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Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

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Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#61

Post by garaetjjte »

db48x wrote: post #58
K0balt wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Unfortunately, it seems that the internal FAA recommendations were not allowed to make their way into any kind of airworthiness directive. The recommendations include very basic procedure changes that mitigate the near term risks without any significant impact to operation, as well as recommendations for what probably amounts to a software change and upgrades to some of the pilot oxygen masks to effect a permanent fi…

> […] stops short of recommending some very, very simple steps in aircraft configuration prior to takeoff that would completely mitigate the issue […] Well, the configuration changes during takeoff mitigate the issue if it happens during takeoff. If it happens at any other time then they don’t do anything to help. > I can see no reason to drag feet on this recommendation […] I can. Perhaps the FAA believes that it is…

>Perhaps the FAA believes that it is better to minimize change fatigue.

Additionally you might want to avoid the association that specific pack supplies air to the cockpit, as it varies across generations. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kegworth_air_disaster

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#63

Post by karavelov »

db48x wrote: post #58
K0balt wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Unfortunately, it seems that the internal FAA recommendations were not allowed to make their way into any kind of airworthiness directive. The recommendations include very basic procedure changes that mitigate the near term risks without any significant impact to operation, as well as recommendations for what probably amounts to a software change and upgrades to some of the pilot oxygen masks to effect a permanent fi…

> […] stops short of recommending some very, very simple steps in aircraft configuration prior to takeoff that would completely mitigate the issue […] Well, the configuration changes during takeoff mitigate the issue if it happens during takeoff. If it happens at any other time then they don’t do anything to help. > I can see no reason to drag feet on this recommendation […] I can. Perhaps the FAA believes that it is…

> Well, the configuration changes during takeoff mitigate the issue if it happens during takeoff. If it happens at any other time then they don’t do anything to help.

There are no birds at higher altitudes

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#64

Post by db48x »

garaetjjte wrote: post #61
db48x wrote: post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> […] stops short of recommending some very, very simple steps in aircraft configuration prior to takeoff that would completely mitigate the issue […] Well, the configuration changes during takeoff mitigate the issue if it happens during takeoff. If it happens at any other time then they don’t do anything to help. > I can see no reason to drag feet on this recommendation […] I can. Perhaps the FAA believes that it is…

>Perhaps the FAA believes that it is better to minimize change fatigue. Additionally you might want to avoid the association that specific pack supplies air to the cockpit, as it varies across generations. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kegworth_air_disaster

Oooh, that’s rough.

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#65

Post by db48x »

karavelov wrote: post #63
db48x wrote: post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> […] stops short of recommending some very, very simple steps in aircraft configuration prior to takeoff that would completely mitigate the issue […] Well, the configuration changes during takeoff mitigate the issue if it happens during takeoff. If it happens at any other time then they don’t do anything to help. > I can see no reason to drag feet on this recommendation […] I can. Perhaps the FAA believes that it is…

> Well, the configuration changes during takeoff mitigate the issue if it happens during takeoff. If it happens at any other time then they don’t do anything to help. There are no birds at higher altitudes

Fewer perhaps, but not none. :)

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#66

Post by DrNosferatu »

Fascinating how many people had to actively shove this to the side so that it became potentially life threatening:

- CFM designed an engine that, in certain emergencies, dumps oil into the quite possible (actually traditional, if I understand correctly?) human-breathing stream of the aircraft, apparently, without the relevant human-breathing system shutdown mandate when said (or any) emergency system is triggered; [truth be told, we never heard their complete story]

- Boeing integrating said new engines into their new 737MAX without appropriately checking for possible new emergency mode interactions with their life-support (in this case, breathing) systems.

- FAA dropped the ball upon accident investigation;

- FAA removed their employee that then picked up the ball;

- EASA swallowing what they were told by FAA without asking further questions;

Well...

I have worked in many no-harm potential software projects that employed more careful engineering than this.

All hardware projects I worked on employed more careful engineering than this.

Conclusion: It becomes more and more difficult to falsify that Boeing, nowadays, simply abandoned engineering design reviews, and, relies solely on some blend of "agile" methods to design people-carrying airplanes.

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#67

Post by DrNosferatu »

K0balt wrote: post #8
hypothesis wrote: post #5

I wonder what was the thought process there: hey we save an engine maybe, but everyone inside the plane gets cooked in 39 seconds. Ship it! Comments on that youtube video are filled with industry insiders and it’s just wild. They even think someone has died from a similar fuming event back in December…

It doesn’t save the engine, it keeps it from ripping the wing off. It’s a good system. The part about filling the cabin with smoke because they couldn’t be bothered to make the software that detects the extreme vibration tell the AC units from that engine to shut down (which they already do if the rpm drops, indicating an engine failure-just not soon enough or reliable enough to prevent the smoke issue) - not so much…

If engine detects malfunction -> close its breathing air pathway to humans.

How difficult is that?

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#69

Post by lupusreal »

beAbU wrote: post #51
pxeger1 wrote: post #50

This guy says he doesn’t understand why the issue isn’t taken more seriously, and that he’s tried to cover every possible hole in his logic. Here’s a possible reason: None of the sources he references about the danger of the smoke itself appear to be very confident that it genuinely could kill you in 39 seconds, and they all seem to be from sites that likely have an incentive to sensationalise. Maybe he had better so…

Or... Alternatively... This YouTube video is incentivised to sensationalise as well. It is on YouTube after all, and there is an algorithm to please.

I haven't watched this channel recently, but from what I saw I the past he seems to have a bias of reassuring the public that air travel is safe and problems are uncommon and usually not as bad as they might seem to the uninitiated. E.g. airline mechanics on the wing applying "duct tape" is normal, not shoddy maintenance.

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#70

Post by MBCook »

jiggawatts wrote: post #56
MBCook wrote: post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I know the FAA can, I was referring to the manufacture. If Boeing makes a software patch do they have any way of forcing everyone to install it other than asking the FAA to issue a directive?

AFAIK, no. I read through the 787 Dreamliner manual for setting up the software for patch distribution to the planes, and there are checks and overrides at every step. The whole thing is physically controlled by the owning airline or maybe the leasing company, but not Boeing.

That sounds smart.

I wasn’t thinking a “we’re pushing an update too bad” kind of thing but more a “hey you have to do this to be allowed to fly, your choice” with the weight of law behind it.

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