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United States discloses nuclear warhead numbers; restores nuclear transparency

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Re: United States discloses nuclear warhead numbers; restores nuclear transparency

#61

Post by holowoodman »

GemesAS wrote: post #48
transcriptase wrote: post #11

Every time I’ve seen nuclear stockpiles and the reduction thereof discussed, I’ve wondered: Assuming for some reason the United States needed to ramp back up to an absurd number of warheads (ignore the MAD/political practicalities), how quickly could they do so? What’s the lead time or rate limiting factors in production? Because if they could start churning out a dozen or a hundred a week within a short period of ti…

Pit production is likely the rate limiting factor. We disassembled a bunch of AFAPs so have a lot of weapons grade plutonium around. But Pu is nasty to work with & Rocky Flats--the previous pit production facility--closed down years ago. Pit production moved to Los Alamos but it is at a much reduced capability. Also, Pantex--where nuclear weapons are assembled--isn't exactly the model for speed & efficiency.

I guess mass produced nukes would rather be enriched uranium based, due to the far easier construction. No fiddly implosive lens assembly. No weird multi-phase cristallization that goes critical if you blink. Metal that is merely as dangerous and nasty as lead, magnesium or arsenic, not plutonium.

If you really want to go carpet-bombing with nukes, miniturization isn't as important as having a lot, quickly and reliably.

Re: United States discloses nuclear warhead numbers; restores nuclear transparency

#62

Post by cfraenkel »

llamaimperative wrote: post #32
JumpCrisscross wrote: post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> no form of full scale nuclear war where the production apparatus for anything becomes a factor Where full nuclear war means a full exchange of strategic fire, yes. For tactical nukes or bombardment of a non-retaliating state, less so.

It's not clear there's any such thing as "tactical nukes" given that they're strategically useless, and it's actually not even clear there's such a thing as nuclear exchange that isn't full scale war. At least as told by Ellsberg in the Doomsday Machine, there was literally no mechanism for the US to launch a partial nuclear attack.

All these other comments should just go read the book, it's worth it and a good, if horrifying read. What 'no mechanism' above means is that for many decades the SIOP consisted of 'launch everything'. The only way it was a 'plan' was to time the arrival times to avoid fratricide. This btw meant that even if there was a 'tactical' shooting event in Western Europe, all the targets in China would have been hit, even if they weren't involved. Needless to say, Japan was never informed of this....

Re: United States discloses nuclear warhead numbers; restores nuclear transparency

#63

Post by amenhotep »

BMc2020 wrote: post #47
devwastaken wrote: post #28

Nobody asks how many anti nuke missiles. :)

Funny enough, I know a little bit about this one. We have them, but they are all come-from-behind missiles, so the launch site has to be as close to Russia (or wherever) as possible, which angers the Russians. The head-on hit-a-bullet-with-another-bullet-is missile still impossible, although many would like us to believe they are already here. Nuh uh. Plus those are still useless against nukes delivered inside ton of…

Your contention is that GMD, THAAD, PAC-3 and Arrow are essentially expensive fireworks? Interesting. Russia and Iran will be delighted to hear that in fact their ballistic missiles were not intercepted.

Re: United States discloses nuclear warhead numbers; restores nuclear transparency

#64

Post by holowoodman »

johnohara wrote: post #51
BMc2020 wrote: post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What you are thinking of is (or used to be, called a MIRV, a mulitiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicle). There's still only one atom bomb per warhead, but 6 warheads per mirv. Think of the MIRV like a cylinder on a revolver with 6 warheads per MIRV like the bullets in it. The warhead has the minimum amount of hardware necessary to make it blow up, while the MIRV has the computers and rocket engines on it. So…

What I was thinking was that whenever the U.S. enters into any form of weapons reduction agreement there has to be an enormous amount of internal reluctance to actually make those reductions. Reagan's so-called "trust, but verify" policy. I find it difficult to accept that any party to those agreements would actually reduce anything without having equivalent plans B, C, and D. I am not a weapons expert so thank you f…

All those arms-reduction treaties are accompanied by some regime of mutual inspections and checks. Each party visits the other's facilities and counts stuff, assesses production and storage capabilities, paperwork, etc. And compares those results to their otherwise-obtained (read: by spies) data about the other party's weapons counts.

Of course it isn't foolproof, and each party can and will maybe try to sneak a few more warheads somewhere. But those inspections at least provide some rough limit on the sneakiness, because if they had more than X% more, we would have noticed or so...

