Earlier quoted context omitted.
And then return me my laptop and steal it again?
Bluetooth keyloggers are a thing. The attacker would need to be nearby.
I'd have to use bluetooth keyboard then, right?
TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
61–70 of 136 posts
Re: TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
#62> briefly grounding the reset pin of a discrete TPM device with a pair of tweezers Ah, the tweezers strike again, just not for Nintendo this time. Truly the most universal hardware hacking tool.
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Re: TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
#63TPM seems beyond useless to me. I wanted to protect a certificate and private key for a Java application, so that you can't just copy the pkcs12 file and use it elsewhere, but there is no decent API in Java to use a TPM 2 chip. So the road ends there... The only protection now is a hardcoded passphrase in the application but you don't have to be a genius to figure that out...
Each TPM having an unique certificate, you may use that to trace a specific machine to a specific user. Game developers could use that to ban (toxic) players from an online service, for example.
Re: TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
#64> briefly grounding the reset pin of a discrete TPM device with a pair of tweezers Ah, the tweezers strike again, just not for Nintendo this time. Truly the most universal hardware hacking tool.
I have to believe there are hardware engineers out there who know locking people out of their devices is essentially bad, and so they leave in those tweezer based attacks on purpose. Although, designing against physical attacks is very difficult, so I guess there’s no need to imagine a good-hearted conspiracy of conscientious hardware folks.
The problem with that approach is that it also weakens security for people who genuinely need it.
Re: TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
#65Earlier quoted context omitted.
it's a misnomer, a bit. fTPM is a firmware-based TPM implemented, usually, by coprocessor (or trustzone style enclave) inside the CPU, yes. It's not related to what TPM standard it implements You can also have external TPM 2.0 compliant devices (commonly referred to as dTPM, probably brought the naming from iGPU/dGPU), and in fact many options offered for making desktops fully compliant with windows 11 (which require…
You're correct, but also I'm reasonably certain that, as much bullshit the list of Win 11 supported CPUs is, all the CPUs on it have fTPM 2.0 available.
In practice it's a matter of how the motherboard firmware is set up, so there's a lot of possible breakage.
Re: TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
#66TPM seems beyond useless to me. I wanted to protect a certificate and private key for a Java application, so that you can't just copy the pkcs12 file and use it elsewhere, but there is no decent API in Java to use a TPM 2 chip. So the road ends there... The only protection now is a hardcoded passphrase in the application but you don't have to be a genius to figure that out...
It's used to establish a root of trust. If your operating system is modified, it fails to validate and the TPM doesn't release the secrets. If your BIOS is modified, it fails to validate and the TPM doesn't release the secrets. If your CPU is modified, it can tell the TPM what it wants to hear and get the secrets even if the BIOS or OS is modified.
For some people, this is a useful increase in security. Those people set up their own TPM according to their own rules. For the rest of us, who had one forced on us by Microsoft, it's just more anti-right-to-repair.
Re: TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
#67TPM seems beyond useless to me. I wanted to protect a certificate and private key for a Java application, so that you can't just copy the pkcs12 file and use it elsewhere, but there is no decent API in Java to use a TPM 2 chip. So the road ends there... The only protection now is a hardcoded passphrase in the application but you don't have to be a genius to figure that out...
Each TPM having an unique certificate, you may use that to trace a specific machine to a specific user. Game developers could use that to ban (toxic) players from an online service, for example.
Couldn't they just reset their TPM to change their "identity"? Or use a different computer or VM?
Also, I'd be pretty frustrated if I was sharing a PC with someone and they got me banned from a game.
Re: TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
#68Good. The only widespread uses of TPM are as user-hostile as any other DRM scheme.
Stallman was right: https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.en.html
(Last few paragraphs.)
See also: https://gabrielsieben.tech/2022/07/29/remote-assertion-is-co...
Re: TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
#69TPM seems beyond useless to me. I wanted to protect a certificate and private key for a Java application, so that you can't just copy the pkcs12 file and use it elsewhere, but there is no decent API in Java to use a TPM 2 chip. So the road ends there... The only protection now is a hardcoded passphrase in the application but you don't have to be a genius to figure that out...
Totally off-topic: You could always write a JNI shim to a C/C++-compatible API, if you know what OS it's running on.
I know it's awful, but probably not as awful as a hardcoded passphrase.
Re: TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
#70Earlier quoted context omitted.
Each TPM having an unique certificate, you may use that to trace a specific machine to a specific user. Game developers could use that to ban (toxic) players from an online service, for example.
Couldn't they just reset their TPM to change their "identity"? Or use a different computer or VM? Also, I'd be pretty frustrated if I was sharing a PC with someone and they got me banned from a game.
I believe you can't "reset" a TPM, but you can buy a new one (if your CPU does not support fTPM). Or buy a new PC I guess. Both solutions are costly though, depending on how often the cheat is found.