Earlier quoted context omitted.
How do the slippery slope arguments not make sense? This is a capability that: 1. Did not exist prior (scanning stuff on the endpoint) 2. Has a plausible abuse case (the same system, applied to stuff that isn't CSAM) I find this very compelling, especially in the shittier regimes (China...) that Apple operates in.
Neither 1 nor 2 are in fact true. Spotlight indexes all kinds of metadata, as does photos search. Adding an agent to upload data from these is easier than extending the CSAM mechanism, and the CSAM mechanism as is is not all that plausible to abuse either technically or socially given how clear Apple’s promises are.
That’s the problem: Apples promise means nothing exactly because it’s so easy to abuse.
Apple says they will refuse when asked to scan for anything that is not CSAM. That’s one of those nice ‘technically true’ statements lawyers like to include.
Apple will not have to refuse anything, because they won’t be asked.
Apple doesn’t get a huge pile of CSAM images (obviously), they get a list of hashes from a 3rd party. They have no way of ensuring that these hashes are only for CSAM content. And when ‘manually’ checking, they aren’t actually looking at potential CSAM, they are checking the ‘visual derivative’ (whatever that means exactly), basically a manual check if the hashes match.
So yes, they would technically refuse if asked to scan for other material, but they will just accept any list of hashes provided to them by NCMEC (an organization created by the US government and funded by the US DoJ) no questions asked. The US government could include any hash they wish into this list without Apple ever noticing.