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Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company

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Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company

#621

Post by Matl »

cbarrick wrote: post #614
2pEXgD0fZ5cF wrote: post #500

Well I was wondering when the war on general computing and computer ownership would be carried into the heart of the open source ecosystems. Sure, there are sensible things that could be done with this. But given the background of the people involved, the fact that this is yet another clear profit-first gathering makes me incredibly pessimistic. This pessimism is made worse by reading the answers of the founders here…

> [T]he war on general computing and computer ownership [...] It is exhausting to see the hatred some have for people just owning their hardware. The integrity of a system being verified/verifiable doesn't imply that the owner of the system doesn't get to control it. This sort of e2e attestation seems really useful for enterprise or public infrastructure. Like, it'd be great to know that the ATMs or transit systems i…

> You argument correctly points out that attestation tech can be used to restrict software freedom, but it also assumes that this company is actively pursuing those use cases. I don't think that is a given.

Once it's out there and normalized, the individual engineers don't get to control how it is used. They never do.

Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company

#622

Post by direwolf20 »

ingohelpinger wrote: post #453
cyphar wrote: post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm Aleksa, one of the founding engineers. We will share more about this in the coming months but this is not the direction nor intention of what we are working on. The models we have in mind for attestation are very much based on users having full control of their keys. This is not just a matter of user freedom, in practice being able to do this is far more preferable for enterprises with strict security controls. I…

Thanks for the clarification and to be clear, I don't doubt your personal intent or FOSS background. The concern isn't bad actors at the start, it's how projects evolve once they matter. History is pretty consistent here: WhatsApp: privacy-first, founders with principles, both left once monetization and policy pressure kicked in. Google: 'Don’t be evil' didn’t disappear by accident — it became incompatible with scale…

Did AI write this comment?

Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company

#623

Post by direwolf20 »

gcr wrote: post #271
yxhuvud wrote: post #205

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Afaik bankid will actually run as long as you can install play store (IE the device don't need Google certificate), which isn't great but a little bit better than what it could have been.

That can't be right. My onyx boox note air 2 eInk tablet lets me install the google play store by registering myself as an AOSP developer and enrolling my device's serial number or GSF identifier with Google using some Google Form that some android team somewhere's automated by now. The device has no hardware security features from what I can tell. There's no way this platform would pass muster with any bank.

The bank doesn't have to actually be secure, only tick certain boxes.

Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company

#624

Post by bee_rider »

fc417fc802 wrote: post #615
charcircuit wrote: post #608

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A hardware token would not suffice. When you login with a hardware token it will generate some sort of token or cookie for further requests. This is where malware can steal that key and use it for whatever it wants. There is a benefit it knowing there is a high chance that the such a key is protected by the operating system's sandboxing technology. Without remote attestation you don't know if the sandbox is actually…

On the contrary, a hardware token will suffice to thwart both phising and MitM which covers ~everything for all practical threat and liability models. What exactly is the concern here? A widespread worm that no one is yet aware of that's dumping people's bank accounts into crypto? It might make for a decent Hollywood plot but is pulling that off actually easier than attacking the bank directly? Keep in mind that the…

Hypothetically on a fully controlled system you could prevent attacks like the sort of “hello this is Microsoft, we’ve identified a virus on your device, please download teamviewer and login to your bank account so we can clear it for you” type spam calls.

Or, hasn’t there been malware that periodically takes screenshots of the device? Or maybe that’s a Hollywood plot, I forget actually.

Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company

#625

Post by BrandoElFollito »

b112 wrote: post #468
coppsilgold wrote: post #331

Remote attestation only works because your CPU's secure enclave has a private key burned-in (fused) into it at the factory. It is then provisioned with a digital certificate for its public key by the manufacturer. Every time you perform an attestation the public key (and certificate) is divulged which makes it a unique identifier, and one that can be traced to the point of sale - and when buying a used device, a poin…

I tend to buy such things with cash, in person. People dislike cash for some strange reason, then complain about tracking. People also hand out their mobile number like candy. Same issue.

> People dislike cash for some strange reason

In my case it is because I would never have the right amount with me, in the right denominations. Google Pay always has this covered.

Also you need to remember to take one more thing with you, and refill it occasionally. As opposed to fuel, you do not know how much you will need when.

It can get lost or destroyed, and is not (usually) replaceable.

I am French, currently in the US. I need to change 100 USD in small denominations, I will need to go to the bank, and they will hopefully do that for me. Or not. Or not without some official paper from someone.

