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Someone bought 30 WordPress plugins and planted a backdoor in all of them

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Re: Someone bought 30 WordPress plugins and planted a backdoor in all of them

#61

Whenever I look at a web project, it starts with "npm install" and literally dozens of libraries get downloaded. The project authors probably don't even know what libraries their project requires, because many of them are transitive dependencies. There is zero chance that they have checked those libraries for supply chain attacks.

Or worse

   sudo curl URL | bash

Re: Someone bought 30 WordPress plugins and planted a backdoor in all of them

#62

Whenever I look at a web project, it starts with "npm install" and literally dozens of libraries get downloaded. The project authors probably don't even know what libraries their project requires, because many of them are transitive dependencies. There is zero chance that they have checked those libraries for supply chain attacks.

This is a key vulnerability of package publication without peer review plus curation. Going to have to have many more automated behavioral code coverage analysis plus human reviewers rather than allowing unlimited, instant publication from anyone and everyone.

Re: Someone bought 30 WordPress plugins and planted a backdoor in all of them

#63

Whenever I look at a web project, it starts with "npm install" and literally dozens of libraries get downloaded. The project authors probably don't even know what libraries their project requires, because many of them are transitive dependencies. There is zero chance that they have checked those libraries for supply chain attacks.

> There is zero chance that they have checked those libraries for supply chain attacks.

Even if they did, unless the project locked all underlying dependencies to git hashes, all it takes is a single update to one of those and you’re toast.

That’s why things like Dependabot are great.

Re: Someone bought 30 WordPress plugins and planted a backdoor in all of them

#64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Anecdata from a JS developer who has been in this ecosystem for 14 years. I'm actively moving away from Node.js and JavaScript in general. This has been triggered by recent spike in supply chain attacks. Backend: I'm choosing to use Golang, since it has one of the most complete standard libraries. This means I don't have to install 3rd party libraries for common tasks. It is also quite performant, and has great suppo…

Frontend: eh - you could pick something that targets wasm. Definitely a tradeoff with its own headaches.

Rust wasm ecosystem also needs a lot of crates to do anything useful, a lot of them unmaintained.

Re: Someone bought 30 WordPress plugins and planted a backdoor in all of them

#66

This is a perfect illustration of what cracks me up about the hyperbolic reactions to Mythos. Yes, increased automation of cutting-edge vulnerability discovery will shake things up a bit. No, it's nowhere near the top of what should be keeping you awake at night if you're working in infosec. We've built our existing tech stacks and corporate governance structures for a different era. If you want to credit one specifi…

That there is a preexisting way for people to get hacked doesn't seem to be a reason to dismiss other, new ways for people to get hacked.

Re: Someone bought 30 WordPress plugins and planted a backdoor in all of them

#67

Whenever I look at a web project, it starts with "npm install" and literally dozens of libraries get downloaded. The project authors probably don't even know what libraries their project requires, because many of them are transitive dependencies. There is zero chance that they have checked those libraries for supply chain attacks.

Most of which can be managed with good SAST tooling and process.

Re: Someone bought 30 WordPress plugins and planted a backdoor in all of them

#69
post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is a reason. The prevailing wisdom has thus far been: "don't re-invent the wheel", or it non-HN equivalent "there is an app for that". I am absolutely not suggesting everyone should be rolling their own crypto, but there must be a healthy middle ground between that and a library that lets you pick font color.

I agree. I don't know many people who have shit on Java more than I have, but I have been using it for a lot of stuff in the last year primarily because it has a gigantic standard library, to a point where I often don't even need to pull in any external dependencies. I don't love Oracle, but I suspect that at least if there's a security vulnerability in the JVM or GraalVM, they will likely want to fix it else they ri…

Do you really need to roll your own NIO HTTP server? You could just use Jetty with virtual threads (still uses NIO under the hood though) and enjoy the synchronous code style (same as Go)

Re: Someone bought 30 WordPress plugins and planted a backdoor in all of them

#70
post #39

This is a perfect illustration of what cracks me up about the hyperbolic reactions to Mythos. Yes, increased automation of cutting-edge vulnerability discovery will shake things up a bit. No, it's nowhere near the top of what should be keeping you awake at night if you're working in infosec. We've built our existing tech stacks and corporate governance structures for a different era. If you want to credit one specifi…

Yeah I tend to agree. For me Mythos' principal risk in my mind is saturation through being able to do bad things faster. Vulnerabilities are found and fixed - that's life. What is a problem is identifying and prioritising vulnerabilities. A miscategorisation or misidentification may lead to an extended attack window of a vulnerability. If a cloud provider, or multiple cloud providers are open to something there then…

Especially because you can potentially use a model like Mythos to figure out how to hide (from humans, at least) a deliberately created vulnerability.
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