I don’t understand the risk honestly. Anyone who can write code to the repo can already do anything in GitHub actions. This security measure was never designed to mitigate against a developer doing something malicious. Whether they clone another action into the repo or write custom scripts themselves, I don’t see how GitHub’s measures could protect against that.
Bypassing GitHub Actions policies in the dumbest way possible
61–70 of 129 posts
Re: Bypassing GitHub Actions policies in the dumbest way possible
#62Earlier quoted context omitted.
It’s like putting curl -sSL https://example.com/install.sh | sh In your action. For sure happens.
Yes; I would also consider that a bad idea. Two wrongs don't make a right (and a different wrong doesn't justify a broken policy elsewhere).
Re: Bypassing GitHub Actions policies in the dumbest way possible
#63We forked the actions as a submodule, and then pointed the uses to that directory. That way we were still tracking the individual commits which we approved as a team. Now there is interesting dichotomy. On one hand PMs want us to leverage GitHub Actions to build out stuff more quickly using pre-built blocks, but on the other hand security has no capacity or interest to whitelist actions (not to mention that the white…
Re: Bypassing GitHub Actions policies in the dumbest way possible
#64Re: Bypassing GitHub Actions policies in the dumbest way possible
#65Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes; I would also consider that a bad idea. Two wrongs don't make a right (and a different wrong doesn't justify a broken policy elsewhere).
Being able to filter or disable network access (aside from what github requires on their side to interact with actions) would definitely be useful, but AFAIK that's only an option for self-hosted runners and enterprise accounts.
Re: Bypassing GitHub Actions policies in the dumbest way possible
#66Had these exact same thoughts while I was configuring a series of workflows and scripts to get around the multiple unjustified and longstanding restrictions on what things are allowed to happen when. That sinking feeling when you search for how to do something and all of the top results are issues that were opened over a decade ago... It is especially painful trying to use github to do anything useful at all after be…
I'm baffled you can't clone internal/private repos with anything other than a developer PAT. They have a UI to share access for workflows, let cloning use that...
Re: Bypassing GitHub Actions policies in the dumbest way possible
#67Re: Bypassing GitHub Actions policies in the dumbest way possible
#68This is why I avoid using non-official actions where possible and always set a version for the action. We had a contractor that used some random action to ssh files to the server and referenced master as the version to boot. First, ssh isn't that difficult to upload files and run commands but the action owner could easily add code to save private keys and information to another server. I am a bit confused on the "byp…
I understand it that way, too. But: Having company-wide policies in place (regarding actions) might be misunderstood/used as a security measure for the company against malicious/sloppy developers.
So documenting or highlighting the behaviour helps the devops guys avoid a wrong sense of security. Not much more.
Re: Bypassing GitHub Actions policies in the dumbest way possible
#69Re: Bypassing GitHub Actions policies in the dumbest way possible
#70This is a prime example of "If you make an unusable secure system, the users will turn it into an insecure usable one." If someone is actively subverting a control like this, it probably means that the control has morphed from a guardrail into a log across the tracks. Somewhat in the same vein as AppLocker &co. Almost everyone says you should be using it, but almost no-one does, because it takes a massive amount of e…
Companies have no business telling their employees which specific programs they can and cannot run to do their jobs, that's an absurd level of micromanagement.