621–630 of 1001 posts
Does anybody have this picture ? I can’t find it
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Signal, that's another one that requires your phone number? Yeah, thanks but no thanks.
Don't they all? But good news is that they have pushed code to allow for usernames (or not even that). It isn't open to the public (or beta) yet, but it looks like the feature is going to be released fairly soon.
No. Threema does not require a phone number (it uses one for the registration verification, but your account is not linked to that number).
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Depending on your exact needs either Telegram or (preferably IMO) Matrix might be a solution. (Yes, I think this is correct: For anyone who are currently on WhatsApp or anything Facebook for that matter even Telegram is a huge improvement in most ways.)
I get your point, but moving people to Signal has been an accomplishment on its own, you get to say "we should move to this new private app" only so many times, before your friends and family grab their torches.
This is also true with Whatsapp[2], but against their terms of service, so you risk getting banned, and built on reverse-engineering, plus you need an android VM of some sort.
I've been personally moving my family to Signal, since that provides the best UX and easier transition from Whatsapp. Once I'm comfortable enough with it, we'll likely transition to matrix.
What Matrix is missing is in my view:
- Client with simple UI, polished UX, and not just a smoking pot of features: FluffyChat[3] is mostly there.
- Server of which I can guarantee the uptime. Dendrite should lower the resource usage for a ~5-100 accounts server, and decentralised identities[4] would allow falling back to another server (such as a friend's).
We're mostly there, so I'm starting to prepare the switch, starting with my more technical friends, by setting a bridge up. Hopefully we can finally break that dependency on phone numbers (ideally, domain names as well with [4]) and move on to bey-based IDs.
[1] https://github.com/tulir/mautrix-signal
[1] Older bridge, unmaintained: https://github.com/matrix-hacks/matrix-puppet-signal
[2]https://matrix.org/docs/guides/whatsapp-bridging-mautrix-wha...
[3] https://web.fluffychat.im/en/
[4] https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/neilalexander/...
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You can think of it like email. Maybe you started on AOL and later realized AOL is terrible. You could export your address book and move to a client/server you trust more and notify all your contacts from the new location. This is the same story on Matrix and what I mean when I say it is a freedom respecting decentralized service. You are also free to run your own DNS to a dedicated EMS instance then later point to y…
Following the e-mail analogy: Inevitably, there will be contacts of yours who didn't get or read your notification, or contacts of yours who aren't in your contacts list.
Signal offers no such choice.
Even if you don't do this, you can still reach contacts on the old server and middle through.
If you switch from walled garden to walled garden like WhatsApp to signal there is no migration path at all.
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> Their infra is generating those encryption certificates, so WhatsApp can very well decode the message and store it for further processing. This is incorrect. The sender's device generates the key with which it encrypts outgoing messages. WhatsApp's infra cannot see the content of any messages sent. (Source: ex-WhatsApp employee)
3 years ago, my friend, an Indian fact-checker, showed me a screenshot of a WhatsApp screen, showing warning from WhatsApp that a message contains a dangerous link This (the warning) is only possible if WhatsApp can read your messages I'm guessing that they read your message on the app. So their claim (end-to-end encryption) is indeed true and correct. But their app can and indeed has been reading your messages, for…
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Looks like end to end encryption feature is bullshit marketing trick if they for example process my message before my device encrypts it to send it to other devices...
Well, let's be fair. The threat model for end-to-end encryption assumes that endpoint devices or the software itself used for communication are not compromised. Or subverted. It's common knowledge that group chats are not E2E - there is one encryption context from a user to the servers, and another context from the server to each member of the group chat. Bog standard transport layer security, in other words. However…
This is not the case. Signal for example has open source which allows to verify that it does not use the message texts for commercial purposes so we can with good reason assume that the messages are at least E2E encrypted properly within the app and at least Signal servers.
Yes, of course if you have root access to the device itself, or otherwise hack it, you can compromise any messenger. But that's not even in the same league as having basically a message spying built-in, turned on, always on, inside your damn messenger app itself.
Whatsapp calling their app "E2E" in their marketing is a spit in the direction of the users that have the technical knowledge to understand how it really works. It is inaccurate in all the ways that matter. It is accurate only in one technical way that is completely irrelevant in the real world, just put there so they could use the phrase in the marketing while not caring about the true intent behind E2E.
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Matrix is riddled with bugs. While I agree with you that signal isn't all that great (they do some really good stuff and then make some really weird trade-offs), I've recently compared Signal, Wire, Threema, Jami, Briar, Element/Matrix, and Keybase. The most mature app is Signal. It has the best usability to privacy trade-off. Threema is the better choice if you don't mind not having a usable desktop client. For me t…
> Wire is the better choice if you can sacrifice a tiny bit of usability for better privacy. Do you mean better privacy than Signal? I was under the impression that Signal was significantly ahead of Wire in this regard with features like private groups and private contact discovery.
They pinky swear they always patch and never dump keys when they have the chance though.
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The article says Whatsapp will now share: * User phone numbers * Other people’s phone numbers stored in address books * Profile names * Profile pictures and * Status message including when a user was last online * Diagnostic data collected from app logs and already was getting: Purchases Financial information Location Contacts User content Identifiers Usage data and Diagnostics
Doesn't this mean that anybody agreeing to those terms needs to ask permission from each and everybody in their address book? And if they don't, can I sue them (at least in the EU) or ask my contact to be removed before the agree to the terms?