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De-anonymization attacks against the privacy coin XMR

monero.forex

61–70 of 116 posts

Re: De-anonymization attacks against the privacy coin XMR

#61
post #57
post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If what tsimionescu says about Lightning is wrong, can somebody kindly reply to them explaining why rather than just downvoting which doesn't help anyone. (Maybe there's a reason they were downvoted that isn't their being wrong, but I don't see what that would be.) (And sorry for going against the guidelines and talking about downvotes, but I'm really just asking for someone to either confirm what they said is right…

See https://blog.breez.technology/lightning-btc-iou-62e3a712c913 for instance.

As that post makes clear at the end, if you don't monitor the BTC block chain actively (with an app or by paying a third party you trust to hopefully do it for you), you can be cheated out of your BTC with Lightning.

Re: De-anonymization attacks against the privacy coin XMR

#63

I was interested to see some AI providers support crypto as their payment. I think we are entering a future where AI regulation puts more people on the darknet.

Very cyberpunk and all, but how are AI regulations driving people to the darknet? You think those highly centralized billion dollar compute operations will secretly offer hidden services so people can ... what? Generate fucked up shit without restrictions? Lol, you could probably do traffic analysis with thermal imaging from a satellite.

> Generate fucked up shit without restrictions? No, that already exists and is not relevant IMO. My comment has nothing to do with what kind of content you generate.

The USA in specific has had a similar problem before with encryption being classified as a munition making very problematic to import or export encryption. That's actually pretty well documented in various pieces of Java code from Sun if you're curious, because different algorithms could not be part of the JRE/JDK that was distributed publicly.

Your mention of "highly centralized billion dollar compute operations" is actually related to the training of the models not the inference. Doing inference for many of these models is readily available at modest consumer hardware availability. There are many different ways to break up models (MoE) etc. The notion that you need a large super computer to do inference is unfounded.

Also, as a reminder, cryptocurrency mining has already proven this to be a thing. Some stay above ground, some go to geopolitical areas for shelter and some stay underground entirely.

For your entertainment I will also include a more simplified play-by-play of how this can play out in the near future:

1. OpenAI or some other USA based AI company continues to get outplayed by foreign models (Qwen, Deepseek)

2. Company cries to government

3. Government does a similar munitions or tariff to what we saw with encryption. Requires at the least anyone wanting to use AI gets one from the good boy list etc.

Now you either (a) use only AI from the good boy list and get outplayed in the global marketplace where our main export is global technology or (b) start acting like a Chinese citizen and using a VPN to access AI services not available only on the approved good boy list.

I will stop here because the rest is already very well documented with how this progresses and you get the same result as the darknet marketplaces (DNM). DNS censorship for AI services not on the good boy list. DNS censorship and legal pressure for VPNs that allow non-good-boy-list services, etc.

Why wouldn't someone change a few .com endpoints to .onion and keep it moving while you send some coin to a wallet?

Re: De-anonymization attacks against the privacy coin XMR

#64
post #15

Fun fact: After some $330m of BTC were stolen last month, Monero spiked 40%+, presumably because the proceeds of that theft were laundered. https://x.com/zachxbt/status/1916756932763046273

I wonder how common this kind of swapping is. Its an interesting financial vehicle when a valid and legal investment strategy is to try to time the laundering of different assets.

It's massively common. USDT is the usual coin of choice because even though the ledger is public, the convenience and relative stability massively outweighs the security risks. In the jobs I've seen, the marks will be 'investing' in BTC but the criminals will be moving those funds out into USDT the moment it hits the bandit wallet.

Re: De-anonymization attacks against the privacy coin XMR

#65

This is by no means a comprehensive analysis. This analysis misses the most major limitation with Monero's decoy based approach to transaction obfuscation: Eve-Alice-Eve attacks (also known as ABA attacks). It also misses an analysis of the possible insecurity of churning and a significant history of randomness implementation errors and flooding attacks specific to Monero. The exact consequences of some of these atta…

Correct, I don't find these to be limitations for any user of Monero, its just a way not to use it. > repeatedly withdraw money from one exchange and then deposit it to another right, don't do that. Withdraw to your wallet. Wait several days. Transfer elsewhere in different denominations. Problem solved for everything you wrote, and its been nearly the same for the entire lifespan of Monero, 11 years now. > Breaks wi…

>right, don't do that. Withdraw to your wallet. Wait several days. Transfer elsewhere in different denominations.

Unfortunately, it doesn't work like that. The EAE attacks only require that the end destination is colluding with the start destination.

Like everything with decoys, privacy is stochastic. So I wouldn't go around making absolute claims about the privacy as many proponents of monero like to do. The developers advise against making these sorts of claims. Monero makes privacy a lot easier, but it's not perfect.

>There are court cases that give the confidence necessary. It is also something to stay abreast of. Always just ask yourself who the transaction is intended to be hidden from.

