61–70 of 330 posts
I realize this is supposed to be a post about how scary the security vulnerabilities these agents will find are. But personally I love when agents do things like this and appreciate the help. Last thing in the world I want is for them to nerf the models.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Using the least amount of security features is a huge amateur mistake. Best practice is to use 2 redundant layers of security, such that if one fails, there is still another one. Using just the minimum amount of security technically possible is almost by definition hubris. An example would be that you never point a gun at someone you don't want to shoot, regardless if there's bullets in the gun. If someone tells you,…
This is true but it's not really a security scenario. The LLM isn't an attacker it's just an unreliable tool.
I feel like everyone pointing out "known Docker vulnerability" is missing the point: the presence of a security hole should not be seen as permission to exploit. Another security hole would be storing your passwords in a plaintext file on the desktop. Stupid? Yes. But I still would not want my agent to assume permission to access email when it's being blocked by 2FA. Even in "bypass permissions" mode I expect it to p…
https://oneuptime.com/blog/post/2026-03-02-ufw-docker-fix-by...
Also, everything the LLM doesn't hesitate to do because the user asked, it won't hesitate to do because the prompt injection asked.
I was playing with gemeni-cli a couple months ago and I asked it to edit some files in a directory it didn't have permission to. It didn't say anything about the permissions, it just used sed to make the edits. The only reason I finally noticed is it had to do some trickier edits and it was struggling to write a python script to edit the files and I finally realized what it was doing. I wonder how many tokens that wa…
Oh, you mean you gave the write-file tool access only to the project dir, but gave the LLM free reign to run cli commands? Yeah, LLMs treat that as consent to write anywhere your user is allowed to.
This was of course dependent on yolo mode, but automatic approval has also been pulling stunts like this. A recent example is data that was purposely kept away from Codex in a folder far far away. When it found a single reference it just went for the data when having an issue. Lesson learned, keep essential data and Codex separated on different machines. Codex remote ssh actually helps here.
What in heaven's name is a "folder far far away"? (It sounds like you put it on an SSD on an extension cord and moved it to the kitchen or something.)
I realize this is supposed to be a post about how scary the security vulnerabilities these agents will find are. But personally I love when agents do things like this and appreciate the help. Last thing in the world I want is for them to nerf the models.