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You have a moral obligation to use crypto

blog.easydns.org

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Re: You have a moral obligation to use crypto

#61

Post by jmnicolas »

Canada wrote: post #40

> But the idea that we are somehow "out of reach of the NSA" is definitely not one of them. Sure, we're not actively collaborating with them, as many US businesses are, but as we've said before: we just assume the pipes going into and out of our major network exchange points are being vacuumed en masse. Maybe easydns isn't, but the Telcos are definitely collaborating. We've had intercept equipment directly under the…

For people wondering :

CSEC means Communications Security Establishment Canada

CSIS means Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Re: You have a moral obligation to use crypto

#62

Post by jmnicolas »

dfc wrote: post #27

The title certainly makes an emotional appeal to me. However I could not find justification/explanation of any moral obligation in the text. I could understand a moral obligation to fight unjust surveillance, but that is not what was presented. Why am I morally obligated to increase the cost of surveillance? If society accepts the unjust surveillance the only consequences of increasing surveillance costs are economic…

I understand it as this : your moral obligation as a technical person is to protect your less computer-savvy users / kinfolks from being unjustly spied.

By increasing the cost of surveillance you force intelligence agencies to make a choice : given widespread enough encryption they would have to decrypt only the real threats and not ordinary citizens.

There is no reason to spy everybody unless you want to model your nation's citizen to be able to influence / control them.

My 2 (euro) cents ;-)

Re: You have a moral obligation to use crypto

#63

Post by boronine »

GauntletWizard wrote: post #4
Karunamon wrote: post #3

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As usual, misconfiguration causing scary warnings, useless to the end user, but the connection is still encrypted. I really wish we'd divorce the identity assurance part of PKI from the encryption part. I have no idea how it would be done, but.

HTTPS Encryption is virtually useless without the identify verification part. Anyone can run a valid HTTPS server with a self-generated public key. Anyone could then place a MITM, and without the identity bit, you're just as compromised. If we had dropped the identity bit, every ISP would be running a MITM proxy, because they want control. Already, plenty of businesses enable poor hygiene by including transparent squ…

Does SSL not use a key exchange algorithm that ensures that a MITM proxy be useless?

Re: You have a moral obligation to use crypto

#64

Post by GauntletWizard »

boronine wrote: post #63
GauntletWizard wrote: post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

HTTPS Encryption is virtually useless without the identify verification part. Anyone can run a valid HTTPS server with a self-generated public key. Anyone could then place a MITM, and without the identity bit, you're just as compromised. If we had dropped the identity bit, every ISP would be running a MITM proxy, because they want control. Already, plenty of businesses enable poor hygiene by including transparent squ…

Does SSL not use a key exchange algorithm that ensures that a MITM proxy be useless?

Even without the CA system, SSL (and TLS) is secure against _passive_ MITM attacks; That is, if the attacker cannot alter the data-stream. This is still reasonable for many simple links, but for internet, it is not.

If you've got no verification of the opposite party, literally any computer could be on the other end. The key exchange mechanism is secure, certainly, but any computer can execute it. The attacker can even show you the real website just proxied through, but that's plenty enough to get your password or any other access that the attacker wants.

Re: You have a moral obligation to use crypto

#65

Post by Joeboy »

robertfw wrote: post #24

Reposting my comment on the blog: I can't comment on which encryption schemes are still strong, but one advantage to using protection for general use is providing strength in numbers. Right now, using Tor or strong encryption is a bright beacon saying "this person has something to hide!" and the NSA et al hone in by default. If, however, using Tor and strong encryption was the norm, it is easier for those who need it…

This is why I heretically believe that bad crypto may in some sense be preferable to no crypto, unless you really have something to hide (eg. you're a defense contractor or an opponent of a tyrannical government).

Re: You have a moral obligation to use crypto

#67

Post by sgift »

Zigurd wrote: post #58
schoen wrote: post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the difference between you and tptacek here is basically about this: http://benlog.com/2014/01/03/there-are-3-kinds-of-crypto/ Google has done an enormous amount to improve and deploy what Ben Adida called "b2c crypto" -- typically turning it on months to years ahead of its main competitors, and actively supporting work on making it stronger. But they've done almost nothing to encourage the use of "p2p crypto…

Of course Google deserves praise for that and 97 other things. But it is completely unapropos to what the article posted here is about. It does not really have an effect on dragnet surveillance because Google can be ordered to simply allow the government to let it happen. There is some value in that foreign governments with their own NSA wannabes could get thwarted.

The problem is that Google would probably closed down if they implemented security which cannot be circumvented, even with a warrant, because they would break the law.

There are many laws and long standing rulings which force companies/people/.. to cooperate with law agencies. So, as it has been stated many times before, the solution for these things is political, not technical. Law always trumps programming and law is influenced by politics.

Re: You have a moral obligation to use crypto

#69

Post by eliasmacpherson »

userbinator wrote: post #52
upofadown wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The real interesting thing about that use is that it makes it impossible for the NSA and the like to strong arm someone else for the keys. With what we know about the current environment, being your own CA is actually the most secure approach.

As long as you're careful to really keep your private keys private; the root of trust gets shifted from a hierarchy of corporations to individuals you know and (personally) trust. I like this "real trust" model a lot more than the current one of a central authority and "being told who to trust", and I think all the advocates of "if you want to use HTTPS you should buy a cert from a CA" are missing this point.

I assume the certs are delivered over ssl from the CA to the client requesting the webserver, is that the case?

Re: You have a moral obligation to use crypto

#70

Post by sokoloff »

boronine wrote: post #63
GauntletWizard wrote: post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

HTTPS Encryption is virtually useless without the identify verification part. Anyone can run a valid HTTPS server with a self-generated public key. Anyone could then place a MITM, and without the identity bit, you're just as compromised. If we had dropped the identity bit, every ISP would be running a MITM proxy, because they want control. Already, plenty of businesses enable poor hygiene by including transparent squ…

Does SSL not use a key exchange algorithm that ensures that a MITM proxy be useless?

The man in the middle can do the key exchange with you. (You seem to be assuming that you start with a connection that you know to be reaching the desired endpoint and that you can start the key exchange there. You can't. The MITM intercepts the initial connection and does the key exchange with you and then turns around and initiates a secure connection with the eventual endpoint. The endpoint sees valid, encrypted traffic and you see valid, encrypted traffic, but the MITM attacker has the full plaintext communication.)

That's why you need the identity portion to be tied to the key exchange.

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