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NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption
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Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption
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Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption
#63Give how quickly quantum is potentially coming, I wonder if we should/could find some way of using multiple quantum-resistant algorithms simultaneously as a default, in case a fault is found after the limited time we have to verify that there are no faults. Also - should we not be switching over to these algorithms starting like... now? Am I wrong that anyone collecting https traffic now will be able to break it in t…
Isn't that trivial in a sense? Encrypt with layer 1, then use that encrypted channel to send layer 2 (and so on). Not sure about the performance. Signal has a post about using pre and post-quantum together: https://signal.org/blog/pqxdh/ > The essence of our protocol upgrade from X3DH to PQXDH is to compute a shared secret, data known only to the parties involved in a private communication session, using both the ell…
You generally don't want to layer encryption like that. It apparently really does introduce new kinds of attacks, which has been observed in the real world.
The pattern typically used for this is that the key for the high-speed symmetric encryption is split into multiple parts, each of which is encrypted with a separate public key system. One classical, one (or two, now?) with a post-quantum algorithm. As long as each part of the key is big enough, this still means you'd need to crack all the separate public key algorithms, but doesn't introduce any of the layering weaknesses.
Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption
#64Earlier quoted context omitted.
And? Finish that thought.
You are tptacek; I believe you know exactly what I meant. But to indulge you, do you think we can know that the selection process is not comprised?
Explain what the compromised selection process does here. NIST doesn't control the submissions.
Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption
#65Earlier quoted context omitted.
Isn't that trivial in a sense? Encrypt with layer 1, then use that encrypted channel to send layer 2 (and so on). Not sure about the performance. Signal has a post about using pre and post-quantum together: https://signal.org/blog/pqxdh/ > The essence of our protocol upgrade from X3DH to PQXDH is to compute a shared secret, data known only to the parties involved in a private communication session, using both the ell…
You generally don't want to layer encryption like that. It apparently really does introduce new kinds of attacks, which has been observed in the real world. The pattern typically used for this is that the key for the high-speed symmetric encryption is split into multiple parts, each of which is encrypted with a separate public key system. One classical, one (or two, now?) with a post-quantum algorithm. As long as eac…
Do not! Use a combiner / KDF.
Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption
#66Earlier quoted context omitted.
If it's breakable by them, it's breakable by anyone. Full stop. It is not possible to create an encryption scheme only breakable by NIST (or NSA, or whatever 3-4 letter agency).
really? it seems to me like it should be theoretically possible in some cases for the same reasons public/private key cryptography is possible.
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Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption
#67Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's a good question, the answer is no. That's the thing about politics... they touch everything. There's a popular youtuber that I like, he's got a funny saying "You might not fuck with politics, but politics will fuck with you!" Fits well here. You might wanna ignore politics when talking about something that should be pure math, but now that we're talking about why crypto is going to be the standards that all co…
> they touch everything. No. They don't. The level at which politics has actually intersected with my life in the past year is zero. I suspect the same is true for the majority of people in the US. Your politics are mostly a fashion choice. You don't need to put them on display in literally ever conversation. You also cannot possibly change the world around you with this behavior so I can't understand why so many peo…
> Your politics are mostly a fashion choice. You don't need to put them on display in literally ever conversation. You also cannot possibly change the world around you with this behavior so I can't understand why so many people feel the need to engage in it.
Given your obvious disgust with someone else thinking or talking about it. (You weren't tagged, you decided to invite yourself into the conversation to proclaim that someone else is wrong for understanding the world differently from you) It's not much of a shock you can't understand why.
> you also cannot possibly change the world around you with this behavior
This feels like the thing you're actually mad about. Complaining at other people for talking about politics (instead of ignoring them) will have even less of an effect. If you want to have an impact ask more questions, don't berate people for not being as smart as you already are, or for daring to see things differently from the way you see them.
As for the change in the world I want to see. First, I want people to be nicer to each other. This us vs them thing needs to stop. Second, I don't need to change the world, I'm happy to just improve my little corner of it a bit. Security (and crypto) is my corner; and NIST has made some mistakes that I find problematic. The idea that leadership of any org *does* influence an org, isn't normally controversial, so if the leadership changes. It's good to know the trust level is gonna change. If the leadership changes in a less trustworthy direction. I'd hope more people learn about it, so blind trust in NIST drops. I would call that a small improvement.
> The government is massive. You always need to consider this. Pretending that a choice of a single federal official is the difference maker here takes bizarre fashion choices into the completely absurd. The only thing you're doing is alienating half the audience with churlish behavior.
I mean, the people replying to you while you rage at them must care a bit about the politics of the system. So I can't imagine that calling something they care about a "fashion choice", and then insulting them wouldn't feel alienating. Is this a do as I say, not as I do kinda thing?
Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption
#68Give how quickly quantum is potentially coming, I wonder if we should/could find some way of using multiple quantum-resistant algorithms simultaneously as a default, in case a fault is found after the limited time we have to verify that there are no faults. Also - should we not be switching over to these algorithms starting like... now? Am I wrong that anyone collecting https traffic now will be able to break it in t…
Sorry if my question appears ignorant, but how quickly is quantum really coming? If your prior belief is "nothing practical is ever likely to come out of quantum computing", then so far there is nothing that would seriously suggest you to reconsider it.
I do not say this lightly, having followed the academic side of QC for more than a decade.
Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption
#69Give how quickly quantum is potentially coming, I wonder if we should/could find some way of using multiple quantum-resistant algorithms simultaneously as a default, in case a fault is found after the limited time we have to verify that there are no faults. Also - should we not be switching over to these algorithms starting like... now? Am I wrong that anyone collecting https traffic now will be able to break it in t…
Sorry if my question appears ignorant, but how quickly is quantum really coming? If your prior belief is "nothing practical is ever likely to come out of quantum computing", then so far there is nothing that would seriously suggest you to reconsider it. I do not say this lightly, having followed the academic side of QC for more than a decade.
It's a reasonable question. The need for quantum resistant crypto isn't because the practical attack is right around the corner. All though, I do really enjoy the analogy of predicting when we'll get QC based crypto attacks, is similar to predicting when humans will land on the moon by looking at the altitude for the highest manned flight. It has more to do with the level of effort it takes to replace infra as critical as cryptography.
Imagine if next year, via magic wand, all the current TLS systems were completely and totally broken such that the whole of the internet using TLS became effectively unencrypted in any way? How much damage would that do to the ecosystem? But we also just invented a new protocol that works, so how long would it take to deploy it to just 50%? or to 80%? And how long would it take to replace the long tail?
I'll also leave record now decrypt later for another commenter.