can't get hacked if you don't use a VPN.
I use sshuttle (https://www.terminalbytes.com/sshuttle-vpn-over-ssh-vpn-alte...).
NordVPN confirms it was hacked
641–650 of 666 posts
Re: NordVPN confirms it was hacked
#642Earlier quoted context omitted.
So what can you do about it?
Full Disk Encryption is an option, but that’ll entail needing the use the IPMI console to enter the password at every reboot, essentially turning it into a manual operation.
One can do LUKS with access via dropbear in initramfs.
If you're lucky during network install, you'll never need out of bound access.
But rebooting is still a manual process.
Re: NordVPN confirms it was hacked
#643Earlier quoted context omitted.
Read up on "Perfect forward secrecy": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy Assuming their IPsec was enabled with it (and OpenVPN should be enabled by default), them leaking their keys does not matter. The sessions can not be decrypted even if the master key is leaked. TLS also has perfect forward secrecy by default. Impersonation is an issue, but the article stated the CA keys have already been rotated and a…
> Impersonation is an issue, but the article stated the CA keys have already been rotated and are out of date. They were not rotated back then in 2018, so we can only guess if MITM had place. Their line of defence appealing to keys which are NOW outdated is just ridiculous. > Read up on "Perfect forward secrecy": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy > The sessions can not be decrypted even if the master key…
> They were not rotated back then in 2018, so we can only guess if MITM had place. Their line of defence appealing to keys which are NOW outdated is just ridiculous.
MITM could have taken place anyway because the attacker was on the machines. They did not need the key.
> It's not true. PFS provides cryptographic isolation between long-term keys and session key used to encrypt data. Obviously, if MSK compromised it is irrevelant, how it was inferred: with PFS or not.
PFS implementations have the session key rotated automatically in software and dependent on the implementation multiple session keys are in use at any given time dependent on flow. The PFS session key would also be different for every VPN server in the NordVPN environment. The only possible way to compromise a session on another VPN node (that was not compromised itself) would have been to intercept it at the time of the session being created and MITM by injecting your own PFS session key.
That is why it is called "Forward secrecy": the session can not be decrypted in the future, only in the present.
Unless your assumption is that this is a state actor with the ability to MITM connections in the first place, or a rogue ISP BGP hijacking that would have been obviously seen on something like BGPStream [https://bgpstream.com/], it is safe to say that no other VPN node's traffic was compromised. Only traffic on this single host in this single location.
More reading: https://www.speaknetworks.com/what-is-ipsec-vpn-pfs-perfect-... (Step 5)
"Instead of making use of the DH Keys Calculated during Phase-1, PFS forces DH-Key calculation during Phase-2 Setup as well as Phase-2 periodic Rekey. The PFS ensures that the same key will not be generated and used again."
OpenVPN (using TLS) also uses PFS by default. There is a reason it is called "Perfect."
EDIT: PFS is commonly also implemented by Diffie-Hellmen (DHE) key exchange: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie–Hellman_key_exchange
EDIT 2: I am not defending them as well. I just believe extrapolating the technical details is fear mongering at best. Believe it is best to focus on the facts as it makes for a stronger argument.
Re: NordVPN confirms it was hacked
#644Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Impersonation is an issue, but the article stated the CA keys have already been rotated and are out of date. They were not rotated back then in 2018, so we can only guess if MITM had place. Their line of defence appealing to keys which are NOW outdated is just ridiculous. > Read up on "Perfect forward secrecy": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy > The sessions can not be decrypted even if the master key…
> They were not rotated back then in 2018, so we can only guess if MITM had place. Their line of defence appealing to keys which are NOW outdated is just ridiculous. MITM could have taken place anyway because the attacker was on the machines. They did not need the key. > It's not true. PFS provides cryptographic isolation between long-term keys and session key used to encrypt data. Obviously, if MSK compromised it is…
I've lost track of discussion and maybe some misunderstanding takes place, but I'll attempt to synchronize.
There are two distinct severe security issues. First one is leaked CA key, which allows to certify any key as a valid key for NordVPN server certificate key. I think it is not necessary to argue about this: traffic decryption to any Nord OpenVPN server became simple as network MITM. Not likely a state-level BGP hijack, but local attack targeting channel of small group of users. Anyway, we do not have cryptographical guarantees since this point.