Re: United States discloses nuclear warhead numbers; restores nuclear transparency

#65

Post by holowoodman »

johnohara wrote: post #55
ianburrell wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Nuclear warhead is a single nuclear device. Are you thinking MIRV where multiple nuclear warheads are mounted to missile? The US has down rated lots of SLBMs and ICBMs recently. Many of the warheads in storage are from missiles. They could put them back, but then they would show in the active count.

That's insightful because it means it may be strictly an accounting issue versus an actual reduction in the number of warheads i.e. the number of warheads counted == the number mounted, not the total number possessed.

The number of mounted warheads is a very important issue, because a nuclear war will take at most half a day. So all the mounted warheads at that point are the ones that can be used, nothing more.

Of course if the war doesn't come as a surprise but with a lot of buildup, then you can remount everything over a few weeks.

Re: United States discloses nuclear warhead numbers; restores nuclear transparency

#66

Post by maxglute »

starik36 wrote: post #16

Why did US disclose this number? Is there a treaty compelling them to? Did other nuclear powers disclose them?

IMO context is: recent US/PRC nuclear talk broke down. US/RU nuclear monitoring also broke down post UKR war. There is no strategic monitoring system anymore between large nuclear powers. Only mind games now. Throw number out there for deterrence/mind game as everyone is either building out (PRC) or modernizing nuke force (US/RU). Maybe anchoring technique to limit proliferation range. That said, there's no reason US adversaries should believe # is credible. And even if it is, each country has different # of launchers/warheads for deterence posture due to different geopolitical/technological constraints. I.e. ballistic missile defense changes penetration ratios.

Re: United States discloses nuclear warhead numbers; restores nuclear transparency

#67

Post by holowoodman »

starik36 wrote: post #16

Why did US disclose this number? Is there a treaty compelling them to? Did other nuclear powers disclose them?

Everyone knows the rough number anyways I'd suspect. Publishing numbers is a part of all arms-control treaties, so unilaterally publishing it may be an attempt to show willingness and shame the others towards a new arms-control treaty.

And of course, as the sister comment said, an announcement of dick-size.

Re: United States discloses nuclear warhead numbers; restores nuclear transparency

#68

Post by BMc2020 »

amenhotep wrote: post #63
BMc2020 wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Funny enough, I know a little bit about this one. We have them, but they are all come-from-behind missiles, so the launch site has to be as close to Russia (or wherever) as possible, which angers the Russians. The head-on hit-a-bullet-with-another-bullet-is missile still impossible, although many would like us to believe they are already here. Nuh uh. Plus those are still useless against nukes delivered inside ton of…

Your contention is that GMD, THAAD, PAC-3 and Arrow are essentially expensive fireworks? Interesting. Russia and Iran will be delighted to hear that in fact their ballistic missiles were not intercepted.

BMc2020: "I would have to be a complete nut to say Hitler was a great man."

amenhotep: "You said Hitler was a great man."

Re: United States discloses nuclear warhead numbers; restores nuclear transparency

#69

Post by hollerith »

johnohara wrote: post #51
BMc2020 wrote: post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What you are thinking of is (or used to be, called a MIRV, a mulitiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicle). There's still only one atom bomb per warhead, but 6 warheads per mirv. Think of the MIRV like a cylinder on a revolver with 6 warheads per MIRV like the bullets in it. The warhead has the minimum amount of hardware necessary to make it blow up, while the MIRV has the computers and rocket engines on it. So…

What I was thinking was that whenever the U.S. enters into any form of weapons reduction agreement there has to be an enormous amount of internal reluctance to actually make those reductions. Reagan's so-called "trust, but verify" policy. I find it difficult to accept that any party to those agreements would actually reduce anything without having equivalent plans B, C, and D. I am not a weapons expert so thank you f…

Till 2022 Washington and Moscow were regularly inspecting each other's nuclear installations to verify compliance with the treaty.

Re: United States discloses nuclear warhead numbers; restores nuclear transparency

#70

Post by holowoodman »

amenhotep wrote: post #63
BMc2020 wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Funny enough, I know a little bit about this one. We have them, but they are all come-from-behind missiles, so the launch site has to be as close to Russia (or wherever) as possible, which angers the Russians. The head-on hit-a-bullet-with-another-bullet-is missile still impossible, although many would like us to believe they are already here. Nuh uh. Plus those are still useless against nukes delivered inside ton of…

Your contention is that GMD, THAAD, PAC-3 and Arrow are essentially expensive fireworks? Interesting. Russia and Iran will be delighted to hear that in fact their ballistic missiles were not intercepted.

While an ICBM is a ballistic missile, the trajectory is far far higher than the usual short- to medium-range ballistic missiles. Velocity at the receiving end of the trajectory will be far higher. Visibility into the trajectory will be worse, because of the huge range and the earth being "in the way".
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