Ah yes, and I am in the US and the Euro is not an accepted currency here. So I need to take my 100 € to a bank and hope I can get 119.39 USD. In the right denominations.

What will I do with the 34.78 USD left when I am back home? I have a chest of money from all over the world. I showed it once to my kids when they were young, told a bit about the world and then forgot about it.

Money also weights quite a lot. And when it does not weights it gets lost or thrown away with some other papers. Except if they are neatly folded in a wallet, which I will forget.

I do not care about being traced when going to the supermarket. If I need to do untraceable stuff I will get money from teh ATM. Ah crap, they will trace me there.

So the only solution is to get my salary in cash, whihc is forbidden in France. Or take some small amounts from time to time. Which I will forget, and I have better things to do.

Cash sucks.

Sure, if we go cashless and terrible things happen (cyberwar, solar flare, software issues) then we are screwed. But either the situation unscrews itself, or we will have much, much, much bigger issues than money -- we will need to go full survival mode, apocalypse movies-style.

Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company

#626

Post by direwolf20 »

jorvi wrote: post #503
blibble wrote: post #252

Earlier quoted context omitted.

it's the "usually" that's the problem this service (untouched by me) had: After=local-fs.target network-online.target remote-fs.target time-sync.target but it was still started without an IP address, and then failed to bind just like this sort of problem: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4880#issuecomment-... the entire thing is unreliable and doesn't act like you'd expect > Or you can do something with Exec…

Are you running this particular unit file as a user unit or a system unit? Some targets like network-online.target don't work from user unit files. You could also try targeting NetworkManager or networkd's "wait-online" services. Or if that doesn't work, something is telling systemd that you have an IP when you don't. NetworkManager has "ipv4.may-fail" and "ipv6.may-fail" that might be errenously true. > at that poin…

> Some targets like network-online.target don't work from user unit files.

So basically it just doesn't work sometimes for no particular reason.

> The difference is that systemd is much better at ensuring correctness

Uh, well, you just said that it isn't, because some targets like network-online.target don't work from user unit files.

Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company

#628

Post by direwolf20 »

charcircuit wrote: post #371
lazide wrote: post #348

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It does mean we should recognize that SSL is nice for some basic privacy/security, but not perfect security.

Same with remote attestation. Not all implementations are actually secure. But hopefully over time those security bugs can be ironed out and the cost to extract a key be made infeasable.

Hopefully not. What you have just said is a synonym for "But hopefully over time manufacturers will be able to completely prevent users from running unapproved software."

Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company

#629

Post by charcircuit »

fc417fc802 wrote: post #615
charcircuit wrote: post #608

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A hardware token would not suffice. When you login with a hardware token it will generate some sort of token or cookie for further requests. This is where malware can steal that key and use it for whatever it wants. There is a benefit it knowing there is a high chance that the such a key is protected by the operating system's sandboxing technology. Without remote attestation you don't know if the sandbox is actually…

On the contrary, a hardware token will suffice to thwart both phising and MitM which covers ~everything for all practical threat and liability models. What exactly is the concern here? A widespread worm that no one is yet aware of that's dumping people's bank accounts into crypto? It might make for a decent Hollywood plot but is pulling that off actually easier than attacking the bank directly? Keep in mind that the…

How does it solve MITM? You type your hardware token in and then an attacker uses it to send money out of your account.

>What exactly is the concern here?

Stealer malware. Or even RATs where attackers get notified when you open a sensitive app and they can take over after you have authenticated.

Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company

#630

Post by bee_rider »

thewebguyd wrote: post #571
bee_rider wrote: post #559

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I do sort of wonder if there’s room in my life for a small attested device. Like, I could actually see a little room for my bank to say “we don’t know what other programs are running on your device so we can’t actually take full responsibility for transactions that take place originated from your device,” and if I look at it from the bank’s point of view that doesn’t seem unreasonable. Of course, we’ll see if anybody…

I suggested this as a possible solution in another HN thread a while back, but along the lines of "If a bank wants me to have a secure, locked down terminal to do business with them, then they should be the ones forking it over, not commanding control of my owned personal device." It would quickly get out of hand if every online service started to do the same though. But, if remote device attestation continues to be…

Yeah, to some extent I just wanted to think about where the boundary ought to be. I somewhat suspect the bank or Netflix won’t be willing to send me a device of theirs to act as their representative in my pocket. But it is basically the only time a reasonable person should consider using such a device. Anybody paying to buy Netflix or the bank a device is basically being scammed or ripped off.
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