Second issue is leaked RADIUS key. Why it is a problem for encryption? Because EAP authentication and key derivation runs between VPN client and RADIUS, and VPN server receives derived keys as attributes of EAP message: https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/wiki/EAPRadi...
> The eap-radius plugin does not implement an EAP method directly, but it redirects the EAP conversation with a client to a RADIUS backend server. On the gateway, the EAP packets get extracted from the IKE messages and encapsulated into the RADIUS protocol, and vice versa. The gateway itself does not need special support for a specific EAP method, as it handles the EAP conversation between the client and the RADIUS backend more or less transparently.
> For EAP methods providing an MSK, the RADIUS server must include the key within the MPPE-Send/Receive Keys; Unfortunately, FreeRADIUS before 2.1.10 did not include these attributes when used with EAP-MSCHAPv2.
So, despite session encryption key is not bound directly to long-term secrets which server possesses, they can be extracted from communication between StrongSwan and RADIUS server.
PFS has nothing to do with all of it. In first case it is possible to issue VALID certificate for eavesdrop VPN server and redirect users traffic to it. In second case MSK probably can be extracted communication between VPN server and RADIUS server (I can't say if it will require MITM of RADIUS session or it is possible to decrypt EAP payload with passive sniffing and posession of RADIUS secret key).
Re: NordVPN confirms it was hacked
#645Earlier quoted context omitted.
It is copy of snippet linked from 8ch.net: https://web.archive.org/web/20180504001844/https://8ch.net/b...
Hasn't that site been down for weeks now?
It's a snapshot of thread dated by May 3, 2018. Info leaked long time ago, but became sensation just recently.
Re: NordVPN confirms it was hacked
#646Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you have physical access twice, full disk encryption usually doesn't help really at all. IPMI seems about as powerful as physical access.
If you just ignore random reboots, sure. But why would you?
I don't think that'd be necessary, couldn't you make changes and then wait for natural reboots?
Re: NordVPN confirms it was hacked
#647Earlier quoted context omitted.
Just set up your code as a boot-once config and wait for the owner to reboot their machine. Make your code end by booting the installed OS (or even by just rebooting again, most people will just curse about the damn slow server boot process).
You can't do that as you don't have any access until it's being rebooted. It's basically like you're standing in front of the machine so there's not really much you can do when you're just looking at a login prompt, you have to be able to stop grub from just booting with the default options and instead boot up using init=/bin/bash or maybe if the server supports iPXE you can just chain load some payload off the inter…
You can manipulate boot settings using BMC commands. No need to mess with Grub or the running system. Instead, tell the system to boot up from an emulated USB drive (image can be attached from some remote server, often including your web browser).
Now wait for the machine to get rebooted (or do it yourself using the BMC, e.g. 'racadm serveraction powercycle' for Dell/iDRAC machines).
Even SecureBoot won't help as you can just turn it off using the BMC.
See here for a bunch of examples for Dell machines using the BMC's HTTP API:
https://github.com/dell/iDRAC-Redfish-Scripting/tree/master/...
Re: NordVPN confirms it was hacked
#648what TechCrunch is hacked????
Re: NordVPN confirms it was hacked
#649Earlier quoted context omitted.
But do they even have to pay much to youtubers for those ads? If you get 50k to 100k views per video then you'll likely make around the range of $50-$150 for the video. Paying the youtuber $50-$100 per video would already have a significant impact on their income, so they'd probably consider it. That would be 50k-100k people who will see the ad, because adblock can't block it.
If somebody is getting $50-$150 per video, they're probably doing it for the passion of making videos, not for the income, and they probably have another source of income that dwarfs what they're getting from youtube.
Not necessarily. If they put up a video every day then that's $1500 a month minimum. That's decent income in most countries, even in many EU ones. Now imagine if sponsor segments doubled that for you - now it's $3000 a month, which is already on the lower end of decent even in the richest countries.
Re: NordVPN confirms it was hacked
#650I am concerned most about one thing: When can the VPN defeat China's Firewall?