In the free world, we have the concept of innocent-until-proven-guilty and evidence-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt. Decoy-based approaches give you plausible deniability, but this often isn't enough for more domains where a lower standard of proof is needed.

Fortunately, all this and more will be fixed in FCMP++ upgrade.

Re: De-anonymization attacks against the privacy coin XMR

#66
post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I wonder how common this kind of swapping is. Its an interesting financial vehicle when a valid and legal investment strategy is to try to time the laundering of different assets.

It's massively common. USDT is the usual coin of choice because even though the ledger is public, the convenience and relative stability massively outweighs the security risks. In the jobs I've seen, the marks will be 'investing' in BTC but the criminals will be moving those funds out into USDT the moment it hits the bandit wallet.

USDT can be frozen so its not the best choice. Its definitely a failure of the Tether team if criminals can openly use it to launder funds without it getting frozen, but they are famously anti regulation.

Re: De-anonymization attacks against the privacy coin XMR

#67

What is the least amount of effort to setup a Monero address like a tip jar, deferring transfers and if necessary even checking the balance until setting up something more full-blown later?

Check out feather wallet (https://featherwallet.org/) on desktop or cake wallet (https://cakewallet.com/) on mobile.

Once you create a wallet and write down the seed phrase, generate a "view key". Creating a new wallet from this "view key" allows you to see incoming transactions to your addresses, but not spend them. So you don't need as much security for "view-only" wallets.

You can generate an address from either wallet. It's a long string of numbers and letters that begins with an "8", under "Receive".

Re: De-anonymization attacks against the privacy coin XMR

#68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Very cyberpunk and all, but how are AI regulations driving people to the darknet? You think those highly centralized billion dollar compute operations will secretly offer hidden services so people can ... what? Generate fucked up shit without restrictions? Lol, you could probably do traffic analysis with thermal imaging from a satellite.

> Generate fucked up shit without restrictions? No, that already exists and is not relevant IMO. My comment has nothing to do with what kind of content you generate. The USA in specific has had a similar problem before with encryption being classified as a munition making very problematic to import or export encryption. That's actually pretty well documented in various pieces of Java code from Sun if you're curious,…

There is no point in hosting Ai endpoint on a .onion domain. The point of Tor is privacy so if you want private Ai prompts just run a local model.

The philosophy behind Tor is maximum privacy, the most private way to do AI is locally.

Re: De-anonymization attacks against the privacy coin XMR

#69
post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Preface this by saying I am not a fan of any cryptocurrency, but I really struggle to understand why Monero has a smaller market cap than BTC. It has to be inertia related right? Monero just seems like a fundamentally better piece of technology. Are there scaling issues with Monero, similar/worse than BTC?

Yes, it scales much worse: * node resources scale with the size of the UTXO set (unspent outputs), which in Monero's case balloons to the entire TXO set (all outputs, orders of magnitude larger) * a typical 2-input 2-output transaction is 4 times larger * wallets have to track all outputs to choose random decoys for transaction inputs One can argue that this is the price to pay for significantly better privacy, but t…

>but the largest benefits come from having no visible amounts or addresses

MWEB is certainly an improvement over transparent transactions (and other methods such as coinjoin, coinswap, cashfusion, etc.), and I welcome the litecoin upgrade. I agree that decoy-based privacy is weak.

However, I don't believe that the mimblewimble meets the standard of privacy needed for most users. It's not the visible amounts and addresses, but the links between transactions that are the main problem. CTs on their own are just a "nice-to-have".

The end goal should be a zcash or firo style of privacy. I think you can scale that to a global network with an adjustable block size, payment channels, and atomic swaps between multiple cryptocurrencies. The problem is that zcash and firo have weak tokenomics compared to monero. Grin will have a hard time finding an initial niche that isn't currently satisfied by monero, and if it does take off, its changes could be merged into bitcoin (https://www.truthcoin.info/blog/imex/).

Re: De-anonymization attacks against the privacy coin XMR

#70
post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, it scales much worse: * node resources scale with the size of the UTXO set (unspent outputs), which in Monero's case balloons to the entire TXO set (all outputs, orders of magnitude larger) * a typical 2-input 2-output transaction is 4 times larger * wallets have to track all outputs to choose random decoys for transaction inputs One can argue that this is the price to pay for significantly better privacy, but t…

Don’t forget that opaque blockchains can have invisible inflation. Transparent blockchains will always be worth more, as the user can verify that inflation has not occurred. This applies to grin as much as xmr.

In opaque blockchains, the mechanism that prevents inflation is the same mechanism that prevents double-spending. The user can verify that inflation has not occurred by running a monero node.

Everything considered, I don't think that the risk of a monero inflation bug is greater than a bitcoin inflation bug when you consider the complexity associated with scripting.

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