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Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

telnyx.com

61–70 of 153 posts

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#61
post #56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Love it! Let those pip users find the compromised packages for us uv users.

Until everyone waits 7 days to install everything so the compromise is discovered on the 8th day. End result will be everyone runs COBOL only.

Or just scan all GitHub repos, find their .toml definition. Calculate the median and then add 7 days to that. That way you are always behind.

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#62
> The Telnyx platform, APIs, and infrastructure were not compromised. This incident was limited to the PyPI distribution channel for the Python SDK.

Am I being too nitpicky to say that that is part of your infrastructure?

Doesn't 2FA stop this attack in its tracks? PyPI supports 2FA, no?

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#63

Telnyx provides voice capabilities for OpenClaw for those wondering.

They should add voip.ms. it's better all around I think

Voip.ms is great for a simple SIP trunk but it has almost none of the programmable voice and other features of Telnyx or Twilio.

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I really am not able to follow this line of reasoning, I am not sure if what you said makes sense and how it relates to uv having a security feature to be on average less safe :/

I believe they are saying that by the time you need something like uv, your project already has too many dependencies. Its the unnecessarily large supply chain that's the problem, and uv exists to solve a problem that you should try to avoid in the first place. I think uv is great, but I somewhat agree. We see this issue with node/npm. We need smaller supply chains/less dependencies overall, not just bandaiding over…

This line of thought is honestly a bit silly - uv is just a package manager that actually does its job for resolving dependencies. You’re talking about a completely orthogonal problem.

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#68
post #56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Love it! Let those pip users find the compromised packages for us uv users.

Until everyone waits 7 days to install everything so the compromise is discovered on the 8th day. End result will be everyone runs COBOL only.

:-) That might not even be enough as I hear (but haven't verified) that Claude does a pretty good job of making sense out of legacy COBOL code!

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#69
So both this and litellm went straight to PyPI without going to GitHub first.

Is there any way to setup PyPI to only publish packages that come from a certain pattern of tag that exists in GH? Would such a measure help at all here?

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#70

> The payload isn't delivered as a raw binary or a Python file. It's disguised as a .wav audio file. > The WAV file is a valid audio file. It passes MIME-type checks. But the audio frame data contains a base64-encoded payload. Decode the frames, take the first 8 bytes as the XOR key, XOR the rest, and you have your executable or Python script. Talk about burying the lede.

I've seen it at least once in code from a big car manufacturer who encrypted their software or parts of it to avoid you reading the xml files. They use a key, split into two or more parts, hidden as the first bytes of some file or as plain text somewhere it would not be out of order, then recombine, run through an deobfuscation function to be an old fashioned DES or XOR key to decrypt the (usually XML, could have been a different key format it's been a while) files. It's not that uncommon. It's also security theater. Funny part is they didn't obfuscate the code to read the key.
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