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Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

diogomonica.com

61–70 of 92 posts

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#61
"we just can't memorize unique, strong passwords, for every single on-line service out there"

... right. Apparently we don't speak in a language with an absurd amount of subtle differences that need to be remembered (one example is punctuation, and all the subtle rules with punctuation as well). We also apparently don't memorize other things such as face recognition, navigation, mathematics, physics, x amount of movies, actors, actresses, favourite foods.

Unfortunately, according to the article, we can't remember around 50 to 100 twenty digit passwords with pieces of singular information we already have memorized.

The article looked promising, oh well.

Also, the article is supporting password managers. Which is the equivalent of thinking that a smart idea would be to basically archive all of the password information into one tiny little hackable program.

Yeah, great plan. Is this really coming from someone with these kind of credentials?

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Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#62

Password managers, combined with randomly-generated passwords, solve the most serious problems afflicting user-selected passwords. Adding two-factor authentication solves yet more problems. And yet both password managers and 2FA are not widely adopted by users. Where do we go from here? I use a password manager, and the UX of registering to a new website is just awful. On the registration page I need to check what so…

> my password manager can try to do it automatically, but it often fails because it doesn't know how to translate fields from the registration page to the login page.

I have yet to find a case where my pwd manager fails to do this (lastpass). I've also never (with the default settings) had a site reject a password generated by it.

> We can do this by introducing a standard web interface for password managers.

I think the web is closer to that than you think (it's fairly easy to figure out the fields in a login/registration/pwd-change form). Mobile apps are a different story, that's where we really need standard system support for delivering credentials.

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#63
post #33
post #18

So I've got a question. Isn't using a password manager with unique, big, long, randomly generated passwords per site essentially the same as two-factor authentication? Something I know (the master password) and something I have (the encrypted password list). The password list lives on my laptop, on my phone, etc. Furthermore, when I use 2 factor auth, I end up storing the lose-your-phone recovery password in the pass…

No. Here are two differences between a password manager and 2FA: 1. A password manager will prevent someone from hacking into a website you use, stealing your password, then logging into another website as you. 2FA won't prevent this because someone who hacks into to a website can get access to the unique random seed that is used to generate the 2FA sequence, and can then use brute-force to determine your password. 2…

Re 1: If a.com is hacked, only a.com's OTP seeds are compromised. b.com should (hopefully) use different seeds, so 2FA still prevents someone from logging in.

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#64

Password managers, combined with randomly-generated passwords, solve the most serious problems afflicting user-selected passwords. Adding two-factor authentication solves yet more problems. And yet both password managers and 2FA are not widely adopted by users. Where do we go from here? I use a password manager, and the UX of registering to a new website is just awful. On the registration page I need to check what so…

I use KeepassX on laptops and it's great, but the password manager use-case really falls apart on phones / tablets.

It is slow and awkward to enter a strong master password on a typical mobile device keyboard, having to shift to numeric and symbolic layouts every few characters. So slow in fact that sometimes I forgo logging-in to a service and wait until I'm back at a laptop.

I don't know what the solution is but that's one of the hurdles to wider adoption. Users just want their passwords to be available. Perhaps biometrics is part of the answer.

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#65
post #38

Maybe this would be a good time to plug my proposed solution to this problem: http://dswi.net/

Could you give a short explanation of the differences to BrowserId?

Are the keys tied to origins? If so, how is that enforced? If not, how do you address the privacy issue of origins tracking you through your key?

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#66

Password managers, combined with randomly-generated passwords, solve the most serious problems afflicting user-selected passwords. Adding two-factor authentication solves yet more problems. And yet both password managers and 2FA are not widely adopted by users. Where do we go from here? I use a password manager, and the UX of registering to a new website is just awful. On the registration page I need to check what so…

On the subject of length, why does seemingly every website enforce a maximum length? I tend to memorize entire sentences with punctuation and capitalization to use as passwords and it's effectively impossible for me to do this when everyone caps password length.

It kind of implies to me that whoever is storing the password has done something incredibly stupid.

Memorizing sentences means that I can just use a copy of The Bones or some other pocket reference as my password manager.

