Earlier quoted context omitted.
These are generally government CAs, so, typically the situation is Microsoft sold the government Windows, and as part of that deal (at least tacitly) agreed to the CA being trusted, and so every system that's trusting these certificates is a Windows PC anyway, running Edge because the whole point was the government will only use Windows and pays Microsoft $$$. Why bake it into everybody else's Windows? If you make sa…
The solution seems straightforward: limit the trust in the CA to .BR domains. [domain name typo fixed]
A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com
61–70 of 233 posts
Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com
#62Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com
#63Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, if the interception system involved was meant only for resources within Brazil’s own agency networks.
But that's not allowed for publicly trusted roots under any circumstances, right? Not sure if that would qualify as an accident.
Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com
#64Earlier quoted context omitted.
But that's not allowed for publicly trusted roots under any circumstances, right? Not sure if that would qualify as an accident.
I think the parent is saying that if they meant to use the cert only internally (e.g., to monitor employees) then that would arguably not be malicious.
Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com
#65Earlier quoted context omitted.
These are generally government CAs, so, typically the situation is Microsoft sold the government Windows, and as part of that deal (at least tacitly) agreed to the CA being trusted, and so every system that's trusting these certificates is a Windows PC anyway, running Edge because the whole point was the government will only use Windows and pays Microsoft $$$. Why bake it into everybody else's Windows? If you make sa…
The solution seems straightforward: limit the trust in the CA to .BR domains. [domain name typo fixed]
Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com
#66Is anybody else surprised at this point?
Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com
#67Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also being issued on a major US holiday- when many are on PTO- does not help with the look.
During carnival we brazillians often take 3 or 4 days leave. Would it be fair during that time if I asked you to hold your PRs, bug tickets and work in general because we're on paid leave? On-call rotation exists for those reasons. Otherwise, all countries would need to respect all other countries holidays. In fact, we're not even aware of most US holidays. It is likely to be a coincidence.
Yes. That's completely normal for companies that do business with Brazil.
Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com
#68So an incompetent CA is trusted by an even more incompetent company, Microsoft? Is anybody else surprised at this point?
Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com
#69Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nope, certificates are issued for CNs(Common Name), also known as FQDNs (Fully qualified domain names). Something such as *.google.com, not IP addresses. If they were issued for IP addresses they would have to reissue the certificate every time they spun up a new server. Also it's why if you spin up another server and make DNS point google.com to that server, it would not pass verification since the certificate you w…
Certificates can be issued to IP addresses (at least on SAN level, not sure if they are allowed in CN in CA/B baseline requirements), like https://crt.sh/?id=15492507462
Re: A Brazilian CA trusted only by Microsoft has issued a certificate for google.com
#70Earlier quoted context omitted.
The solution seems straightforward: limit the trust in the CA to .BR domains. [domain name typo fixed]
IIRC name constraints is very poorly supported by client software, so there are likely lots of clients out there that wouldn't even parse that restriction out of the cert, and happy accept anything singed by the CA.