Earlier quoted context omitted.
I still haven't seen what you describe, the behaviour of other projects. And I dont believe it without proof (since it was claimed so often by GOS without proof being shown, or in some cases with it obviously not existing). For the security thing: It is wrong to claim that an unlocked bootloader completely breaks the android security model. If anything, it breaks one specific aspect, one that doesn't matter for many…
> It is wrong to claim that an unlocked bootloader completely breaks the android security model. You seem knowledgeable about this, so I'll take the opportunity to ask: if I install a malicious app and it manages to escape the sandbox and alter the system, my understanding is that it will be detected next time I boot it (because the image hash won't match). Isn't that true? > Signing keys for bootloaders might just n…
They're misrepresenting what has been said by GrapheneOS and also lack a good understanding of it themselves. They're definitely not a good source of information about this.