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Security Hole in Sendgrid

chunkhost.com

61–70 of 97 posts

Re: Security Hole in Sendgrid

#61
post #58
post #4

Looks like a deeply unsatisfactory response from SendGrid. They don't even know for sure ("it appears .. pretty much confirms") that their own support staff changed the email address?

This shows why so-called PR-speak is necessary. Email like this should not be in a conversational style because it can easily be misinterpreted.

are you serious? How was it misinterpreted? It point blank says that that's what happened? Please illustrate how exactly it was manipulated to say something else?

Re: Security Hole in Sendgrid

#62
What I found most interesting was they were targeted due to Bitcoin. Today most services would never store credit cards themselves but rather have them stored at a secure payment gateway. So they're unlikely to be attacked to get to those cards. T

Trust me I know that CC's are getting sniffed in transit too often so I'm not saying they're 'safe'. I'm just wondering if there is something unique to Bitcoin that suddenly makes you a target as though you were known to be storing CC's data at rest onsite.

Re: Security Hole in Sendgrid

#64

The problem is that it was technically possible, for a representative, to make this change without the proper verification. You just can't rely on humans for that.

SendGrid once went over my head and changed my account settings on behalf of a customer of mine, without even consulting me beforehand. I had a customer with a history of reporting mails as spam (activity reports he requested in a webapp). When you report a mail as spam, the address goes into a blacklist to avoid causing sender reputation issues. After the third or so time of having him ask to get the mails again, then mark one of them as spam, I told him I wouldn't be offering that feature to him any longer. He contacted SendGrid about it directly, and the SendGrid rep actually went into my account and added his address to a whitelist to bypass the blacklist, where I intended it to remain.

I thought that was just the strangest thing, and it didn't sit well with me. Accessing a customer's account when they request service is one thing, but making changes on behalf of a stranger you know has no authority over that account? That was when I moved the last of my apps over to Mandrill.

Re: Security Hole in Sendgrid

#66
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> - You need to make sure that your email servers IPs are not on black lists. This alone is a huge, huge chore. Especially if you run a hosted service that allows some user-specified content in outbound email bodies. It's a lot cheaper for us to pay Mandrill to handle all of that for us, provide us excellent metrics and diagnostics, and let us know if one of our users is sending junk mail before it gets out of hand.

Even if you do everything right you can still find yourself on a blacklist. Then you get to pound sand. Blacklists suck. Not as much as spam sucks, though.

Frankly, with the amount of bullshit blacklists out there that real mail providers actually trust, I've come to detest blacklists more than spam.

Re: Security Hole in Sendgrid

#67
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Even if you do everything right you can still find yourself on a blacklist. Then you get to pound sand. Blacklists suck. Not as much as spam sucks, though.

Frankly, with the amount of bullshit blacklists out there that real mail providers actually trust, I've come to detest blacklists more than spam.

Has anyone set up a blacklist full of random IPs as a joke to see how many people follow it?

Re: Security Hole in Sendgrid

#68
post #49
post #26

Social engineering will almost always work. I don't really fault Sendgrid for this (though I could see this not working as well if you were using Amazon SES...no support to even talk to!). It sucks that they got caught with their pants down but I bet a good social engineering attempt on ChunkHost might have yielded similar results. The lesson here is to have multiple defenses. 2 factor auth is a great start and it wo…

You should fault Sendgrid as they specifically have a policy NOT to perform this change of email request (from the article). Sendgrid can also change their systems so that phone support personnel can NOT perform this change or perform this change with approval from a supervisor. Sendgrid being in the business they are in should also know that they are susceptible to these types of attacks and what they can lead to (m…

I don't know... Mistakes happen. There seems to be little to gain from faulting SendGrid, but faulting SendGrid would force them to take some kind of action such as terminating the rep. I think I'd prefer the rep remain employed, because I trust they'd never make this mistake again. Also, now all the other reps know to avoid it.

EDIT: May I ask what can be gained from faulting SendGrid in this case?

Re: Security Hole in Sendgrid

#69
post #35
post #5

Another title for this submission could have been: "Massive Security Hole in ChunkHost. Non-2FA accounts can be owned." Because it turns out anyone with a Sendgrid Support account also effectively had potential access to any account at ChunkHost not using two-factor authentication. Which is also true of thousands of other companies that are relaying their password reset emails through third party SMTP services. SendG…

That would be because sendgrid is lame. I've recently tried to use their service to send emails, club member newsletters. I've never thought much about bulk e-mails before and I thought it was a "solved problem" by now. Sendgrid are well known so they were my first choice. During initial testing I found both bugs in the API and missing functionality. I've worked over 20 years with IT and yet sendgrid support is easil…

I work with SendGrid frequently because of my day job, and they have hands down the worst software and design of any company in the industry.

I use Mandrill for my private projects, and it is so much better it's shocking SendGrid has a single customer.

Re: Security Hole in Sendgrid

#70
BCC every message is evil, as it can be misused as in this case. SendGrid should never allow that, or at least should flag such behavior. At the minimum, they should notified account owners of this change.
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