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fwiw they should probably slow down a bit, even though they seem to be winning the race. they started selling their own subscription plan last week, and promptly committed all subscriber’s emails to the public repo > Hey - have some bad news. > We accidentally committed your email to our repo as part of a script that was activating OpenCode Black. > No other information was included, just the email on its own.
To be clear, this is a vulnerability. Just the same as exposing unauthenticated telnet is a vulnerability. User education is always good, but at some point in the process of continuing to build user-friendly footguns we need to start blaming the users. “It is what it is”, Duh.
This “vulnerability” has been known by devs in my circle for a while, it’s literally the very first intuitive question most devs ask themselves when using opencode, and then put authentication on top.
Particularly in the AI space it’s going to be more and more common to see users punching above their weight with deployments. Let em learn. Let em grow. We’ll see this pain multiply in the future if these lessons aren’t learned early.
fwiw they should probably slow down a bit, even though they seem to be winning the race. they started selling their own subscription plan last week, and promptly committed all subscriber’s emails to the public repo > Hey - have some bad news. > We accidentally committed your email to our repo as part of a script that was activating OpenCode Black. > No other information was included, just the email on its own.
Isn't it insane that any web page can run a port scan in the first place? Who wants that? Meanwhile, running opencode in a podman container seems to stop this particular, err, feature.
It feels that today security is secondary to growth. As long as your growing, a few incidents here and there aren't going to make a difference.
Well I feel like they will take security more in context from here on out. Atleast they didnt implode their communications like I see from some other companies. To be really honest, when you bet on AI agents, I feel like soemtimes you bet on the future of the product as well which is built by the people so you are basically betting on the people. I'd much rather bet/rely on people who are sensibile in communications…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why not just ask Claude to fix the security issues and make sure they don't happen again?
And if you don't have a Claude subscription, you can just ask your friends to fix them via the remote code execution server.
This is pretty egregious. And outside the fact the server is now disabled by default, once it's running it is still egregious: > When server is enabled, any web page served from localhost/127.0.0.1 can execute code > When server is enabled, any local process can execute code without authentication > No indication when server is running (users may be unaware of exposure) I'm sorry this is horrible. I really want there…
The rest is just code running as your user can talk to code running as your user. I don't really consider this to be a security boundary. If I can run arbitrary code by hitting a URL I accept that any program running as me can as well. Going above and beyond is praiseworthy (good for you turning on SELinux as an example) but I don't expect it by default.