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GrapheneOS Defends Data-Wiping Function That Blocked US Border Search

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61–70 of 206 posts

Re: GrapheneOS Defends Data-Wiping Function That Blocked US Border Search

#61
post #53
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Should we take the same approach for physical searches? If the cops are executing a search warrant on a house, and there's a safe, should they send in a safe cracker on the off chance the safe is wired with a "duress pin" (eg. thermite that burns the contents)?

Isn't this already done? Don't they send narcotics back to a lab? And do sobriety tests back at the station if you refuse a field test?

>Don't they send narcotics back to a lab?

1. They do field tests before sending to a lab

2. They're sending it to a lab to ensure the results are accurate, not to guard against an off chance something is boobytrapped.

Re: GrapheneOS Defends Data-Wiping Function That Blocked US Border Search

#62
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Should we take the same approach for physical searches? If the cops are executing a search warrant on a house, and there's a safe, should they send in a safe cracker on the off chance the safe is wired with a "duress pin" (eg. thermite that burns the contents)?

I mean, if it's possible to configure and there is at all a reason for someone to configure it as such, then it makes the most sense to treat it as a very valid possibility, right?

Hindsight is 20/20 right? Sure, the duress pin feature was around for years, but so was the technology to set up a thermite boobytrap in a safe. Maybe now CBP officers should be more careful about entering random pins people gave them, but snarky remarks like "Maybe digital forensics shouldn't be handled by barely highschool graduates at a busy border crossing" are entirely unjustified.

Re: GrapheneOS Defends Data-Wiping Function That Blocked US Border Search

#63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not a lawyer, but my understanding is that refusal to give the PIN (“remaining silent”) would be a valid application of the 5th, but not giving a false PIN. 5th does not imply the right to mislead or lie to someone investigating a crime. Not clear on anything else regarding the duress PIN but I don’t think a 5th defense would apply. Note that you apparently have to explicitly invoke your right to remain silent or you…

Hmm, interestingly here in Sweden we have "free evidence" (way of gathering is not considered even if "illegal", however someone doing something illegal to obtain it could instead be charged separately). As such in a case like the Salinas one, being silent or "pleading the fifth" would be moot as both would just indicate "deafening silence" to the judges since the defendant had been cooperative up until that point. (…

Interesting, did not know this. The “right to remain silent” has a long history here, and I think it’s important. The biggest reason for its continued existence, IMHO, is to shut down overly aggressive, threatening, or manipulative questioning. It’s easy for trained investigators to bully someone into a false confession, or even just a misstatement that could be turned against them. Having the right to shut up and pass future answers through a lawyer makes perfect sense in the face of this.

Re: GrapheneOS Defends Data-Wiping Function That Blocked US Border Search

#64
post #29

This is possibly the best advertising. GrapheneOS was kind of niche before. But if the US Government hates you then you're on the right track.

On one hand, I love GrapheneOS and see it as a cornerstone of digital privacy software. I have supported the project financially for years. On the other hand, I'm worried that the publicity will only make explicit targets out of GrapheneOS users, and that you would only be using it "if you have something to hide".

Say that as they may, it’s a whole different slope to fall down if they want to do anything about that beyond pointing and whining. If we cross that bridge, we probably have bigger things to worry about. So I think it should be fine for now.

Re: GrapheneOS Defends Data-Wiping Function That Blocked US Border Search

#65
post #9

This should be an interesting case in today’s legal climate Obviously grafeneOS has no liability. But the owner of the device didn’t take the action to remove the data, the CBP officer entered it. We already have some precedent around being forced to give up your password. How does that change if you are forced to give up a password that is destructive? What if the password works fine at home and the same password do…

Intentions matter. If the intent is to trick the officer to enter a PIN code that will destroy potential evidence then it does not matter that you didn't type the PIN code. Your speech is the thing that triggers a series of events that you know will lead to a wipe. Just like you can be charged with destruction of evidence even if you trick someone else to take the action.

See also, 5th amendment. They can't just declare on the spot that your data is now their data.

Re: GrapheneOS Defends Data-Wiping Function That Blocked US Border Search

#66
post #9

This should be an interesting case in today’s legal climate Obviously grafeneOS has no liability. But the owner of the device didn’t take the action to remove the data, the CBP officer entered it. We already have some precedent around being forced to give up your password. How does that change if you are forced to give up a password that is destructive? What if the password works fine at home and the same password do…

If you have a safe in your home and you knowingly wire up a bomb that goes off when a certain lever is pulled then you lie to the police and tell them the way to open the safe is to pull that lever you'd pretty clearly be responsible for the damage done when the bomb goes off. I don't see why this would be any different.

Because booby traps are illegal and wiping your phone doesn’t kill or maim the officer

Re: GrapheneOS Defends Data-Wiping Function That Blocked US Border Search

#67
post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Intentions matter. If the intent is to trick the officer to enter a PIN code that will destroy potential evidence then it does not matter that you didn't type the PIN code. Your speech is the thing that triggers a series of events that you know will lead to a wipe. Just like you can be charged with destruction of evidence even if you trick someone else to take the action.

The level of duress also matters. US citizens have been shipped to foreign prisons and there's an active case of high-level officials at DOJ violating court orders about that.

  > US citizens have been shipped to foreign prisons
From US soil?

Re: GrapheneOS Defends Data-Wiping Function That Blocked US Border Search

#68
post #35

UBS had a similar capability on their laptops so they facilitate tax evasion for US clients: https://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/30/why-did-the-us-pay-this-form...

Only the people working on tax evasion had this on their laptops?

Re: GrapheneOS Defends Data-Wiping Function That Blocked US Border Search

#69
post #59
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

[flagged]

That's a bit of a strawman. No defense attorney would omit the other circumstances of the search, some of which very likely overstepped legitimate authority.

[flagged]

Re: GrapheneOS Defends Data-Wiping Function That Blocked US Border Search

#70
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is supposed to protect people from random and arbitrary stops and searches. It's a fundamental American right. But in the 100 mile border zone, the federal government has tried to impinge on those basic rights. https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/border-zone
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