When something like this happens, do security researchers instantly contact the hosting companies to suspend or block the domains used by the attackers?
Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised
61–70 of 569 posts
Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised
#62Thank you for posting this, interesting. I hope that everyone's course of action will be uninstalling this package permanently, and avoiding the installation of packages similar to this. In order to reduce supply chain risk not only does a vendor (even if gratis and OS) need to be evaluated, but the advantage it provides. Exposing yourself to supply chain risk for an HTTP server dependency is natural. But exposing yo…
> Remember that you are programmers and you can just program, you don't need a framework, you are already using the API of an LLM provider, don't put a hat on a hat, don't get killed for nothing. Programming for different LLM APIs is a hassle, this library made it easy by making one single API you call, and in the backstage it handled all the different API calls you need for different LLM providers.
There's only two different LLM APIs in practice (Anthropic and everyone else), and the differences are cosmetic.
This is like a couple hours of work even without vibe coding tools.
Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised
#63It will only take one agent-led compromise to get some Claude-authored underhanded C into llvm or linux or something and then we will all finally need to reflect on trusting trust at last and forevermore.
You know that people can already write backdoored code, right?
Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised
#64Thank you for posting this, interesting. I hope that everyone's course of action will be uninstalling this package permanently, and avoiding the installation of packages similar to this. In order to reduce supply chain risk not only does a vendor (even if gratis and OS) need to be evaluated, but the advantage it provides. Exposing yourself to supply chain risk for an HTTP server dependency is natural. But exposing yo…
Comparing this project to is-odd seems very disingenuous to me. My understanding is this was the only way you could use llama.cpp with Claude Code for example, since llama.cpp doesn't support the Anthropic compatible endpoint and doing so yourself isn't anywhere near as trivial as your comparison. Happy to be corrected if I'm wrong.
Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised
#65github, pypi, npm, homebrew, cpan, etc etc. should adopt a multi-multi-factor authentication approach for releases. Maybe have it kick in as a requirement after X amount of monthly downloads.
Basically, have all releases require multi-factor auth from more than one person before they go live.
A single person being compromised either technically, or by being hit on the head with a wrench, should not be able to release something malicious that effects so many people.
Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised
#66airflow, dagster, dspy, unsloth.ai, polar
Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised
#67It will only take one agent-led compromise to get some Claude-authored underhanded C into llvm or linux or something and then we will all finally need to reflect on trusting trust at last and forevermore.
If that would happen, The worry I would have is of all the sensitive Government servers from all over the world which might be then exploited and the amount of damage which can be caused silently by such a threat actor or something like AWS/GCP/these massive hyperscalers which are also used by the governments around the globe at times.
The possibilities within a good threat could be catastrophic if we assume so, and if we assume nation-states to be interested in sponsoring hacking attacks (which many nations already do) to attack enemy nations/gain leverage. We are looking at damage within Trillions at that point.
But I would assume that Linux might be safe for now, it might be the most looked at code and its definitely something safe.
LLVM might be a bit more interesting as it might go a little unnoticed but hopefully people who are working at LLVM are well funded/have enough funding to take a look at everything carefully to not have such a slip up.
Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised
#68This is bad, especially from a downstream dependency perspective. DSPy and CrewAI also import LiteLLM, so you could not be using LiteLLM as a gateway, but still importing it via those libraries for agents, etc.
Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised
#69It will only take one agent-led compromise to get some Claude-authored underhanded C into llvm or linux or something and then we will all finally need to reflect on trusting trust at last and forevermore.
You know that people can already write backdoored code, right?
But now you have compromise _at scale_. Before poor plebs like us had to artisinally craft every back door. Now we have a technology to automate that mundane exploitation process! Win!
Re: Tell HN: Litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI are compromised
#70A general question - how do frontier AI companies handle scenarios like this in their training data? If they train their models naively, then training data injection seems very possible and could make models silently pwn people. Do the labs label code versions with an associated CVE to label them as compromised (telling the model what NOT to do)? Do they do adversarial RL environments to teach what's good/bad? I'm ve…
I am pretty sure that such measures aren't taken by AI companies, though I may be wrong.