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Lessons learned from cracking 2 million LinkedIn passwords

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Re: Lessons learned from cracking 2 million LinkedIn passwords

#61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Mandatory https isn't a law, either. Good thing or HN would be in violation of it.

So?

To be clearer, my point was that HN not using HTTPS doesn't seem like a reason not to require sites to use HTTPS, let alone introducing any security regulations at all.

Re: Lessons learned from cracking 2 million LinkedIn passwords

#62

I always use site specific, but also site derived passwords. I think it's time to reevaluate that practice. I remember seeing that three of the top password fragments for LinkedIn were link, job, and work. My password was all three... oops.

So the saying that OpenBSD developers are paranoid is not true after all?

Re: Lessons learned from cracking 2 million LinkedIn passwords

#63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So?

To be clearer, my point was that HN not using HTTPS doesn't seem like a reason not to require sites to use HTTPS, let alone introducing any security regulations at all.

All standards become obsolete eventually. Mandating them by law is a sure road to legacy legal cruft hurting the legitimate aims it was put in place to help.

Re: Lessons learned from cracking 2 million LinkedIn passwords

#65
post #59
post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It will get to the point that we need biometric scanners or implanted RFID chips with private keys to do authentication, since brute forcing even unrememberable passwords will be trivial eventually.

Why? There are plenty of ways to make brute force hard or damn near impossible, it's just a little harder to implement. It has been discussed a lot of times here at HN and other places. Also, do you really think that storing private keys on RFID would be a wise choice? I would put that in the "stupid as fuck"-category, just above storing your keys on a USB-stick, as they are both easy to copy and duplicate, and with…

That's the problem, though. If people didn't reuse passwords, if people didn't use words and personal information in passwords and if people had no problem changing them every day then a lot of problems with security would be solved. But those are not realistic expectations, and blaming users for not being computers does not solve the problem.

Slow hash function certainly help, but I think we also need something that goes beyond straightforward cryptography to address authentication issues. Something that redefines the rules of the game to be more human-friendly and less computer-friendly.

But then again, I never even heard the question being phrase this way: what do we want from "program-less" authentication and what we can use to achieve it.

Re: Lessons learned from cracking 2 million LinkedIn passwords

#66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You might want to look at a browser extension like PwdHash [1]. It uses a client-side script to generate a cryptographic hash from your common password and the domain name. I've been using it for about four years now and have been generally very happy. It means that if my password ever gets leaked the attackers are not only unlikely to find my password of "ngjO3uBJrvt", but if they get it they do not have any informa…

I don't use that because of (unfounded) concerns that I will someday need to enter my password into some device where it's not available, or the domain will change, or some other scenario where bad things will happen because I do not actually know the password I told the site.

I call this 'primary authentication' which means you're in an environment where you can't execute code (staring at your xfce4 desktop log on prompt for example). Password managers and generators are only useful after you've logged on. Form there, you can execute code and use a password manager for 'secondary authentication' (websites, email, etc.).

Re: Lessons learned from cracking 2 million LinkedIn passwords

#67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, calculating the "true" strength is difficult to do, because even though sophisticated tools are available to aid the process, the attackers are still human, and can input their own guesses that may or may not be more accurate. If the attacker knows (or can closely guess) the password rules used to generate your password, he or she has a better chance of getting a hit. Let's look at a password like "My first car…

Beautifully written. Also worth noting is that sites exist that only use lower(trunc(password, 8), so your first 8 characters should be sufficiently random. For the grandparent, that leaves "my first", which is especially weak in a dictionary attack.

I don't get it. Is there a reason for some sites to actually do that? (considering that they don't store your password as plaintext)

I guess if someone stole their database it would be impossible to know your real password, but still...

Or am I missing something here?

Re: Lessons learned from cracking 2 million LinkedIn passwords

#68
post #6

Here's a useful one-liner to create a strong password in Linux: cat /usr/share/dict/words|egrep -v "é|'s$|[Åå]|[Øø]"|shuf --random-source=/dev/random -n4 This uses the dictionary /usr/share/dict/words and skips all the words containing characters like é, å, ø and all those ending in 's . The resulting word list has 72,940 words in it. Then it chooses 4 random words from this dictionary and prints them to the screen.…

[deleted]

Re: Lessons learned from cracking 2 million LinkedIn passwords

#69
post #6

Here's a useful one-liner to create a strong password in Linux: cat /usr/share/dict/words|egrep -v "é|'s$|[Åå]|[Øø]"|shuf --random-source=/dev/random -n4 This uses the dictionary /usr/share/dict/words and skips all the words containing characters like é, å, ø and all those ending in 's . The resulting word list has 72,940 words in it. Then it chooses 4 random words from this dictionary and prints them to the screen.…

To generate random alphanumeric strings drop the following into your zshrc:

  function mkpw () {
      if (( $# == 0 )) then
          head /dev/urandom | uuencode -m - | sed -n 2p | cut -c1-${1:-12}
      else
          head /dev/urandom | uuencode -m - | sed -n 2p | cut -c1-${1:-$1}
      fi
  }
By default it generates an alphanumeric string of length 12. Given an integer argument n it generates an alphanumeric string of length n.

Re: Lessons learned from cracking 2 million LinkedIn passwords

#70
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, calculating the "true" strength is difficult to do, because even though sophisticated tools are available to aid the process, the attackers are still human, and can input their own guesses that may or may not be more accurate. If the attacker knows (or can closely guess) the password rules used to generate your password, he or she has a better chance of getting a hit. Let's look at a password like "My first car…

One improvement: for most people, the risk is not that someone tries to crack your password, it is that someone uses rainbow tables to crack many passwords, one of which may be yours. Rainbow tables have a degree of freedom: the function that maps hashes back to passwords. You should try and pick a password that that function will never generate. To get that, do something unique. Good options, I think, are including…

Can you explain more about this rainbow table function? From what I understand, rainbow tables are simply precomputed hashes of common passwords. What you're saying is that we should use passwords that aren't in a rainbow table, which by definition implies that the passwords are not common.
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