Live data from Hacker News

How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

kibty.town

61–70 of 350 posts

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Isn't it really common for build machines to have outbound internet access? Millions of developers use GitHub Actions for building artifacts and the public runners definitely have outbound internet access

It is and regardless a few other commenters saying or hinting it isn't...it is. An air gapped build machine wouldn't work for most software built today.

Sounds like a problem with modern software build practices to me.

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#63

The cat is cute but I'd rather not have it running in front of the text while I'm trying to read and use my cursor.

Then just… put the cursor in the corner? The blog isn’t interactive or anything. I think the cat is cute.

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#64
post #3

Dave here, founder of ToDesktop. I've shared a write-up: https://www.todesktop.com/blog/posts/security-incident-at-to... This vulnerability was genuinely embarrassing, and I'm sorry we let it happen. After thorough internal and third-party audits, we've fundamentally restructured our security practices to ensure this scenario can't recur. Full details are covered in the linked write-up. Special thanks to Eva for resp…

Don't worry man, it's way more embarassing for the people that downloaded your dep or any upstream tool.

If they didn't pay you a cent, you have no liability here.

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#65

As an Electron maintainer, I'll re-iterate a warning I've told many people before: Your auto-updater and the underlying code-signing and notarization mechanisms are sacred . The recovery mechanisms for the entire system are extremely painful and often require embarrassing emails to customers. A compromised code-sign certificate is close to the top of my personal nightmares. Dave and toDesktop have build a product tha…

And yet, tons of developers install github apps that ask for full permissions to control all repos and can therefore do to same things to every dev usings those services. github should be ashamed this possibility even exists and double ashamed that their permission system and UX is so poorly conceived that it leads apps to ask for all the permissions. IMO, github should spend significant effort so that the default is…

I personally haven't worked with many of the github apps that you seem to refer to but the few that I've used are only limited to access the specific repositories that I give and within those repositories their access control is scoped as well. I figured this is all stuff that can be controlled on Github's side. Am I mistaken?

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#66
post #3

Dave here, founder of ToDesktop. I've shared a write-up: https://www.todesktop.com/blog/posts/security-incident-at-to... This vulnerability was genuinely embarrassing, and I'm sorry we let it happen. After thorough internal and third-party audits, we've fundamentally restructured our security practices to ensure this scenario can't recur. Full details are covered in the linked write-up. Special thanks to Eva for resp…

[deleted]

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

from todesktop's report: > Completed a review of the logs. Confirming all identified activity was from the researcher (verified by IP Address and user agent).

With privileged access, the attackers can tamper with the evidence for repudiation, so although I'd say "nothing in the logs" is acceptable, not everyone may. These two attack vectors are part of the STRIDE threat modeling approach.

They don’t elaborate on the logging details, but certainly must good systems don’t allow log tampering even for admins.

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#68

As an Electron maintainer, I'll re-iterate a warning I've told many people before: Your auto-updater and the underlying code-signing and notarization mechanisms are sacred . The recovery mechanisms for the entire system are extremely painful and often require embarrassing emails to customers. A compromised code-sign certificate is close to the top of my personal nightmares. Dave and toDesktop have build a product tha…

And yet, tons of developers install github apps that ask for full permissions to control all repos and can therefore do to same things to every dev usings those services. github should be ashamed this possibility even exists and double ashamed that their permission system and UX is so poorly conceived that it leads apps to ask for all the permissions. IMO, github should spend significant effort so that the default is…

I will note that at least for our GitHub enterprise setup permissions are all granular, tokens are managed by the org and require an approval process.

I’m not sure how much of this is “standard” for an org though.

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#69

The cat is cute but I'd rather not have it running in front of the text while I'm trying to read and use my cursor.

I had to go back and enable JavaScript. Wow, is the goal to direct my attention away from reading the text?

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#70
post #32

"i wanted to get on the machine where the application gets built and the easiest way to do this would be a postinstall script in package.json, so i did that with a simple reverse shell payload" Just want to make sure I understand this. They made a hello world app and submitted it to todesktop with a post install script that opened a reverse shell on the todesktop build machine? Maybe I missed it but that shouldn't be…

In what world do you have a machine which downloads source code to build it, but doesn't have outbound internet access so it can't download source code or build dependencies? Like, effectively the "build machine" here is a locked down docker container that runs "git clone && npm build", right? How do you do either of those activities without outbound network access? And outbound network access is enough on its own to…

In a world with an internal proxy/mirror for dependencies and no internet access allowed by build systems.
Post reply on HN