock Android that they can lock up in a closet plugged into power.
Re: Android Developer Verification: Threat masquerading as protection
#680Earlier quoted context omitted.
And all are useless because you can't use your mandatory bank or gov id app.
Not useless. It is like the missing printer driver for Linux Desktop. It makes the experience ugly, but this is not the fault of the Linux OSes. Also the bank should not require apps (instead they can offer hardware key support or desktop apps) and in fact some - at least in Germany - offer a different authentication possibility. Also the app for the German ID is published on fdroid and does not rely on Google servic…