Earlier quoted context omitted.
The reasoning behind this is that your fingerprints and face etc. are public knowledge. Whereas you can retain your right to remain silent (about your password/PIN), failing to provide these aspects of your person can be viewed as not cooperating.
>The reasoning behind this is that your fingerprints and face etc. are public knowledge. Not really. You can be compelled to give blood sample for alcohol testing, but your blood is hardly "public knowledge". Same thing with strip searches.
The protester's guide to smartphone security
61–70 of 246 posts
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#62> However, in this situation it may make more sense to disable biometric authentication. In Face ID, there's a setting that requires direct eye contact in order to open your phone. Highly recommend enabling this when feeling insecure about someone forcing you to open your phone (if it's not already on by default) because it means somebody forcing you to open your phone with Face ID can be easily defeated by simply cl…
Depending on your settings, this may also call 911 automatically, but that can be canceled.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#63Also Meshtastic.org is a cheap (various It supports strong encryption layer and over 1 km/mile per “hop” in most circumstances. Designed originally for off grid, it’s very flexible and pretty polished. Abstracts your phone into a UI. Has a whole ecosystem behind it. I’ve been using it for festivals and tracking my vehicles (high theft area) for years. Very handy should infra not be available. Should be great for prot…
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#64Earlier quoted context omitted.
Don’t both Apple and Android implement random BT MAC addresses specifically to prevent this kind of tracking?
How about my smartwatch, or my $29 earbuds? They are always conveniently near the 'random mac' and can be used to fingerprint.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#65I don’t understand the issue. Protesting is legal. Are we advocating for illegal activity?
1) Protesting is illegal in many parts of the world. 2) Authoritarians have been known to act illegally to solidify their power.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#66Earlier quoted context omitted.
> don't take identifiable pics of people without consent Hard disagree. Public events are public events. My conclusion, based on experience at street protests, historic trends, and current political events, is that there have been significant actions by provocateurs over the past decade or more, and particularly in Portland in 2020. Taking and posting pictures of these people is an important act. It the internet age…
As another Portlander, disagree with exceptions: surveillance footage made it harder to identify people from top down angles, and it meant that a lot of people had their charges dismissed because of that. (I will need to look it up.) The bigger risk to a protest movement, I would argue, is an opposing agent provocateurs trying to get people doxxed. That risk to more people outweighs getting minority of provocateurs s…
That wouldn't be an agent provocateur right?
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#67I don’t understand the issue. Protesting is legal. Are we advocating for illegal activity?
>Protesting is legal first of all, where? secondly, what has legality of protest got to do with privacy?
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#68Old phones are an underappreciated resource, imo. I keep a few handsets around for apps I don't want on my daily driver (ex:food ordering, 2FA). More in line with the article: For alternate cell/SMS service I have a RedPocket SIM. (note: I see now it's $45/yr on ebay. I'm paying less, prob grandfathered).
>Old phones are an underappreciated resource, imo. Not really. Old phones don't receive security patches and can be trivially unlocked to extract all relevant information. Sure, it might not have your nudes or bank login, but if you're using it to coordinate the protest that's plenty of incriminating evidence for the police. >For alternate cell/SMS service I have a RedPocket SIM. (note: I see now it's $45/yr on ebay.…
For a phone that was off until 2 hours ago and it's only login is the app they comm with, there don't seem to be a lot of meaningful risk vectors.
> and can be trivially unlocked to extract all relevant information.
The unlocker will maybe get one app login and 2 hours of location data.
> if you're using it to coordinate the protest that's plenty of incriminating evidence for the police.
It's one app login and 2 hours of location data. Most of that same info can be gleaned by directly observing the individual.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#69A sufficiently motivated state actor will have little issue with finding what they want/need, no matter what measures are taken.
Every security practice is a risk/reward. The measures being offered here are no-cost measures which can reduce the exposure of evidence to casual security / police.
Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security
#70404 Media just released a great related article "The Powerful AI Tool That Cops (or Stalkers) Can Use to Geolocate Photos in Seconds" https://www.404media.co/the-powerful-ai-tool-that-cops-or-st...
What does this have to do with protests? Aren't protests by definition events where the organizers want people to be aware of?