> You'll find that adding a long salt, unique to each password, is a far more effective protector against brute force than "hash speed".
No, I'll find that you've apparently stopped your education at hashing 101 and hashing speed is covered in hashing 102.
1. It's not an either-or situation, all three hashes I mentioned not only specifically include salts in their hashing interface but go as far as mandating a salt for brypt and scrypt (I don't believe PBKDF2 mandates one though it surely is recommended)
2. Salts don't protect much against brute-force attacks, their primary role is to protect against rainbow tables (dictionary attacks) in case the hashed data is leaked. They do add cost to brute-forcing a series of passwords (if salts are unique), but that cost is low compared to
3. Hash speed mitigates brute-forcing from both inside (leaked data) and outside (provide built-in rate-limiting, of course additional rate-limiting is still a good idea). Increasing the raw cost of computing the hash by multiple orders of magnitude and adding data dependencies within the hash (to prevent trivial parallelization) are very much vital against brute-force attacks.
4. You might have wanted to read your own bloody links, the first one specifically mentions hash speed to mitigate brute force attacks, and mentions salts only against rainbow tables; responses to the second one specifically note that salt mitigate rainbow table attacks but do not significantly mitigate brute force attacks especially on weak passwords.