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A Message to Our Customers

apple.com

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Re: A Message to Our Customers

#661

Earlier quoted context omitted.

".. what this means is that even Apple can't break into an iPhone with a secure passphrase (10+ characters) and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint." That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security…

"From what I understand Tim is doing, and I greatly admire, is trying to avoid a judicial requirement that they be able to do this on demand. The so called "back door" requirement, because he knows, as others do, that such a feature would be used by more than the intended audience, and for more than the intended uses, to the detriment of Apple's users." To be fair - the only reason he's doing it is because it would c…

> the only reason he's doing it is because it would cause a significant drop in sales for Apple devices. People overseas would immediately stop buying because "The American government is listening", and that's assuming countries like China and Russia wouldn't ban them outright.

That hasn't happened with other devices or earlier iPhones that aren't as secure.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#662

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Apple has implicitly for a long time, and lately much more vocally, cared about privacy. They say that. But with closed source software we can't verify that it's true. I'm not saying they don't care about privacy, only that we don't really know if they do or not.

With open source software, it doesn't appear that people can verify things are safe either given the long-term security issues with things like OpenSSL et al.

I never said they could. There is a better chance that they can, but that line of thinking ends up trying to prove a negative.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#663
post #540

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure you can draw the conclusion that Apple can push OS updates to a locked phone. What Tim Cook wrote is that > "install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation." > "the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession." So the FBI has the physical phone already. They can deliver to Apple who can disassemble it and either use a JTAG/Flash programmer on an internal connector to manua…

"I'm not sure you can draw the conclusion that Apple can push OS updates to a locked phone." The iphone contains a sim card. A sim card is a complete, general purpose computer with its own CPU and RAM and the ability to run arbitrary java programs that can be uploaded, without your knowledge by your carrier. You are owned . Deeply, profoundly, in ways that you have no way to manage/mitigate. The real question, for me…

You are owned. Deeply, profoundly, in ways that you have no way to manage/mitigate.

The international legal framework of sovereignty basically says you are owned. (Not universally de jure, but pretty much de facto.) Whatever rights you have are effectively granted to you by your country. Unfortunately, this notion is seldom given any thought, and the current most visible proponents of such an idea are unpleasant angry underclass men using it as an excuse to behave badly. There are others who have given thought to this, however, and it is part of the motivation behind such things as The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Declaration_of_Human...

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#664

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The iPhones with an A7 or later CPU should be secure against this. This whole thing is only an issue because the phone in question is an iPhone 5C, which uses an older CPU without the "secure enclave" system.

Would you expand upon this?

Sure thing.

Starting with the A7 CPUs, the iPhone CPU has a "secure enclave" which is basically a miniature SoC within the SoC. The secure enclave has its own CPU with its own secure boot chain and runs independently of the rest of the system. It runs a modified L4 microkernel and it does all of low-level key management.

The secure enclave contains a unique ID burned into the hardware. This ID can be loaded as a key into the hardware AES engine, but is otherwise designed to be completely inaccessible. Assuming AES is secure, that means the key can be used to encrypt data but can't be extracted, not even by the supposedly secure software running in the secure enclave. This key is then used to generate other keys, like the ones used to encrypt files. That means you can't extract the flash memory, connect it to a computer, and then try to brute force it from there. Or rather you can, but you'll be brute forcing a 256-bit AES key, not a 4-digit PIN, making it effectively impossible.

One of the secure enclave's tasks is taking a PIN (or fingerprint) and turning it into the encryption key needed to read the user's files. The main system just hands off the user's code to the secure enclave, and gets back either a key or a failure. The escalating delays with successive failures and wipe after too many failures are both done in the secure enclave. That means that updating the device's main OS won't affect it.

All of this is discussed in Apple's security guide here:

https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf

The one open question is software updates for the secure enclave. According to that guide, its software can be updated. Does that mean it can be updated with code that removes the restrictions and allows brute-forcing passcodes? The guide doesn't address how the updates work.

My guess, based on how meticulous Apple is about everything else, is that updates are designed to make this scenario impossible. The secure enclave must be unlocked to apply an update, or if updated without unlocking it wipes the master keys. This would be pretty simple to do, and it would fit in with the rest of their approach, so I think it's likely that this is how it works, or something with the same effect.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#665

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is there a list of sensibly built phones available? I'd like to buy a phone where the modem and SIM do not have access to main memory (AIUI most phones use a single-chip SoC with a built-in modem).

What's the point of accessing main memory in a locked and encrypted phone?

> What's the point of accessing main memory in a locked and encrypted phone?

The phone isn't always locked and encrypted; for example, whenever the user is using the phone it's unlocked and decrypted.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#666

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"To be fair - the only reason he's doing it is because it would cause a significant drop in sales for Apple devices." That's not being fair at all. To say the only reason he is doing it is to protect iPhone sales doesn't speak to Tim's character. Of course he cares about sales, but he also cares about privacy.

It's definitely one of those rare times doing the right thing is also the most profitable thing.

Doing the right thing is very often (if not almost always) the most profitable thing. It's very difficult to make a business out of serving your customers poorly; if you disagree, give it a shot, and let me know how it turns out for you.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#667

Earlier quoted context omitted.

".. what this means is that even Apple can't break into an iPhone with a secure passphrase (10+ characters) and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint." That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security…

> That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security. No, they can't. A quick update to recent hardware practices: modern SoCs like Apple's have something called "Secure Enclave Processor" that's on-die. This is the first thing to start when the c…

"Computationally-signed bootloader" - but does Apple have the private key? If so, why can't they create another bootloader?

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#668

Ok, so I completely fail to see how a random crazy guy with a gun who shoots up a bunch of unarmed people has "national security implications". This seems to be a "fact" that everyone wants to agree on, but is frankly a load of BS if one considers the government probably already has his entire call/texting history for the last couple years. I see this as just another "its for the children" ploy, of which I'm complete…

Good point. You'd think this would be something that local / state law enforcement should be handling, but the reason it's kicked up to the federal level is that the attack is politically motivated, which places it in the "terrorism" category.

The irony is that most people are afraid to stand up (to body scanners, mass surveillance, etc.) because of threats of violence from their own government, which is in itself a form of terrorism.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#669

Earlier quoted context omitted.

".. what this means is that even Apple can't break into an iPhone with a secure passphrase (10+ characters) and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint." That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security…

"From what I understand Tim is doing, and I greatly admire, is trying to avoid a judicial requirement that they be able to do this on demand. The so called "back door" requirement, because he knows, as others do, that such a feature would be used by more than the intended audience, and for more than the intended uses, to the detriment of Apple's users." To be fair - the only reason he's doing it is because it would c…

Being the vocal advocate to stand up to the gov't IS risky. The wording is carefully crafted to prevent spin damage (pro-terrorist, anti-law enforcement).

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#670
post #2

Huge props to Apple - here's hoping against hope that Google, Facebook, and Amazon get behind this. One thing I was wondering is how Apple is even able to create a backdoor. It is explained toward the end: "The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force…

> here's hoping against hope that Google, Facebook, and Amazon get behind this

I would assume that Google, Facebook, and Amazon are already sending every single keystroke we type straight to all the three letter agencies pretty much in real time. (I also assume the same about Apple, so I'm not sure what to make of this open letter.)

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