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F-Droid site certificate expired

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Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#61
post #59

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I've used mitm proxies, the problem is I don't know whether the software is behaving the same way under a proxy as it would normally. Edit: To be clear, I'm not even suggesting the software would be doing this maliciously! Apps do all sorts of weird things when you try to proxy them, I know this because I do run most of my traffic through a proxy (for non-privacy reasons). Just for example, QUIC gets disabled.

If you're that worried about software being that devious, then you probably shouldn't be using that software at all, regardless of your ability to monitor its traffic.

I guess I think it's relatively more paranoid to worry about the ISP being that devious.

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The only one of those things that is the fault of ACME is the first one, and are you really suggesting between that and your second bullet point that we should charge money for encryption so that people value it more? Encryption is free so people do it more. Paying money doesn't actually make people trustworthy. (Though you can totally charge people to prove they aren't malicious, but if you want to do that, why tie…

> Paying money doesn't actually make people trustworthy. This is fundamentally a naive understanding of both security and certificates. Paying money absolutely makes people trustworthy because it's prohibitive to do it at scale. You might have one paid malicious certificate but you can have thousands of free ones. The one malicious domain gets banned, the thousands are whack-a-mole forever. Further, certificates used…

EV certs didn't actually afford the guarantees people hoped and expected. I could simply spend a few hundred dollars to register "Stripe, LLC" or "Microsoft, Inc." in my local jurisdiction, and then get an EV cert with that name on it.

Browser vendors removed the extra UI around EV certs not because certs in general are easier to get, but because the identity "guarantee" afforded to EV certs was fairly easy to spoof. EV certs still exist, and you can foolishly pay for one if you want. Free ACME-provided certs has nothing to do with this.

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Meanwhile, in the real world: - We went from the vast majority of traffic being unencrypted, allowing any passive attacker (from nation state to script kiddie sitting in the coffee shop) to snoop and any active attacker to trivially tamper with it, to all but a vanishing minority of connections being strongly encrypted. The scare tactics used to sell VPNs in YouTube ads used to all be true, and no longer are, due to…

> - We went from the vast majority of traffic being unencrypted, allowing any passive attacker (from nation state to script kiddie sitting in the coffee shop) to snoop and any active attacker to trivially tamper with it, to all but a vanishing minority of connections being strongly encrypted. I still don't understand why this is so terrible. Public wifi networks were certainly a real problem, but that's not where the…

> If you're on a traditional home internet connection, who exactly can tamper with your traffic? Your ISP can, and that's not great, but it doesn't strike me as blaring siren levels of terrible, either.

This characterization in on the same level of sophistication as "the Internet is just a series of pipes". Every transit station has the opportunity to read or even tamper with the bytes on an unencrypted http connection. That's not just your ISP, it also includes the ISP's backbone provider, the backbone peering provider, your country's Internet Exchange, the Internet Exchange in the country of the website, the website's peering partner, and the website's hosting partner.

Some of those parties may be the same, and some parties I have not mentioned for brevity. To take just one example: there is only one direct link between Europe and South America. Most traffic between those continents goes via Amsterdam (NL) and New Jersey (US) to Barranquilla (CO), or via Sines (PT) to Fortaleza (BR). Or if the packets are feeling adventurous today, they might go through Italy, Singapore, California and Chile, with optional transit layovers in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Thailand or China.

Main point being: as a user, you have no control over the routing of your Internet traffic. The traffic also doesn't follow geographic rules, they follow peering cost. You can't even be sure that traffic between you and a website in your country stays inside that country.

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is, if your objective is to closely centralize the web. If you make https mandatory, via scare tactics, only people with certificates will have websites. If you make ephemeral certificates mandatory by taking advantage of a monopoly, then only big SSL providers who can afford it will survive. Then, when you have only two or three big SSL providers, it's way easier to shut someone off by denying them a certificate,…

Meanwhile, in the real world: - We went from the vast majority of traffic being unencrypted, allowing any passive attacker (from nation state to script kiddie sitting in the coffee shop) to snoop and any active attacker to trivially tamper with it, to all but a vanishing minority of connections being strongly encrypted. The scare tactics used to sell VPNs in YouTube ads used to all be true, and no longer are, due to…

With centralised trust, encryption is meaningless.

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#65
post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> - We went from the vast majority of traffic being unencrypted, allowing any passive attacker (from nation state to script kiddie sitting in the coffee shop) to snoop and any active attacker to trivially tamper with it, to all but a vanishing minority of connections being strongly encrypted. I still don't understand why this is so terrible. Public wifi networks were certainly a real problem, but that's not where the…

> I still don't understand why this is so terrible. While I don't really have a scary threat model, I don't love the idea that my ISP could have been watching my traffic. Maybe there's a world where my government has ordered ISPs to log specifics about traffic in order to trap dissidents doing things they don't like. But sure, I live in the US, which isn't (yet) an authoritarian nightmare (yet!). But maybe I live in…

Have you checked the list of root certificates your browser accepts as good?

Do it and tell me you trust websites which have a green lock next to the url..

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#67
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

CRLs are becoming bulky, and OCSP have some privacy implications (telling the CA which websites you visit), plus most browsers are set to soft fail if there's an outage and the request can't be made instead of a hard fail and making the website inaccessible, reducing the security and usefulness of OCSP. Short-lived certificates fixes these issues from an end-user standpoint.

Is it possible that one day certificate expiration will be a thing of the past?

How would they get recurring revenue/donations then?

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Meanwhile, in the real world: - We went from the vast majority of traffic being unencrypted, allowing any passive attacker (from nation state to script kiddie sitting in the coffee shop) to snoop and any active attacker to trivially tamper with it, to all but a vanishing minority of connections being strongly encrypted. The scare tactics used to sell VPNs in YouTube ads used to all be true, and no longer are, due to…

> - We went from the vast majority of traffic being unencrypted, allowing any passive attacker (from nation state to script kiddie sitting in the coffee shop) to snoop and any active attacker to trivially tamper with it, to all but a vanishing minority of connections being strongly encrypted. I still don't understand why this is so terrible. Public wifi networks were certainly a real problem, but that's not where the…

> Your ISP can

And already has! ISPs used to inject ads into unencrypted connections: https://www.infoworld.com/article/2241797/code-injection-new...

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#69
post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Meanwhile, in the real world: - We went from the vast majority of traffic being unencrypted, allowing any passive attacker (from nation state to script kiddie sitting in the coffee shop) to snoop and any active attacker to trivially tamper with it, to all but a vanishing minority of connections being strongly encrypted. The scare tactics used to sell VPNs in YouTube ads used to all be true, and no longer are, due to…

With centralised trust, encryption is meaningless.

Strong players in the web space are also trying to centralize DNS resolvers, using similar arguments.

Moar encryption, much secure.

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#70
post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

DANE would be better than LE, but weirdly the massive companies building browsers don't want to provide support. Spooky! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Na...

DANE is not a good idea. It makes DNS the CA. DNS doesn't have any stringent security requirements to its design or operation, as CAs do. It depends on a problematic protocol (that, among other things, limits the ability to deal with different operational and failure modes). And just because a nameserver provides a record, doesn't mean an authorized domain owner wanted that record to be an authorized secure transport…

No, it doesn't. It makes the registrar the CA. Which makes sense, they already authorize who owns which domain. They should absolutely do so cryptographically in some fashion.

What's weird is that the major registrars never even tried to enter the PKI business. It would have made sense. It would even have hastened the adoption of much needed TLS extensions.

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