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#67
post #62

Password managers, combined with randomly-generated passwords, solve the most serious problems afflicting user-selected passwords. Adding two-factor authentication solves yet more problems. And yet both password managers and 2FA are not widely adopted by users. Where do we go from here? I use a password manager, and the UX of registering to a new website is just awful. On the registration page I need to check what so…

> my password manager can try to do it automatically, but it often fails because it doesn't know how to translate fields from the registration page to the login page. I have yet to find a case where my pwd manager fails to do this (lastpass). I've also never (with the default settings) had a site reject a password generated by it. > We can do this by introducing a standard web interface for password managers. I think…

> I have yet to find a case where my pwd manager fails to do this (lastpass). I've also never (with the default settings) had a site reject a password generated by it.

A few minutes ago I registered to T-mobile, and 1Password thought that my username was something like mytmobile.aspx. I also find that 1Password has a very hard time with banking sites. There is at least one bank where it simply fails to login. YMMV of course.

Going beyond these anecdotes, even if these heuristics almost always work, I believe that having heuristics involved at all is preventing mainstream adoption. I think that if the password management interface is standardized and heuristic-free, then we will see password management support in the mainstream browsers. I am imagining a future where the auto-generated passwords work transparently so that users don't even know about them. I think this cannot happen without browser support.

> Mobile apps are a different story, that's where we really need standard system support for delivering credentials.

I agree that password management on mobile is a greater pain point, and (as mentioned elsewhere in this thread) the additional problem there is with entering the master password.

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#68
It seems that the real hacker scenario was forgotten. If the attackers own the system, they can do lot more than just steal password hashes. They can modify the system to store plain text passwords when users login as well as steal the information from the system(s), in many cases. Of course it's easy to forget that there are sites with very different security levels. Others are just running without any monitoring and others have very strict IDS/IPS, 24/7 security & intrusion monitoring staff & systems, version control, configuration management, enforcement, monitoring systems, etc. I don't actually even understand why people are so obsessed with this password topic. I personally consider passwords as shared random blobs. So what if it leaks? If I were the primary target of the attackers, they probably already stole the required information from the system(s), even without the password(s).

2FA doesn't help either at all, if the system is completely compromised. The attacker(s) can easily circumvent it, because they probably already have full control of the system. Only way to get these things right, is tight layered security, internal protocols, etc. Why does the 'site' anyway have full access to password(s). Shouldn't there be secondary hardened authentication system, and only tokens passed? Does the system(s) containing the data, properly verify from authentication service if the user is allowed to access the data etc? These are endless topics, when it's forgotten that there are systems with completely separate security requirements. Is 2FA enough? No? Do you run authentication client on smart phone? It's computer, it's hackable. There should be hardware token. Does the hardware token give you monotonic 'non action independent' codes? It does? Well, that's also fail. Because every authentication code should be based on the action & content it's authenticating. Otherwise you could authenticate something, you're not aware about. Many systems fail on that scale too, completely. Of course there are secure solutions, but those are expensive.

Password managers are also bad solution, because those run on your computer / phone, and as we know, consumer devices / normal business systems aren't ever secure. All are sitting ducks if attacker really wants to control those. Which also means that they can access your password managers content at will. Actually most important passwords in my password manager say something like, "Do you really think I'm stupid enough to put the password here?"

Passwords / PINs are completely good part in multi factor authentication scheme where you have to know something. I often wonder why people prefer to disable passwords when using SSH key login? I personally think that key + password is better than key only, in case of the keys are stolen. Just my random blah thoughts about all this endless blah blah.

I've also seen many times, that the crackers have so many systems under their control, that they don't even care to explore the content of the systems they're owning. So they have missed the important stuff several times. Or they're smart enough to let me to believe so. ;)

P.S. My bank doesn't allow stronger than six digits password. But does it matter?

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#69

Linkbaity title from a PhD student with something to sell: the example cited was entirely correct about password strength, and is something the article author admits is important as it is the underpinning of using password managers. > Even if we entertained the XKCD comic and started training users to select four random words instead of a complex single-word password, I argue that it would not amount to a significant…

And may be Square should let him go as well?

If he's working at Square as a security researcher and routinely did work of this caliber, I would be surprised.

While this wasn't a good article about security, for what may be any of several reasons that don't have anything to do with his work relationship with Square or qualifications in general, I'm not childish enough to pretend that a single bad article dictates even his merit as a security professional. We've all been there and said something silly in public.

That being said, this read like a strawman of a popular comic to sell his research/pet topic, and poor security articles like that should be called out for what they are - poor articles on security.

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