If you access a known account through Tor or any other identity hiding protocol could possibly expose you. And I wonder if it is impossible for US government to break encryption if it is specifically after you.
Use of Tor and e-mail crypto could increase chances that NSA keeps your data
61–70 of 116 posts
Re: Use of Tor and e-mail crypto could increase chances that NSA keeps your data
#62Since I (and the majority of global internet users) are not "US persons", they're claiming they're entitled to intercept and store all my communications anyway - so my personal reaction to this is going to be to increase the use of tor and crypto for random everyday stuff. I'll start GPG encrypting email to anybody I know will be able ro deal with it. I might even start randomly mailing GPG encrypted mail for no reas…
> perhaps I'll automate mailing randomly chosen chunks of 1984 and Brave New World to randomly chosen public keys/emails from public keyservers
Repurpose Sircam to do this, perhaps.
Re: Use of Tor and e-mail crypto could increase chances that NSA keeps your data
#63The NSA operates a Tor exit node at Georgia Tech, and likely at other research institutes and universities. The fact of the matter is, people who use Tor are the ones trying to hide from the government, and it only makes sense for the NSA to run Tor exit nodes and analyze all traffic passing through them. You probably have more privacy by not using Tor at all.
What node? I am not seeing any nodes in:
128.61.0.0/19
128.61.32.0/19
128.61.64.0/18
128.61.128.0/17
130.207.0.0/16
143.215.0.0/16
204.152.10.0/23
Re: Use of Tor and e-mail crypto could increase chances that NSA keeps your data
#64The NSA operates a Tor exit node at Georgia Tech, and likely at other research institutes and universities. The fact of the matter is, people who use Tor are the ones trying to hide from the government, and it only makes sense for the NSA to run Tor exit nodes and analyze all traffic passing through them. You probably have more privacy by not using Tor at all.
> You probably have more privacy by not using Tor at all.
This statement is beyond absurdity. Controlling a few exit nodes doesn't compromise Tor, it's designed to resist that. Tracing someone is possible, but it is extremely difficult and/or unreliable unless you've managed to compromise nearly all nodes on a chain.
Re: Use of Tor and e-mail crypto could increase chances that NSA keeps your data
#65Earlier quoted context omitted.
And this is why we should (and we should encourage everybody we can to) regularly do the most mundane of browsing using TOR. I'm making a personal effort to use TorBrowser whenever I have some trivial need to use a government website. I suspect I'd stop short of applying for a visa via TOR, but I'll happily look up my local state or federal politicians and their websites, or renew my car registration, or any of the o…
And this is why we should (and we should encourage everybody we can to) regularly do the most mundane of browsing using TOR. And that's why I encourage everybody I can to run a tor node https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay.html.en
Also, if you don't want to run a node on your home network/machine http://cloud.torproject.org/ makes it ridiculously easy to set up one on EC2 (for as little as ~$3/month)
Re: Use of Tor and e-mail crypto could increase chances that NSA keeps your data
#66This is fairly obvious. From the NSA's perspective, people that act like people who have something to hide are more likely to be hiding something. I'd be surprised if they didn't take it into account.
Yes. I can't imagine someone smart enough to encrypt their traffic wouldn't realize it makes them look dodgy to people who get paid to be paranoid.
Re: Use of Tor and e-mail crypto could increase chances that NSA keeps your data
#67Earlier quoted context omitted.
What I mean by using Tor right, for instance, is avoiding use of certain browser plugins that can potentially give away your location.
Yeah - fair enough. On oft-hear piece of advice is to never use an identity you ever use elsewhere over TOR - for me, as a "non US person", even if I can trust TOR and TLS/SSL to ensure the privacy of my data in transit, it doesn't matter if the far end of my connection through TOR ends up at my gmail/apple/facebook/linkedin/twitter/dropbox/yahoo/amazon/any-other-US-affiliated-corporation. Being "non US" and located…
If they can see the bits coming out of your VPS in NYC and heading to other data centers, surely they can see the bits coming from .au into your VPS and correlate them?
Re: Use of Tor and e-mail crypto could increase chances that NSA keeps your data
#68Earlier quoted context omitted.
And this is why we should (and we should encourage everybody we can to) regularly do the most mundane of browsing using TOR. I'm making a personal effort to use TorBrowser whenever I have some trivial need to use a government website. I suspect I'd stop short of applying for a visa via TOR, but I'll happily look up my local state or federal politicians and their websites, or renew my car registration, or any of the o…
And this is why we should (and we should encourage everybody we can to) regularly do the most mundane of browsing using TOR. And that's why I encourage everybody I can to run a tor node https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay.html.en
What is the current number of Tor nodes? What's to say that all tor nodes are now monitored? It's possibly a smaller task than storing all voice calls etc.
Re: Use of Tor and e-mail crypto could increase chances that NSA keeps your data
#69Earlier quoted context omitted.
And this is why we should (and we should encourage everybody we can to) regularly do the most mundane of browsing using TOR. And that's why I encourage everybody I can to run a tor node https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay.html.en
Also, if you don't want to run a node on your home network/machine http://cloud.torproject.org/ makes it ridiculously easy to set up one on EC2 (for as little as ~$3/month)
Q: Should I run an exit relay from my home?
A: No. If law enforcement becomes interested in traffic from your exit relay, it's possible that officers will seize your computer. For that reason, it's best not to run your exit relay in your home or using your home Internet connection.
Instead, consider running your exit relay in a commercial facility that is supportive of Tor. Have a separate IP address for your exit relay, and don't route your own traffic through it.
Of course, you should avoid keeping any sensitive or personal information on the computer hosting your exit relay, and you never should use that machine for any illegal purpose.
Re: Use of Tor and e-mail crypto could increase chances that NSA keeps your data
#70Earlier quoted context omitted.
"I will start GPG encrypting email to anybody I know who will be able to deal with it" As sad as it is to say, lets be honest and admit that this is a fairly small number. How long do you think it will be till your less committed friends get tired of decrypting your emails and just ignore what you send? Make sure you only pick people that use actual email clients because gpg and Gmail is no fun. As far as the "Thomas…
Now I'm thinking of a patched SMTP server, that queues all outgoing mail - and sends mail every hour on the hour to each of my GPG enabled recipients, with a queued "real mail" if there is one or a random encrypted NSA RickRoll if there's no real mail to send. (I suspect that'd last about 121 minutes before most of my friends spam filtered me forever)
Don't forget you have to use your main machine to send the random messages to your smtp server. If you do not it will be pretty easy to recognize what mail was routed through the machine and which messages were randomly generated by the server as a cover traffic.