Earlier quoted context omitted.
I agree, silly limitation. On zizmor, there's no mention of coverage on commit SHA the section you've linked, nor in the entire page when I do Ctrl+F. Is there anything I'm missing?
Oh, I guess I didn't document it explicitly. My bad! You can see it in the source here[1]. [1]: https://github.com/zizmorcore/zizmor/blob/db5ed6b3bb445848a8...
GitHub Actions is the weakest link
61–70 of 95 posts
Re: GitHub Actions is the weakest link
#62Re: GitHub Actions is the weakest link
#63Back when GitHub Actions first came out, I used commit hashes rather than tags in all my `uses:` lines. Some of my colleagues disagreed, saying that tags were secure enough. I eventually said, "Well, for well-known actions like actions/checkout, sure; if that one gets compromised it'll be all over the news within minutes." But for all the third-party actions, I kept commit hashes. I feel rather vindicated now. There'…
GitHub Actions doesn't have a lock file, so your repo is still prone to transitive attacks if the SHA-locked actions you use also happen to use other composite actions by tags, which could be compromised in the future.
Re: GitHub Actions is the weakest link
#64Programming in YAML has always seemed crazy to me. Actions seem like a great place to create a simple mixed imperative/declarative scripting language (js extension or whatever) with a solid instrumented/observable/debuggable runtime and an OO API that can be run locally against mock infrastructure.
Re: GitHub Actions is the weakest link
#65[1]: https://blog.howardjohn.info/posts/blacksmith-gha/
[2]: https://binhong.me/blog/github-action-runner-alternatives/
Re: GitHub Actions is the weakest link
#66I apologize in advance for the plug. I've spent the last 5 years warning of the importance of not leaving CI locked in a black box platform and proprietary DSL. All the while going on a quest to reinvent CI as an open, programmable platform. Honestly it's still a work-in-progress: it turns out that reinvention is hard! But, if you want a glimpse of what CI can be when you shed 30 years of legacy, consider checking ou…
Re: GitHub Actions is the weakest link
#67Back when GitHub Actions first came out, I used commit hashes rather than tags in all my `uses:` lines. Some of my colleagues disagreed, saying that tags were secure enough. I eventually said, "Well, for well-known actions like actions/checkout, sure; if that one gets compromised it'll be all over the news within minutes." But for all the third-party actions, I kept commit hashes. I feel rather vindicated now. There'…
I don’t think this problem is fixable without a higher level way to specify the full nested tree. Something like TOFU for the first time your action ran (pinning all children as of that run) might be an improvement, but that is still can be gamed by a timed attack that modifies the action at a later date (literally, if time greater than X do …).
Re: GitHub Actions is the weakest link
#68Back when GitHub Actions first came out, I used commit hashes rather than tags in all my `uses:` lines. Some of my colleagues disagreed, saying that tags were secure enough. I eventually said, "Well, for well-known actions like actions/checkout, sure; if that one gets compromised it'll be all over the news within minutes." But for all the third-party actions, I kept commit hashes. I feel rather vindicated now. There'…
Re: GitHub Actions is the weakest link
#69Re: GitHub Actions is the weakest link
#70I apologize in advance for the plug. I've spent the last 5 years warning of the importance of not leaving CI locked in a black box platform and proprietary DSL. All the while going on a quest to reinvent CI as an open, programmable platform. Honestly it's still a work-in-progress: it turns out that reinvention is hard! But, if you want a glimpse of what CI can be when you shed 30 years of legacy, consider checking ou…